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Abstract
The thesis explores the effects of buyer-supplier networks on asset pricing and merger activity
and lays down the theory of external auditing. The dissertation is composed of three parts.
In the first part we propose a structural model of firm dependence in a vertically connected
network of firms based on cash-flows between the buyers and suppliers. We prove that in a closed
network economy the set of equivalent martingale measures depends only on the topology of the
network. Network market model induces contagion effects. We develop semi-analytical formulas
for corporate debt, credit default swaps and collateralized debt obligations. We test the empirical
validity of the model on the subcontractors’ network of the SwissAir Group. The yield spread
average relative prediction error is 18% comparing to the 89% error of the Merton model.
The second part of the dissertation examines firms’ merger activity and its effect on stock prices
based on the risk mitigation by creating an internal capital market. We propose a solution concept
for coalitional games without superadditivity, which extends the Shapley value, and apply it to the
merger activity of firms in a network. The possibility of a merger increases the equity value of stand-
alone firms. Higher network dependence increases merger activity and merger surplus. Increased
leverage ratio generates an inverted U-shaped curve of merger activity. The merger is rarely of
conglomerate type affirming previous empirical evidence and occurs predominately between either
buyers or suppliers depending on which party dominates the other in number.
The third part of the thesis develops a model of optimal auditing behavior when cash flows to
the firm are observed imperfectly by the outside investors. An external auditor’s report produces
a verifiable signal and reduces the observed cash flow volatility. Using the results in information
theory we develop explicit formulas for firm’s share price under auditing. The shareholders and
debtholders in a firm disagree about the optimal auditing effort which primarily shields debtholders.
Under sufficiently favorable economic conditions we obtain that the first best audit contract is offered
irrespective of the bargaining power and the number of auditors. Finally we develop the auditing
profits and firm values for a multi-unit firm which lays ground for empirical testing.
Keywords: Asset pricing, credit risk, contagion, buyer-supplier networks, network topology, merg-
ers, coalitional games without superadditivity, optimal auditing, auditor’s revenues, entropy.
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Chapter 1
Pricing Credit Risk in Buyer-Supplier
Networks
1.1 Introduction
Generating credit spreads that are close to the observed spreads has been a challenge for the theoret-
ical credit risk literature. Eom, Helwege, and Huang (2004) investigate the performance of several
structural models1. They find that the models of Merton, Geske and Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein
underestimate corporate yield spreads, while the model of Leland and Toft (1996) overestimates
them. Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) overestimate the spreads of risky bonds and underestimate
spreads on safe ones. Recently, Cohen and Frazzini (2007) observed that a long/short equity strat-
egy based on buyer-supplier economic links of dependent firms yields yearly alphas of over 18%.
Additionally, it has been widely reported that historical financial distress and defaults of dependent
firms are highly correlated, c.f. Keenan (2000) and Jarrow and Yu (2001).
Based on these observations, we propose a structural model of firm dependence, which explicitly
accounts for economic links, i.e. firm relationships that are excessively hard to break. The theoret-
ical setting of economic links resembles properties of economic relationship in Grossman and Hart
(1986), Hart and Moore (1990) and has its origins in the network literature; see Jackson (2005).
The model is able to explain the empirical facts in Cohen and Frazzini (2007) and complements the
contagion literature by giving explicit economic motives for firm contagion. We define contagion as
an economic setting in which securities’ prices of non directly related firms depend on the character-
istics of each other. Essential to our model is the fact that the payments made by a buyer to a supplier
firm lower the asset value of the buyer and increases the assets of the supplier by equal amounts.
The importance of such a buyer-supplier dependence for credit risk is supported by the following
examples.
• In January 2002, the retailer K-Mart filed for the Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. At almost
the same time a supplier of K-Mart, the food distributor Fleming Companies Inc. was affected
by the financial distress of K-Mart. Their shares fell by more than five percent in a single day.
Besides Fleming, the retailer Footstar and Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia and Scotts Co.
felt the financial distress due to K-Mart’s bankruptcy.
1The models compared in the article of Eom, Helwege, and Huang (2004) are Merton (1974), Geske (1977), Leland
and Toft (1996), Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) and Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001).
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• Faced with Parmalat’s bankruptcy procedures, the Danish dairy-based company Arla Food
Ingredients with sales of 740 million Euros declared soon after Parmalat’s default that none of
its contracts were watertight.
• Cohen and Frazzini (2007) case study of Coastcast and Callaway Corp. give an example
in which sales losses of the buyer firm (Callaway) affected not only the price of Callaway’s
stocks but in addition induced losses in the supplier firm (Coastcast), thereby influencing its
stock returns.
Since economic links are expensive to break, the reduction in buy orders of one firm is likely to
propagate through the whole economy. This motivates us to introduce the notion of networks, i.e. of
many economically linked firms.
The model is defined in continuous time. At any point in time, there is a fixed number of firms
in the model, some of which are active and others of which have defaulted. The asset process of
a firm in a network evolves as follows. Each active firm issues a buy order at independent random
times to all its suppliers. This action induces monetary transfers between the firms. We consider
monetary transfers based on Gibrat’s law (Gibrat (1931))2 in which the firm transfer to each supplier
is proportional to the supplier’s firm asset value3.
In addition to the buyer-supplier network relationships, the firms also have external sources of
income which are network independent. These external sources are modeled similarly as in Merton
(1974). The relationship between the external income source and the network-based income is an
indicator of the dependence structure of the firm - the higher the cash flow amount generated through
the external sources, the less dependent the firm is.
Firm default is modeled as a hitting time of the asset process to some exogenously determined
boundary. We identify the principal debt value as the default boundary. A default in the network
freezes the asset process of the defaulting firm, and the network henceforth evolves with the re-
maining firms. A firm that has built its relationships with only one buyer is more prone to default,
compared to the firm that has diversified its business activities to multiple buyers. Since every firm
depends on all other firms in a network, default contagion can be global.
We recognize that buyer-supplier relationships are not the only sources of firm dependencies.
Scho¨nbucher (2000) identifies others - direct obligor connections, dependence on the same input
factors (and exposed to same price shocks), or selling to the same markets. We treat the last one to
some extent by including externally generated cash flows dependence.
We prove as a first result that between default times, the firm network model can be well ap-
proximated by a diffusion process in a heavy-traffic network. This is a good approximation for
competitive and low margin industries. We then assume that firms’ assets are tradeable4. Results
2Gibrat’s law states that the expected growth rate of firms is proportional to their sizes. If the proportionality factor is
g, then the expected cash transfer that the firm receives in a time period is g− 1. Gibrat’s law was empirically confirmed
in a series of studies such as Audretsch, Klomp, Santarelli, and Thurik (2002) and Santarelli (1997) for the services
industry and startup Italian firms and rejected in other papers for the manufacturing sector. For an empirical survey
of the validity of Gibrat’s law see the paper by Audretsch, Klomp, Santarelli, and Thurik (2002) and references and
discussion therein.
3The same assumptions for a one or two firm example are made in Hackbarth and Morellec (2005) for capital structure
and in Lambrecht and Perrudin (2003) in the case of real modeling of the firm’s asset size.
4This holds also in an environment, where there are securities, perfectly correlated to the firms’ asset processes. An
extension to the case when only functions of the asset processes, such as stocks or bonds, are traded makes a model more
difficult, but some of the properties of the original network model as described in this article are preserved.
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about market completeness are then proven. Without external income streams, markets are incom-
plete. The topology of the network characterizes the set of all martingale measures - the dimension
of the space is increased for every buyer-supplier chain and for every connected component of the
firm network. Financial markets with external cash flows are generally complete.
Additionally, our model generates default clustering. Default clustering is a phenomenon, when
a default of a major buyer causes an increased probability of suppliers’ default. We compute excess
mean survival times of the suppliers in a variety of networks and give economic insight about the
types of networks where default clustering occurs.
We apply our model to price corporate debt, credit default swaps and collateralized debt obliga-
tions. The network model implies that the firm’s risk structure can be decomposed into two com-
ponents and shows how to couple them. The first component is the business relationships with
immediate firm buyers. The second component is the effects of other firms in the buyer-supplier
chain to which the firm belongs - the model induces contagion effects. The corporate yield spreads
can therefore increase either because of firm’s dependence on a limited number of buyers or because
the contagion effects in the network itself are large even though the firm is diversified. A recent case
of the subprime mortgage crisis is an example of the latter. We show that for normal market condi-
tions an increase of firm network dependence increases the yield spreads of corporate bonds. This
finding is in line with the empirically observed mispricings attributed to buyer-supplier dependencies
in Cohen and Frazzini (2007).
Similar effects are observed for credit default swap prices with a single network firm as the
referenced entity and collateralized debt obligations written on a portfolio of firms in a network. The
CDO tranche yields is sensitive to two effects: the firm network dependency structure and tranche
seniority. In a typical setup, firm dependency increases the CDO tranche yield, but much less than
tranche seniority.
We test the empirical validity of the network model on the case of credit quality evolution of
the subcontractors of the SwissAir Group (SAG). SwissAir, a subsidiary of the SAG, defaulted in
October 2001. We observe that the default of SwissAir was reflected in the bank’s credit ratings
or that the SAG subcontractors diversified their business activities already before SwissAir default.
Fitting the network pricing model to the subcontractors’ bond yield data, we arrive at the mean
relative error of yield spread for the largest 19 subcontractors, each of which had a business volume
relation to SAG in excess of 10% is 18%, compared to the 89% mean relative error of the Merton
model for this specific example.
The model of network evolution most closely related to this article is Schellhorn and Cossin
(2004). They also use graph representation of the network but model firm processes explicitly as
queues in a stationary environment - firms reorganize at distress by external investors injecting addi-
tional cash. Our model explicitly accounts for defaults in a network. Shin (2005) and Eisenberg and
Noe (2001) consider a one period equilibrium model of price formation in a network system popu-
lated by risk-neutral agents. They derive the existence and uniqueness of prices of debt securities,
but the model can be implemented only algorithmically. Our model does not account for firm strate-
gic decisions. For a buyer-supplier chain of only two firms the reader is referred to Tirole (2003, ch.
4).
This chapter complements the contagion literature and tries to bridge the gap between the struc-
tural and reduced form models of firm default. The model identifies the risk sources coming from the
buy-supply orders and at the same time shares contagion properties with the reduced form models
of Jarrow and Yu (2001), Collin-Duffresne, Goldstein, and Helwege (2003) and Collin-Dufresne,
Goldstein, and Hugonnier (2004). These papers consider the coupling of default intensities of two
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dependent firms. The paper by Bielecki, Jeanblanc, and Rutkowski (2005) derives partial differen-
tial equations for dependent firms which are difficult to handle for more than two firms. Giesecke
and Weber (2006) define firm dependence statistically between neighboring nodes on a multidimen-
sional grid. Their model differs from ours in at least two aspects. First, their model is a reduced
form model; no intuition on the asset formation is given. Second, firm interaction is local but can
induce global contagion effects. Our model, on the contrary, can be very general and account for
dependence between arbitrary firms.
This dissertation chapter is structured as follows. The network firm dependence model is given
in Section 1.2. We mark the firm dependence model to the market in Section 1.3. We analyze
network market properties and derive the degree of market incompleteness. The absence of arbitrage
conditions is investigated and pricing measures are characterized. Corporate and portfolio-linked
securities in a network model are priced in Section 1.4. In Section 1.5 we develop the econometric
setup to test the model. We apply it to predict the yield spreads of SwissAir subcontractors. Section
1.6 concludes.
1.2 Firm network dependence
We consider an infinite horizon economy where uncertainty is represented by a filtered probability
space (Ω,F ,F,P). The filtration F := {Ft}t≥0 represents the arrival of information about firms’
buy orders and firms’ defaults. We assume that the filtration F satisfies the usual conditions of right
continuity and completeness with respect to P.
A random network is a random process {G}t≥0 = {(G(t), E(t))}t≥0: For every t ≥ 0, (G(t), E(t))
is a graph with nodes G(t), the firms, and edges E(t), the cash flows between the firms. The number
N of firms is kept constant over time in the whole paper. The set of edges of graph Gt at time t
is described by an adjacency matrix E(t) ∈ RN×N , where Eij(t) ∈ Ft is the number of directed
connections from node i to j at time t. Eij represents the extent of business relations between firms
i and j. The structure of the adjacency matrix defines the topology of the network . Matrices are
denoted by boldface letters and vectors are underlined in the sequel.
1.2.1 Firm asset process and adjacency matrix evolution
The firms’ cash flows at time t is a vector A(t) ∈ RN with Ai(t) the cash flow values to firm i
at time t. The firms undertake the following activities: In a small time interval dt firm k issues
a buy order to all of its suppliers with probability λk dt. These actions are independent between
all firms. Conditionally on a buy order, the amount EkjPjAj is paid to the supplier j where Pj is
a normalization factor. This factor measures the relative strength of business dependencies across
firms and simplifes the analysis of a network market by allowing for integer values Eij . We set
λ = (λ1, λ2, . . . , λN)
′ for the buy order intensities where Pj are proportionality factors.
Besides these network internal cash flows, exogenous cash flows are considered too, i.e. cash
flows which are linked only to a single node in the network. The consideration of exogenous cash
flows gives us the flexibility to model statistically cash flows to an open network and it also enables
us to partition a large network into smaller ones of particular interest. External cash flows can be
either positive or negative. We write Bi for the cash amount of external cash flows to firm i. As an
example, consider firm 1 (node 1) which buys twice the amount of goods from firm 2 than from firm
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3, see Figure 1.1(a). This is modelled by introducing twice as many connections (arrows) between
firms 1 and 2 as between firms 1 and 3. Sources of the firms’ external cash flows have no nodes. Firm
1 buys goods from all firms, while firm 3 is the supplier of goods to both firm 1 and 2. Following a
(a) Complete network. (b) Default of firm two. (c) Payments by firm one. (d) Payments by firm two.
Figure 1.1: A network G of three firms (1, 2, 3) with external sources of cash flows (arrows not emanating from any
node) is presented in 1.1(a). The network of firms after the default of firm two (Figure 1.1(b)). The cash payments by
firm 1 (Figure 1.1(c)) and firm 2 (Figure 1.1(d)).
buy order, the asset values of the supplier firms change. We assume that the nominal amount of the
buy order exactly offsets the good’s value while the supplier earns a strictly net positive flow. There
is no strategic interaction on the firms’ side, nor is there an explicit input-output price modelling in
the economy. We next define the dynamics for the asset/connection process V = (A,E).
Dynamics of the asset process A
We assume that Ai (i = 1, . . . , N) satisfies the dynamics
dAi = Ai
(
N∑
j=1
EijPi dNj +BiPi dNi + ηi dt
)
, (1.1)
whereN = (N1, . . . , NN)′ is a vector of independent Poisson processes with intensities (λ1, . . . , λN)
and ηi is the drift of Ai. The dynamics of all cash flows reads
dA(t) = A(t−) [P (t−)(E(t−) +B(t−)) dN(t) + η dt] , A(0) = A0 (1.2)
where we have denoted byA = diag(A1, . . . , AN),P = diag(P1, . . . , PN) andB = diag(B1, . . . , BN)
the diagonal matrices with elements Ai, Pi and Bi on their diagonals respectively. The existence of
a strong solution to the stochastic differential equation (1.2) follows from Theorem 1.19, Øksendal
and Sulem (2005). Several assumptions are made in (1.2). First, we assume that the cash flows to
the firm upon an issue of a buy order are proportional to its size. This is supported empirically in
Gibrat’s Law (Gibrat (1931)). Second, the exogenous cash flows AiPiBi to firm i arrive at the same
time (and with the same intensity) as the payment streams to i-th suppliers, that is the exogenous
cash flows to firm i and the payments of firm i to i-th suppliers are perfectly correlated.
Given the cash flow dynamics (1.2), the present value Ii of firm’s i assets is given by
Ii(t) = E
Q
t
[∫ ∞
t
e−r(s−t) dAi(s)
]
(1.3)
for a constant discount factor r and for some exogenously defined equivalent martingale measure
Q ∼ P. By the Girsanov theorem for Poisson processes (see Jeanblanc, Yor, and Chesney (2005))
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all equivalent martingale measures changes are given by
dQ
dP
∣∣∣F t = L(t), (1.4)
where L is the exponential martingale defined by dL(t) = L(t−)ϑ(t) dM and ϑi = γiλi − 1 for
some vector γ. As stated in the Proposition 9.5.2 of Jeanblanc, Yor, and Chesney (2005) under the
measure change the process N is a Poisson process with intensity γ. It is a consequence of (1.3) that
the model is arbitrage-free, i.e. the process
e−rtIi(t) +
∫ t
0
e−rs dAi(s)
is a Q-martingale. The present value Ii follows the same dynamics as Ai but with a changed initial
value and Poisson process intensities. This is made rigorous in the next proposition.
Proposition 1.2.1. Let A be given as in (1.2) and assume that
PEγ + η < r · 1. (1.5)
Then the dynamics for Ii follows dIiIi = dAiAi where Ii(0) = KiAi(0) for some Ki > 0. The factor Ki
is given in the Appendix, see equation (1.18). If (1.5) holds then the model is arbitrage free also in
networks with sequential firm defaults.
Since Ii and Ai follow the same dynamics we abuse the notation and write A for the present
value I with the same intensities λ and drift η.
Dynamics of adjacency matrixE
In general, the firms’ dependence structure changes over time. We assume for simplicity through-
out that the network dependency structure is constant, i.e. E(t) = E(0) for all t ≥ 0.
We can explicitly solve (1.2) is we perform a log-normal approximation. We assume that (i)
EijPi > −1 and BiPi > −1 for all i, j and that (ii) EijPi and BiPi are small. Then, we first define
E˜ij =
{
log(1 + EijPi) i 6= j
log(1 +BiPi) i = j
(1.6)
Under the assumption (ii) we can make the approximation
E˜ij ≈
{
EijPi i 6= j
BiPi i = j
= P ·E. (1.7)
It follows at once, that the solution to the asset dynamics (1.1) for firm i is given by
Ai(t) = Ai(0) exp
(
N∑
j=1
E˜ijNj(t) + ηit
)
. (1.8)
Therefore, Ai can be expressed as a Dooleans-Dode exponential (see Revuz and Yor (1991)) of
a weighted sum of independent Poisson processes. This solution show that the conditions (i) are
necessary to enforce positivity of the asset process A.
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We further consider only networks where the buyer of a good is not the supplier of that same
good, i.e. a buyer-supplier chain has no goods transfer cycles. The model is best suited for industries
which engage in product specialization, such as transformation of raw materials, or assembly lines
and can accommodate completely vertically integrated networks or networks where firms depend on
multiple buyers and suppliers. We call such networks buyer-supplier chains.
Definition 1.2.2. A buyer-supplier chain is a network, where there is no sequence of F1, F2, . . . , Fn
such that EFi,Fi+1 6= 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n− 1 and EFn,F1 6= 0.
1
432
retailer
97 865
intermediaries
suppliers
Figure 1.2: A buyer-supplier chain in tree-form. Firm 1 is the
final buyer of goods and firms 5 to 9 are producers (suppliers) of
initial goods. External cash flows to the firms are suppressed.
Figure 1.2 shows a buyer supplier chain with
many buyers and suppliers. The adjacency
matrix of this directed graph is
E
′ =


2 2 2
1 2 1
1 1 2
1 1 1


.
The Proposition 1.2.3 characterizes buyer-supplier chains in terms of their adjacency matrices.
Proposition 1.2.3. A network is a buyer-supplier chain if and only if firms can be permuted in such
a way that the correspondingly permuted adjacency matrixE′ is upper diagonal.
We assume without loss of generality in the sequel that firms in the network are enumerated in the
way that Proposition 1.2.3 holds.
The following proposition, which is a consequence of Theorem 1.1 in Mckay, Oggier, Royle, Sloane,
Wanless, and Wilf (2004) establishes a link between the positive-definiteness of the matrix E˜ and
buyer-supplier chains. It states that the set of positive definite matrices E˜ is in one-to one correspon-
dence with the set of buyer-supplier chains in a network.
Proposition 1.2.4. IfB = 0 then the matrixE is positive definite if and only if G is a buyer-supplier
chain.
Since the matrices E˜ can be viewed as volatility matrices of firms’ asset process values, Propo-
sition 1.2.4 states that they can be positive definite only for networks without cycles.
The asset dynamics so far is driven by Poisson processes. But if the intensity of the network cash
flows between individual firms is sufficiently large, the process Ai in (1.8) can be well approximated
by a multivariate exponential Brownian motion, see Appendix 1.A.1 for precise statements. Intu-
itively, an asset process of a firm with many buy and supply orders occurring at a fast rate resembles
a Brownian motion. This corresponds to the economy with a large number of transactions in each
time interval. We refer to such economies in the sequel. The next Proposition makes the diffusion
approximation to the Poisson process precise.
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Proposition 1.2.5. Let
√
n
(
η + E˜λ
)
n→∞−→ µ and E˜λ1/2 n→∞−→ F (1.9)
for some µ and F . Then Ai converges weakly to
Ai
n→∞−→ Ai(0) exp
(
N∑
j=1
FijWj + µit
)
(1.10)
where (W1, . . . ,WN)′ is a N-dimensional Brownian motion. If furthermore G is a buyer-supplier
chain and if for all i, k
√
nEijλj → 0 (1.11)
then the convergence (1.10) holds also in networks with sequential firm defaults.
Conditions (1.9) are the “heavy-traffic conditions” for the network environment. They state that
the cash-transfer amounts E˜ have to decrease by an order of 1√
n
to compensate for the increase in the
perceived intensity of flow payments
√
nλ. This is consistent with limit theorems for Poisson and
stable processes, see e.g. Davidson (1994). The log-normal firm asset dynamics (1.8) and its limit
(1.10) depend only on the dependency matrix E and not on E’s higher powers.5 Hence, in the log-
normal setting only immediate dependence matters, i.e. the log-normal approximation (1.10) does
not induce contagion. To induce contagion in the approximating model (1.10) we have to consider
either different cash flow dynamics or dynamic firm defaults, i.e. firms default with time and only
the network of remaining firms evolves further.
The last part of Proposition 1.2.5 is satisfied, if for example E = E1f(n) and λ = λ1g(n)
for some fixed matrix E1 and λ1 such that limn→∞ f(n)g(n) = 0. The condition is important in
a network model with sequential firm defaults, see Figure 1.1(b). If a firm defaults, the network
topology changes. Condition (1.11) then guarantees that the convergence formula (1.10) is valid
also in a smaller network with some defaulted firms. Conditions (1.11) state that for every firm i the
total amount of buy orders from every business relationship j (EjiPi) decreases while their intensity
λj increases.
1.3 Financial network market model
To analyze market completeness properties of the network model in the last section, we mark the
network to the market. We assume that the firms’ asset process A is tradeable and introducing a
riskless money market account B(t) = B(0)ert with interest rate r. We refer to this construction as
the network market model. We first specify the market prices of risk in this model.
Proposition 1.3.1. Let the equivalent martingale measure Q ∼ P be given as in (1.4). Then the drift
δ process of A is given by
δ = PEγ + η. (1.12)
5En describes the dependence of a buyer on the supplier’s supplier etc., i.e. there exists a network path of length n
between the two depending firms.
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The vector γ represents the market price of buy risks in a network model. The value γi is the
elasticity of securities prices with respect to the buyers’ i buy orders. The system (1.12) implies
that the elasticity γi depends on all buy-supply business relationships in the network, i.e. if the firm
A has a relationship with firm B then γA depends also on the business relationships strength EBk
of firm B with other firms k. Hence, the market price of buy-risk of any one firm in a network is
determined globally; that is, the model shows contagion effects6.
Due to the change in the volatility structure of the assets after a firm default, structural mod-
els with sequential firm defaults can induce arbitrage or market incompleteness. Proposition 1.3.1
identifies conditions in which such market characteristics are not possible. The condition on Bi in
Proposition 1.3.1 means that the external cash flows to every firm are non-zero (and negative) - we as-
sume that the majority of firms’ cash flows is generated by the network. This translates naturally into
the condition for dynamic market completeness. A default reduces the number of firms/securities in
the network and, by the correlation condition, also reduces the uncertainty associated with the buy
orders. Hence, markets remain complete. We also assume that the growth rates or all firms are larger
than the riskless rate, a standard assumption.
We consider the relationship between the degree of network market incompleteness, i.e. the rank
of E˜ and the firm network topology. We always assume in the sequel that the network market model
is free of arbitrage, i.e. conditions of Proposition 1.3.1 are satisfied.
Proposition 1.3.2. Let B = 0 and the market be free of arbitrage, i.e. condition (1.5) holds. If the
network G is composed of R connected components and pi is the maximum number of disjoint paths
ordered by their maximum size in component 1 ≤ i ≤ R of G, then the dimension of the space of
equivalent martingale measures to a selected Q of a network market model is ∑Ri=1 pi. Moreover
the Jordan cages of the Jordan canonical form of E corresponds to the paths in G.
In a network with no external cash flows, i.e. Bi = 0 for all firms, the degree of network market
incompleteness increases with every disjoint buyer-supplier chain in the network. Therefore there
exists a correspondence between the buyer-supplier chains and the degree of market incompleteness.
Since every buyer-supplier network contains at least one path, the network market model without ex-
ternal cash flows is always incomplete. Moreover, the dimension of network market incompleteness
at least equals the number of firms in the network without outgoing cash flows. The argument is as
follows. Consider a firm F which is not a supplier to any other firm. Hence firm F is redundant
in the network economy and adds one dimension of economic uncertainty (the buy orders) to the
market, thereby increasing the dimension of market incompleteness by one. Since connected com-
ponents are pairwise independent, the set of martingale measures can be defined for each component
separately. This is proven in Lemma 1.A.2 of the Appendix. Hence, without loss of generality we
restrict the analysis to connected networks. Finally, the network models (1.2) and (1.10), for the case
B = 0, generate the same set of equivalent martingale measures.
We claim that our model allows for default clustering, see Scho¨nbucher (2000) for empirical
evidence. To show this, we consider an example. First we use the average excess supplier survival
time (MEST) after the buyer has defaulted in a single buyer - single supplier network as a measure
of default clustering. Second, we set τ1 (τ2) for the default time of the buyer (supplier). The mean
excess survival time reads E(τ2 − τ1|τ2 ≥ τ1). Computation of the mean excess survival time in
a firm network model is similar to the pricing of path-dependent options: The default outcome of
6As already stated in the introduction we define contagion as an economic setting in which securities’ prices of non
directly related firms depend on the characteristics of each other.
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any firm in a network depends on the entire asset path of all other firms. The results in Table 1.1
rely extensively on numerical computations; the theory is provided by He, Keirstead, and Rebholz
(1998). The details are found in the Appendix. Table 1.1 shows the mean excess survival time of the
supplier for different values of the network dependence parameter E12 and external cash flow levels.
Columns two and three, Table 1.1, shows that in general the mean excess survival time decreases
E12 MEST,B low MEST,B high
10 0.31 0.091
15 0.29 0.087
20 0.26 0.083
25 0.23 0.077
30 0.21 0.072
35 0.19 0.067
40 0.16 0.062
Table 1.1: Mean excess survival time (MEST) for the supplier in a network of two firms for different levels of the
network dependency parameter E12 and the level of external cash flows B. All other model parameters are as in Table
1.3 reduced to the first two firms. The volatility of external cash flows in Bhigh is Bhigh11 = B
high
22 = −50. Cash flow drift
of both firms is 0.02. The first parameter choice (MEST, B low) corresponds to a regime of normal external cash flow
volatility, approximately ranging from 5% to 20%. The second parameter choice (MEST, B high) corresponds to the
highly volatile external cash flow scenario 20%− 35%.
with higher buyer-supplier dependence. Low external cash flows imply higher mean excess default
times while higher cash flow volatilities of external cash flows imply low excess survival time. This
indicates default clustering - the higher the network dependence between the buyer and the supplier,
the lower is the mean survival time of a supplier firm after the buyer firm has defaulted. Furthermore
the MEST for high external cash flow dependence (column 3) are smaller than for low levels of B
(column 2) indicating that large negative external cash flows reduce firm survival probabilities.
The extent of default clustering, i.e. the decrease of mean excess survival time of the supplier,
is determined by a superposition of several effects. The first effect is the loss of revenues after
a buyer’s default. This reduces the drift of the firm’s asset process which in turn lowers the mean
excess survival time. Second, a buyer-supplier relationship virtually increases the drift of the supplier
and has in general a positive effect on the supplier’s asset distribution at the time of buyer’s default.
Third, there are asset volatility effects. While a highly dependent network can have a positive effect
on the supplier’s drift, it can have a negative effect in terms of increased asset volatility.
1.4 Pricing of securities in a network model
We apply the theory to price derivative securities in network markets. The prices depend on the net-
work topology, i.e. the dependence which is induced by the buy and supply orders. This dependence
is an additional source of risk in derivatives pricing. This source enters the pricing of all securities
which we consider: zero coupon corporate debt, credit default swaps (CDS) and collateralized debt
obligations (CDO) written on a portfolio of firms in a network. Without loss of generality, we con-
sider connected networks only, see Proposition 1.3.2 and Appendix 1.A.3. To highlight the impact
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of the network dependence strength on prices, we use the Frobenious norm7 of the adjacency ma-
trix E called the dependence value. Intuitively, the stronger the network dependence, the larger the
components Eij and the higher are the Frobenious norm values. We always assume that firms can
default only at maturity of their contracts. We first prove two general results which are independent
of the specific securities under consideration. The first one shows that firm dependence has a global
effect on securities’ prices.
Proposition 1.4.1. For every firm a with a direct path to a firm b in a network G, the prices of firm
b’s securities (such as debt values, credit default swap ratios) depend on the characteristics of firm
a. More precisely
Vb = Vb(ηb, Bb, {Ba, ηa, Eak}a)
where Vb is the value of any of firm’s b securities.
Hence the value of firm’s securities depend on all firms to which there exists a buy-supply path
and not only to the immediate buyer firms. This fact is strong evidence for firm contagion which
was modelled and documented in Shin (2005). The second result states that the lower suppliers are
in the buyer-supplier chain, the higher is the price of buy order risk. This is the amplification result.
Proposition 1.4.2. If δi−ηi
PiBi
≥ δi+1−ηi+1
Pi+1Bi+1
> 0 for all i = 1, . . . , N − 1, Bi+1 ≤ Bi < 0 and Ei+1,j ≥
Eij ≥ 0 for all i, j = 1, . . . , N , then the market prices of buy risks (equation (1.12) in Proposition
1.3.1) satisfy: γi ≥ γi+1.
The assumption that Bi+1 ≤ Bi < 0 is justified if we assume that firms higher in the buy-supply
chain have smaller external cash flows (Bi+1 ≤ Bi) and rely more on network generated ones. The
restriction Eij ≤ Ei+1,j (j > i + 1) reflects the essential fact of the buy-supply chain that more
products are sold between close successors (i + 1 and j) in the chain than between distant ones (i
and j). Under these conditions the market prices of risk of firm cash-flows are larger for firms higher
in the chain than for those lower, which is another evidence for contagion in the network model -
a shock to a high level supplier has a larger effect on prices for all securities connected with that
supplier. Proposition 1.4.2 also identifies firms which pose a high systemic risk for the economy.
It is an easy consequence of the proof of Proposition 1.4.2 that the differences γi − γi+1 are more
pronounced the higher the network dependence Ei,i+1 is between them.
The network model proposed in this chapter fits in a broad class of reduced form models. If
the asset process Ai is given as in (1.1) and the default event be τi = inf{t;Ai(t) ≤ γi} then the
stopping time τi is totally inaccessible and the default time of firm i has the time-varying intensity
µi(t) = λi · 1
(
γi ≤ Ai(t) < γi
1 +Bi
)
· 1(Bi < 0)
+
N∑
j 6=i
λj · 1
(
γi ≤ Ai(t) < γi
1 + Eij
)
· 1(Eij < 0) · 1(τj > t) (1.13)
producing a recursive structure of defaults. Using the results in Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and
Hugonnier (2004) we can reduce the pricing in the network model with intermediate defaults to the
7Frobenious norm ‖E‖F of matrix E is the square root of the sum of squared elements of E, i.e. ‖E‖F =√∑
i,j E
2
ij .
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computation of occupancy times of a sum of Poisson processes. We illustrate this on an example of
two firm network whose default intensities then read
µ1(t) = λ1 · 1(γ1 ≤ A1 < δ11) + λ2 · 1(γ1 ≤ A1 < δ12) · 1(τ2 > t)
µ2(t) = λ1 · 1(γ2 ≤ A2 < δ21) · 1(τ1 > t) + λ2 · 1(γ2 ≤ A2 < δ22)
where we have denoted by
δij =
{
γj
1+Eij
i 6= j
γi
1+Bi
i = j
.
Using the results in Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Hugonnier (2004) we can write the default
probability of firm 1 by using the change of measure given in equation (4.9) in Collin-Dufresne,
Goldstein, and Hugonnier (2004)
P(τ1 > T |Ft) = 1(τ1 > t) · E1
[
exp
(
−
∫ T
t
µ1(s) ds
)
|F1t
]
= 1(τ1 > t) ·
{
1(τ2 < t) · E
[
exp
(
−λ1
∫ T
t
1(−γ1,δ11](A1(s)) ds
)
|Ft
]
+1(τ2 > t) · E1
[
exp
(
−
∫ T
t
(λ11(−γ1,δ11](A1(s))
+λ21(−γ1,δ12](A1(s)) · 1(τ2 > s)) ds
) |F1t ]}
where under E1 the intensity of τ2 equals
λ1 · 1(γ2 ≤ A2 < δ21) + λ2 · 1(γ2 ≤ A2 < δ22).
The network model therefore requires the computation of the Laplace transform of the occupation
time of Poisson processes.
1.4.1 Pricing of corporate debt
The next result is the analogue of the classical result of Merton (1974) for corporate debt pricing in
a complete network market model.
Proposition 1.4.3. Let Nλ1,...,λNa1,...aN ,T be the distribution of a random variable a1N1 + . . . + aNNN
where Ni are independent Poisson random variables with parameters λ1T, . . . , λNT respectively.
The price of a zero-coupon corporate bond of firm i in a network, with principal value Di and
maturity Ti, where all other firms are financed with securities with maturities longer than Ti is given
by
DVi = Die
−rTi
(
1−Nλ1,λ2,...,λN
E˜i1,E˜i2,...,E˜iN
(d)
)
+
Ai(0)e
(
PN
j=1 EijPiλj−r)TiN (1+Ei1Pi)λ1,(1+Ei2Pi)λ2,...,(1+EiNPi)λN
E˜i1,E˜i2,...,E˜i,N
(d) (1.14)
where
d = log
Di
Ai(0)
− ηiTi (1.15)
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The firm i bond’s hedging portfolio consists of holding
U ′(APE)−1 (1.16)
of assets of every firm in the network where U = (U1, . . . , UN )′ and
Uk = DVi(t, Ai(1 + EikPi))−DVi(t, Ai).
To the best of authors’ knowledge there does not exist an explicit expression for the distribution
Nλ1,...,λNa1,...,aN ,T . Instead we rely on the numerical inversion of the characteristic function of a weighted
sum of independent Poisson distributed random variables, i.e. the probabilities Nλ1,...,λNEi1,...,EiN ,T are
computed numerically by Fourier inversion. Equation (1.15) show explicitly the different sources
of risk. First, there is risk associated with the exposure to every direct relationship Eij weighted by
the extent of relationship Pi. Second, there is a risk from the external cash flows Bi. Finally, there
is risk associated to the global network dependencies λj which measure the exposure of the firm j
to the global network economy. If the λi are small the risk to the firm’s bond arises primarily from
direct buyer-supplier relationships Eij , Bi. But if the λi are large, this induces large effects on debt
prices even if the immediate business relationships Eij and Bi are all small.
If we do not account for a network firm dependence structure, i.e. all Eij = 0 in (1.14) and also
if Bi = 0, we get the result that debt is riskless: The firms have perfectly diversified their business
activities.
An interesting property of the pricing model is that the drift η of the asset process A matters
in the determination of debt prices. This observation is missing in the standard Brownian markets
where the drift of the security affects the market price of risks but not the securities’ prices. The
reason for this difference is due to the Poisson-jumps. Since high growth firms, i.e. firms with high
η in equation (1.2), undergo jumps in their values which are also large, their value process becomes
more volatile. This then leads to higher risk premia for the corresponding buy orders.
Furthermore, as already noted in Propositions 1.4.1 and 1.4.2, the model generates contagion
in the following sense. Since the market prices of buy-risks γi are determined endogenously by
equation (1.12), the price of debt of firm i depends not only on its immediate buyers but also on the
buyers’ buyers, etc., i.e. the whole supply chain matters. More evidence on contagion is given by
the hedging results (1.16). The hedging of a bond on any firm in the network, viewed as a derivative
on that firm’s value, is constructed by taking positions in all other firms’ values in the original firm’s
buy-supply chain.
Theses results differ from those of related models in the contagion literature. Our model explic-
itly identifies the sources of risk from the network dependence contrary to the reduced form models,
such as Jarrow and Yu (2001) and Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Hugonnier (2004). In the latter
models, authors impose the dependence of default intensities between the firms, but do not identify
the risk sources.
We illustrate the relationship between overall network dependence and corporate debt prices in
Figure 1.3 for the case of three firms. The model parameters are given in Table 1.3, Appendix 1.B.
Under normal market conditions the network dependence increases corporate yield spreads of all
three firms in the economy, see Figure 1.3. This confirms the empirical observation that Merton’s
model generally underestimates corporate yield spreads. It also shows that the yields of low level
supplier’s (firm 1) securities exhibit a much greater network dependence than the intermediary’s
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Figure 1.3: Zero-coupon debt yields in two distinct three-firm networks. The parameters are given in Table 1.3. On
the horizontal axis is the network dependency value (Frobenius norm, see the beginning of Section 1.4). The volatility
ranges between 0.1 and 0.2 for all firms in the network. Since B is diagonal, the only dependence between the firms
arises from the network.
(firm 2) or retailer’s (firm 3) securities. This effect has several sources. First, firm 1 has a stronger
network dependency than the other firms. Second, there is the contagion effect which manifests itself
in a higher yield slope form for firm 1 than for all other firms. We further observe that variations
of the exogenous cash flow matrix B scales the excess debt yield curves of all three firms in either
direction but the shape of the curves remains the same. Finally, the term structure of yield spreads
in Figure 1.3 is increasing for all three firms. The highest yields arise for the firm 1 which is most
exposed to the network firm and firm 3 faces the lowest yields.
Our model helps also to explain empirical facts observed in Cohen and Frazzini (2007) that there
exists a positive abnormal return on stocks of mutually dependent firms. If we apply our approach
to stocks of firms in the network using the same parameters as in Table 1.3, between 2% to 16% of
stock return is attributed to firm network dependencies. Our model therefore offers guidance on the
“pricing of economic links” between firms.
We conclude this section by proving that our model generalizes Merton’s result to Poisson-type
networks: As the buy-supply orders become more and more frequent (in the sense of convergence
theorem in Section 1.2) we obtain the Merton’s formula.
Proposition 1.4.4. Under the conditions (1.9), the debt pricing formula (1.14)-(1.15) of Proposition
1.4.3 converges to the debt pricing formula of the Merton (1974) model with the following volatility
σ2i = Bi
√
λi +
N∑
j=i+1
Eij
√
λj. (1.17)
The result follows directly from the definition of weak convergence property in Proposition 1.2.5,
equation (1.9). The network model directly relates the volatility of the firms’ assets to firms’ buy-
supply dependence. Variance σ2i exhibits a “square-root rule”, i.e. the variance depends on the
square root of the order transaction velocities λi.
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1.4.2 Pricing of credit default swaps (CDS) and collateralized debt obliga-
tions (CDO)
Credit default swaps written on a reference identity in a given network are contracts between a pro-
tection buyer and a protection seller, where the protection buyer obliges himself to pay a constant
amount D at times {ti}i=1,...,T to the protection seller until the default of the referenced entity. The
protection seller obliges himself to pay an amount U in the event of default. Without loss of gener-
ality we assume that the payments U and D are constant. The dynamics of the network firm is given
in Proposition 1.3.1. We also assume that the network satisfies the conditions of Propositions 1.3.1
and 1.2.5, which insures that the network market model with sequential firm defaults is complete
and free of arbitrage. The pricing formulas for a CDS are given next.
Proposition 1.4.5. Let σi be defined in (1.17). We define αi = r − 12σ2i , ϑi =
√
α2i + 2σ
2
i r and
xi = log(Ai(0)/Di). Then the ratio U/D is given by
U
D
=
repayment at default given default︷ ︸︸ ︷
exp
(
−xi(αi + ϑi)
σ2i
)
N
(−xi + ϑiT
σi
√
T
)
+ exp
(
−xi(αi − ϑi)
σ2i
)
N
(−xi − ϑiT
σi
√
T
)
T∑
j=1
e−rtj
[
N
(
xi + αitj
σi
√
tj
)
− exp
(
−2αixi
σ2i
)
N
(−xi + αitj
σi
√
tj
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
discounted probability of default
.
To illustrate the result we consider the same three-firm example of the last section. The depen-
dence of the protection seller/buyer ratio U/D on the network dependency level and CDS duration
is shown in Figure 1.4. We observe as a function of the network dependence the following behavior
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Figure 1.4: The relationship between a CDS U/D ratio and the network dependency value (defined in the introduction
to Section 1.4, left figure) and the maturity of a CDS (right). The network parameters of the CDS are given in Table
1.3. For the chosen parameter values, the volatility ranges between 0.1 and 0.2 for all firms in the network. Since B is
diagonal, the only dependence between the firms arises from the network.
of the U/D ratio: (a) The U/D ratio for the low-level supplier firm 1 is much higher than for the
intermediary firm 2 or retailer firm 3. (b) The U/D ratio increases faster for firm 1 than firm 2. (c)
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U/D ratio for firm 3 is almost zero. The first fact follows from the highest network dependence of
firm 1 compared to the firm 2 or 3, i.e. the intermediary and the retailer firm are more diversified in
their business activities. The second fact is a consequence of the contagion effect. Firm 1’s risk is
amplified by firm 2, as discussed in Proposition 1.4.2. The third fact is a consequence of the high
diversification of firm 3. The term structure of CDS payments exhibits much the same effects as the
network dependency structure with the absence of the characteristics of stylized fact (b) above - the
network dependency structure of the network is kept constant.
CDOs are securities, where the payment to individual tranches is influenced by a network of
firms. Hence, network dependence seems naturally suitable for the pricing of this kind of securities8.
The CDOs under consideration are composed of K tranches, each tranche with principal value Fk,
k = 1, . . . , K. Let (Di)Ni=1 be the individual bonds’ principal payments of equal maturity T and
D =
∑N
i=1Di =
∑K
k=1 Fk the total principal payment to the bondholders. Let Ck =
∑k−1
j=1 Fj .
The K tranches of the CDO are structured as follows. The first tranche absorbs all credit loses
until the value of the remaining principal payments reaches CK−1. Similarly, the i-th tranche (i =
1, . . . , K−2) absorbs all credit losses until the total of Ci−1. The K-th tranche recovers what is left.
We refer to Hull and White (2005) for typical values of K and (Fi)Ki=1.
Proposition 1.4.6. Given the CDO structure above, the value Vk of the k-th tranche is
Vk ≈ e−rTFkN(d1k+1)− Cke−rT (N(d1k)−N(d1k+1)) + e−rT+mSN+
1
2
σ2
SN
(
N(d2k)−N(d2k+1)
)
= e−rT (Ck+1N(d1k+1)− CkN(d1k))︸ ︷︷ ︸
tranche k repayment value
+ e
−rT+mSN+ 12σ2SN
(
N(d2k)−N(d2k+1)
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
correction term
dk1 and dk2 are defined as
dk1 =
mSN − logCk
σSN
, dk2 =
mSN + σ
2
SN
− logCk
σSN
with σi defined as in (1.17)
mSN = −
1
2
σ2SN + log
(
N∑
i=1
exp
(
mi +
1
2
σ2i
))
,
σ2SN = log

1 +
∑N
i=1(e
σ2i − 1)e2mi+σ2i + 2∑N−1i=1 ∑Nj=i+1 emi+ 12σ2i emj+ 12σ2j (eρijσiσj − 1)(∑N
i=1 e
mi+
1
2
σ2i
)2

 ,
mi = log(Ai(0)) +
(
r − 1
2
N∑
j=1
Fij
)
T, ρij =
∑N
k=1 FikFjk
σiσj
To justify the approximation results made in Proposition 1.4.6 we simulated one hundred thou-
sand samples of sums of log-normal random variables for realistic network parameter values. The
average p-value of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic is around 0.4. This is a relatively high number
for distributions that are not the same, but whose distribution functions are close.
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Figure 1.5: The relationship between the CDO tranche yield, the network dependency value (defined in the introduction
to Section 1.4, figure left) and term structure of the CDO (right figure). The firm network parameters are given in Table
1.3. All three tranches have the same principal. For the chosen parameter values, the volatility ranges between 0.1 and
0.2 for all firms in the network. SinceB is diagonal, the only dependence between the firms arises from the network.
Figure 1.5 shows the relationship between the CDO tranche yields and the network dependency
value. Tranche prices in Figure 1.5 exhibit similar behavior as the corresponding corporate debt
prices and CDS U/D ratios in Figures 1.3 and 1.4. Tranche yields increase with increased degree of
firm network dependencies. Tranches’ risk sharing effect decreases the value of the junior tranche 3
much more (and with greater intensity) than the senior tranches 1 and 2.
1.5 Empirical Analysis of the SwissAir Case
SwissAir, a subsidiary of SwissAir Group (SAirG), defaulted in October 2001. A threat of default
of such a large contractor was the contagion effect on the network of SAirG suppliers. We apply
the network pricing model to the analysis of loan yields of SAirG suppliers. Our sample contains
a total of 56 SAirG suppliers. The set of suppliers consists of small and medium size enterprises
in the canton of Zu¨rich as well as some large, internationally active firms. All suppliers were also
counterparties of a Swiss bank. Hence, it was a priori not clear to the bank whether the SwissAir
Airlines default would contage the bank’s counterparties. The SAirG network with all its subsidiaries
and supplier firms considered is depicted in Figure 1.6. SAirG consists of four subsidiaries, SwissAir
Airlines, SwissAir Services, SwissAir Relations and SwissAir Logistics, with SwissAir being a part
of SwissAir Airlines. We treat all the subsidiaries as one firm in a network. The credit quality data
provided by the bank includes the relationship of every supplier to the particular SAirG subsidiary.
We assume that there are no business relationship between SAirG suppliers. The network is therefore
star shaped with SAirG as its center.
We answer the following two questions. Do the bank’s credit ratings of SAirG suppliers provide
an indication for the potential default of SwissAir or did the suppliers itself anticipate it? How
well does the network pricing model predict the credit ratings of SAirG suppliers after the SwissAir
default?
8Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Hugonnier (2004) shows possible mispricing of the CDO tranche yields if firm-firm
dependence is not considered.
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SAirG
SAirL SAirS
SAirISAirR
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1
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56
Figure 1.6: The network of SwissAir Group. SAirG represents the SwissAir Group, SAirL stands for SwissAir Airlines,
SAirS for SwissAir Services, SAirR for SwissAir Relations and SAirI for SwissAir Logistics. The SAir denotes the
SwissAir. The subsidiaries of SwissAir Group are shown in circles and the suppliers in rectangles. The suppliers of each
subsidiary are denoted by numbers from 1 to 56. The grayed path indicates the contagion possibility from SAir to the
supplier of another SAirG daughter company.
To answer the first question we denote by Yi,t the rating9 in numerical terms (from 1 to 8) of firm
i (i = 1, . . . , i = 56) at time t, t = t0, . . . , t1, where t0 = D − 5, t1 = D + 5 and D denotes the
default time of SwissAir (October 2001). The data provided are semi-annual. The measure for bank
default anticipation we propose is A = 1
i
∑i
i=1Ai, where
Ai =
∑t1
t=t0
(Yi,t − Yi,t−1)2(∑t1
t=t0
(Yi,t − Yi,t−1)
)2 =
∑t1
t=t0
(Yi,t − Yi,t−1)2
(Yi,t − Yi,0)2
measures the bank’s anticipation of the credit rating degradation of supplier i. The intuition for
this measure is that for positive xi (i = 1, . . . , N) we have the inequality
∑N
i=1 x
2
i ≤
(∑N
i=1 xi
)2
with equality when all but one xi are zero. Setting xi,t = Yi,t − Yi,t−1, we have that Ai ≈ 1
when all but one credit rating migrations are close to zero. This corresponds to a sudden drop in
credit quality of firm i. Conversely if many xit are nonzero, then Ai ≈ 0, and the bank is likely
to anticipate the degrading credit quality of the supplier i. The numerical value obtained for A
from the data is AB = 0.66. A Monte-Carlo simulation based on transitional S&P probabilities
for the period 1981-1996, with the same proportion of firms corresponding to rating categories as
in the SAirG sample, gives a value of AP = 0.72 with variance 0.003. Since the banks’s default
anticipation value AB is significantly lower than the statistically obtained AP , we conclude that in
the time leading towards SwissAir default a combination of the following events has occured: (a)
The bank correctly gradually anticipated credit quality decrease of SAirG suppliers and (b) The
SAirG suppliers themselves anticipated SwissAir default and diversified their business activities
accordingly.
9The rating classes can be mapped into rating classes of standard credit quality assessment agencies, such as S&P
and Moody’s.
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We consider next the empirical validity of the network rating model. We select in our primary
sample those suppliers whose total business volume with SAirG was larger than 10%. The average
business volume percentage over the entire sample is 33%. The credit history of each supplier exists
for the last 5 years before the default and semi-annually for 4 years after the default of SwissAir.
We assume that the credits were 3 year contracts, which corresponds to the average credit duration
of bank’s loans. Along with the credit quality of the suppliers, their leverage ratio, relative size in
terms of SAirG, and the extent of business volume was provided. The amount of business volume
proxies for the relative strength of business dependence between firms, i.e. the matrix E and the
average intensity of buy orders proxies for λ. We assume that the payments are on a monthly basis,
i.e. λ = 12 · 1 and that the external cash flows of suppliers are as in the Merton model - the matrix
B is diagonal, reflecting the market completeness assumption in Proposition 1.3.1. Additionally, we
assume that there is no supplier-suppliers dependence. The only network dependency exists between
the supplier and the SwissAir Group. Hence, the network is star shaped and the network dependency
matrixE is of rank 1.
Since the pre-default leverage and business volume data are not available, we proceed as follows.
We first estimate the level of external cash flows not related to SAirG for each supplier. For that
purpose we use post-default data and estimate the volatility of external cash flows by equations
(1.14)-(1.17) using the nonlinear regression method of Griliches and Intiligator (1983). We then
add the network component to the model, see equation (1.17), thereby obtaining the volatility of
cash flows by the suppliers before the SwissAir default, when SwissAir still constitued an amount
of business volume by each supplier. Using again equation (1.14), we obtain the predicted yield of
corporate debt.
Let yit be the corporate debt yield of firm i at time t and let d(Lti, U ti , Bi) be the computed yield
from equation (1.17) with F given in (1.9) when the i-th firm’s leverage at time t equals Lti, loan
duration is U ti and Bi is the extent of external cash flows to the firm. The estimating equation then
reads
yit = d(L
t
i, U
t
i , Bi) + ε
i
t
where the error terms εit satisfies the same assumption as in Griliches and Intiligator (1983). The
results are presented in Table 1.2. The second column presents the true debt yield of the supplier
as provided by the bank for each of the 19 supplier firms with business volume exceeding10 the
10% level. The third and fourth columns give the predicted corporate yield as computed from the
network pricing and the Merton’s model. The fifth and sixth columns show the relative yield error
of the individual supplier for both models. The average relative yield error of the network model
is 18% compared to the 89% average relative predicition error of the Merton model. Moreover, the
Merton model underestimates corporate debt yield spreads in 13 out of 19 cases. This confirms the
empirical results in Eom, Helwege, and Huang (2004).
The analysis of SAirG suppliers suggests that firms should not be considered in isolation con-
trary to standard models, such as KMV, CreditPlus and CreditMetrics. In the presence of a large
contractor, an additional yield premium should be added even though the cash flows may not appear
volatile. The additional yield premium is interpreted as a “buyer contagion default premium”.
10This restriction is imposed in order to satisfy the normal market conditions, i.e. the network component dominates
the external cash flow component, see Proposition 1.3.1.
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Firm # Bank yield Model yield Merton y. RE (Model) RE (Merton)
1 3.54% 4.04% 3.38% 13.99% 4.65%
2 3.81% 3.56% 18.96% 6.45% 397.59%
3 3.57% 2.18% 15.81% 38.95% 342.93%
4 3.54% 2.13% 2.49% 39.82% 29.71%
5 3.81% 3.81% 4.25% 0.06% 11.50%
6 3.54% 2.39% 2.62% 32.62% 25.97%
7 3.54% 2.57% 11.39% 27.32% 221.77%
8 3.54% 2.73% 2.80% 22.83% 20.94%
9 3.54% 2.80% 6.07% 20.85% 71.38%
10 3.54% 4.48% 3.86% 26.55% 9.10%
11 3.81% 3.47% 3.94% 8.88% 3.52%
12 3.81% 2.45% 2.58% 35.63% 32.30%
13 3.57% 3.40% 7.82% 4.78% 119.09%
14 3.81% 3.87% 5.30% 1.69% 39.12%
15 3.54% 3.41% 2.14% 3.79% 39.47%
16 3.81% 3.49% 5.85% 8.38% 53.49%
17 3.54% 2.13% 9.68% 39.83% 173.51%
Table 1.2: The consequitive columns represent: the firm number, bank (true) corporate yield, yield as predicted by the
network model, yield predicted by the Merton (1974) model and the relative errors for both the network and the Merton
model. In the sample are 19 firms with total business relationship percentage to SAirG exceeding 10%. The relative
prediction error of both models is computed as |Bank yield−Model yieldBank yield |.
1.6 Conclusions
This dissertation chapter lays out a theory of securities pricing in the presence of buyer-supplier
networks, emphasizing the effect on the structure of financial markets. We show that the network
model has the potential to reconcile over- and underestimation issues of structural models reported
in empirical literature by inducing a network dependence of firms to their buyers and suppliers.
The degree of network market incompleteness is determined only by the topology of the network.
More precisely, the dimension of the space of equivalent martingale measures increases with every
buyer-supplier chain. When the buy orders occur rapidly we obtain a limit to the classical Brownain
financial market model.
We identify the risk structure of corporate securities by connecting them to market prices of buy-
orders. Corporate debt yield spreads can increase due to two manifestly different reasons: either
by exposure to direct business relationships of the firm to its buyers or by increase in market prices
of buy orders which are determined globally - the model induces contagion effects and ties the
systemic risk of the economy to the prices of individual securities. We prove that the prices of firm’s
obligations depend not only on its immediate buyers but on the whole buy-supply chain.
In a typical situation the model predicts an increase in corporate and portfolio excess yields with
increasing network dependency of firms and a higher slope of excess yield curve (with respect to
network dependency) for firms lower in the buyer-supplier chains.
The model is empirically tested on the network of subcontractors of the SwissAir Group. The
default of SwissAir had the potential to induce a contagion effect in its subcontractors network. We
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show that the subcontractors diversified their business activities and anticipated the financial distress
of SwissAir. The network model has an average 18% yield spread relative prediction error compared
to an 89% error for the Merton model.
The network model sheds light on the asset risk structure of vertically connected firms and can
be further improved by considering endogenous network formation.
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1.A Appendix
1.A.1 Proofs of Section 1.2
Proof. (of Proposition 1.2.1.) The result follows by simple computation
Ii(t) = E
Q
t
(∫ ∞
t
e−r(s−t)Ai(s)
(
N∑
j=1
EijPi dNj(s) +BiPi dNi(s) + ηi ds
))
=
∫ ∞
t
e−r(s−t)EQt
[
Ai(s)E
Q
s
(
N∑
j=1
EijPi dNj(s) +BiPi dNi(s) + ηi ds
)]
=
∫ ∞
t
e−r(s−t)EQt
[
Ai(s)
(
N∑
j=1
EijPiγj ds +BiPiγi ds + ηi ds
)]
=
∫ ∞
t
e−r(s−t)Ai(t) exp
(
N∑
j=1
(EijPiγj(s− t) +BiPiγi(s− t) + ηi(s− t)
)
[
N∑
j=1
EijPiγj +BiPiγi + ηi
]
ds
=
∑N
j=1EijPiγj +BiPiγi + ηi
r −
(∑N
j=1EijPiγj +BiPiγi + ηi
)Ai.
This proves that dIi
Ii
= dAi
Ai
and
Ii(0) = Ai(0)
∑N
j=1EijPiγj +BiPiγi + ηi
r −
(∑N
j=1EijPiγj +BiPiγi + ηi
) = Ai(0)Ki. (1.18)
Proof. (of Proposition 1.2.5) Let M(t) = N(t)−λt be the compensated martingale associated with
N . We set Y = log(A) and compute
Y (t) = Y (0) + ηt+ E˜M(t) + E˜λt
= Y (0) + ηt+ E˜λ1/2λ−1/2M(t) + E˜λt
Donsker’s theorem gives us that the process Sn(t) = 1√nλ
−1/2M(nt) converges in distribution (as
n→∞) as a process to the N dimensional Brownian motionW . By assumptions of the Proposition
and the continuous mapping theorem we get the desired result.
It remains to prove the last part of the Proposition. Before the default of firm i we have (by the
first condition (1.9)) to hold
µi = lim
n→∞
√
n
(
ηni +
N∑
j=1
E˜nijλ
n
j
)
.
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After the default of some firm j 6= i the same condition has to hold but in a smaller network, i.e.
µi = lim
n→∞
√
n
(
ηni +
∑
j 6=i
E˜nijλ
n
j
)
.
Subtracting both condition we get that
0 = lim
n→∞
√
nEnijλ
n
j .
This is precisely the condition (1.11).
1.A.2 Proofs of Section 1.3
Proof. (of Proposition 1.3.2) Let the network of firms G = ∪Rl=1Pl where Pl are disjoint paths of
lengths dl in G ordered by maximum length, i.e. d1 ≥ d2 ≥ . . . ≥ dR. We will prove that the Jordan
cannonical form JE ofE can be written as
JE =


J1
J2
.
.
.
JR

 , (1.19)
where
J l =


0 1
0 1
.
.
. 1
0

 ∈ Rdl×dl ,
that is the Jordan cages are the same length as the paths in the decomposition of G. This proves the
Proposition.
Since G is a buyer supplier chain, the adjacency matrix allows for the reordering of firms, such
that E′ is upper triangular with zeros on the main diagonal. The Jordan canonical form of such a
matrix is as in (1.19) - matrices E and E′ have the same Jordan form. What remains to be shown is
that the Jordan cages J1, . . . ,JR correspond to the disjunct paths ordered by maximum length. Let
us assume that the Jordan cages in (1.19) are also ordered by size, i.e. size J1 ≥ size J2 ≥ . . . ≥
size JR.
We use the following two transformations on the matrix E′ which both preserve the Jordan
canonical form: (1) Lij(α) adds to column i the α-multiple of column j as well as to row j the
−α-multiple of row i (see Bujosa, Criado, and Vega (1998) for elaboration) and (2) Sij swaps i-th
and j-th row and column in E. By applying the series of transformations in Lemma 1.A.1. This
reduces the matrix to the classical Jordan form.
Lemma 1.A.1. Let A be a strictly upper triangular matrix with strictly positive values on the first
upper-diagonal. Then A has only one Jordan cage.
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Proof. It is easily seen that e1 (the first basis vector) is in the kernel of A. We will show that there
does not exist any other vector in the kernel. This will prove that there is only one Jordan cage. Let
us assume that another v = λ2e2 + . . . + λnen is in the kernel of A (we can assume that v ⊥ e1)
where not all λi = 0. Then
Av = λ2a12e1 +
+λ3a13e1 + λ3a23e2
+ . . .
In order for Av = 0 it necessary needs to hold λi = 0 for all i (aij ≥ 0 and ai,i+1 > 0) which
contradicts the assumption.
Moreover, the sequences of transformations to do this are ones that at all times preserve the
upper-triangular structure of the matrix. We first multiply the matrixA by the P = diag(p1, . . . , pn)
such that
p−11 a12p2 = 1
p−12 a23p3 = 1
.
.
.
p−1n−1an−1,npn = 1
We then apply the following sequence of transformationsLn,n−1(−an−2,n), L−an−3,n , . . . , Ln−1,2(−a1,n).
This makes the matrixAwith zeroes in the last column except for 1 in the upper-diagonal. We repeat
the following sequence until we obtain the Jordan form.
Lemma 1.A.2. Suppose that the firm network graph can be partitioned into K connected compo-
nents. Then the rank of E is the sum of ranks of adjacency matrices of the connected components.
Specifically rankE ≤ N −K.
Proof. If there are K connected components in a graph, thenE can be decomposed as
E =


E1
E2
.
.
.
EK

 ,
whereEk is the adjacency matrix of the k-th connected component. Then rank (E) =
∑K
k=1 rank (Ek) ≤
N −K, since rank (Ek) ≤ dim (Ek)− 1.
The following proposition is a restatement of Theorem 2 of He, Keirstead, and Rebholz (1998) and
the notation is adopted from there. τi denotes the first hitting time of the linear Brownian motion
process Xi of Di, Di < 0.
Proposition 1.A.3. Let Xi = αit+ σiWi (i = 1, 2), where W1 and W2 are two correlated Brownian
motions with correlation ρ and running minimum mi. Then the probability density
P(X1(t) ∈ dx1, X2(t) ∈ dx2, m1(t) ≥ m1, m2(t) ≥ m2) = p(x1, x2, t;m1, m2) (1.20)
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is
p(x1, x2, t;m1, m2) =
ea1x1+a2x2+bt
σ1σ2
√
1− ρ2h(x1, x2, t;m1, m2)
if x1 ≥ m1, x2 ≥ m2, m1, m2 < 0 and zero otherwise and
h(x1, x2, t;m1, m2) =
2
βt
∞∑
n=1
e−
r2+r2
0
2t sin
(
npiθ0
β
)
sin
(
npiθ
β
)
I(npi)/β
(rr0
t
)
where
a1 =
α1σ2 − ρα2σ1
(1− ρ2)σ21σ2
a2 =
α2σ1 − ρα1σ2
(1− ρ2)σ1σ22
b = −α1a1 − α2a2 + 1
2
(σ21a
2
1 + σ
2
2a
2
2) + ρσ1σ2a1a2
tanβ = −
√
1− ρ2
ρ
β ∈ [0, pi]
z1 =
1√
1− ρ2
[
x1 −m1
σ1
− ρx2 −m2
σ2
]
z2 =
x2 −m2
σ2
z10 =
1√
1− ρ2
[
−m1
σ1
+
ρm2
σ2
]
z20 = −m2
σ2
r =
√
z21 + z
2
2
tan θ =
z2
z1
θ ∈ [0, β]
r0 =
√
z210 + z
2
20
tan θ0 =
z20
z10
θ0 ∈ [0, β]
and Iζ is the modified Bessel function.
Proposition 1.A.4. The following identity holds
P(τ1 ∈ [t, t+ dt), X2(t) ∈ dx2, m2(t) ≥ D2) = p(−D1, x2, t;D1, D2) dx2 dt
where p is defined as in (1.20) in Proposition 1.A.3.
Proof. We compute
P (τ1 ∈ [t, t+ dt), X2(t) ∈ dx2, X2(t) ≥ D2)
= P(X1(t) ∈ [D1, D1 − dD1), X1(t) ≥ D1, X2(t) ∈ dx2, X2(t) ≥ D2)
= p(−D1, x2, t;D1, D2) dx2 dt
by the reflection property of the first Brownian motion X1.
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We use the tower property of conditional expectation to compute the expected excess survival time
of the supplier firm 2 given that it defaults after firm 1 is
E(τ2 − τ1|τ2 > τ1) =
∫ ∞
0
du
∫ ∞
D2
dx2
∫ ∞
0
dt P(τ2 − τ1 > u|X2(t) = x2) ·
P(τ1 ∈ [t, t+ dt), X2(t) ∈ dx2, m2(t) ≥ D2)
=
∫ ∞
0
du
∫ ∞
D2
dx2
∫ ∞
0
dt P(Xc2(u) ≥ D2|Xc2(0) = x2) ·
P(τ1 ∈ [t, t+ dt), X2(t) ∈ dx2, m2(t) ≥ D2),
since the process Xc2 without the firm 1 is again a time homogenous Brownian motion with drift.
1.A.3 Proofs of Section 1.4
Proof. (of Proposition 1.4.1.) Let there be a directed path between p1 = a → p2 → . . . → pk = b.
We show that then γb = γb(Ba, ηa, Eak) which in turn proves the statement in the proposition. We
prove this by induction on the length k of the path between a and b. The basis for induction k = 1 is
the case where there is a direct connection a→ b. Writing equation (1.12) for γb we have
PbBbγb +
∑
i6=a
EbiPbγi + EbaPbγa = δb − ηb.
Since γa = γa(Ba, ηa, Eak) and the statement follows. We have proven the basis of induction. We
now assume that we have the proven the dependence for the paths of length k. The statement then
follows by similar considerations as the one in (1.21): γk+1 = γk+1(γk) which implies the result.
Proof. (of Proposition 1.4.2.) We compute
γi − γi+1 = δi − ηi
PiBi
− δi+1 − ηi+1
Pi+1Bi+1
−
∑N
j=i+1Eijγj
Bi
+
∑N
j=i+2Ei+1,jγj
Bi+1
=
δi − ηi
PiBi
− δi+1 − ηi+1
Pi+1Bi+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
− Ei,i+1γi+1
Bi︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
−
N∑
j=i+2
(
Ei,j
Bi
− Ei+1,j
Bi+1
)
γj︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
≥ 0,
which together with the assumptions proves the result.
Proof. (of equation 1.13.) The equation follows from the following relationship:
µi dt = dP(Ai(t+ dt) ≤ γi|Ai(t), Ai(t) > γi)
= P
(⋃
j
Ai(t) ≤ γi(1 + Eij), dNj = 1
)
=
∑
j
P( dNj = 1) · 1(Eij < 0) · 1(Ai(t) ≤ γi(1 + Eij))
The remaining part of the equation (1.13) follows from the facts that P( dNj = 1) = λj dt, Eii = Bi
and taking into account only the firms in a network that are still active.
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Proof. (of Proposition 1.4.3.) The price of corporate debt in this case is
EQ(e−rT min(Ai(T ), Di)) = EQ(e−rTAi(T )1(Ai(T ) ≤ Di) + e−rTDi1(Ai(T ) > Di))
= e−rTDiQ(Ai(T ) ≥ Di) + EQ(e−rTAi(T )1(Ai(T ) ≤ Di)).
We note that under the measure Q we have that the process Ai at time t is given by
Ai(t) = Ai(0) exp
(
ηit+
N∑
j=1
E˜ijNj(t)
)
where Nj is a Poisson process of constant intensity λj . Therefore
Q(Ai(T ) ≥ Di) = Q
(
N∑
j=1
E˜ijNj(T ) ≥ log Di
Ai(0)
− ηiT
)
= 1−Nλ1,λ2,...,λN
E˜i1,E˜i2,...,E˜i,N
(d)
where
d = log
Di
Ai(0)
− ηiT.
To handle the second integral we make the change of measure
dO
dQ
= exp
(
N∑
j=1
E˜ijNj(T )−EijPiλjT
)
.
Under this change of measure the processes
Nj(t)− (1 + EijPi)λjt
are local martingales which by the martingale classification theorem shows that Nj is a Poisson
process under O with intensity (1 + EijPi)λj. Therefore
EQ(e−rTAi(T ) · 1(Ai(T ) ≤ Di)) = Ai(0)e(
PN
j=1 EijPiλj−r)TO(Ai(T ) ≤ Di)
= Ai(0)e
(
PN
j=1 EijPiλj−r)T ·
N
(1+Ei1Pi)λ1,(1+Ei2Pi)λ2,...,(1+EiNPi)λN
E˜i1,E˜i2,...,E˜i,N
(d) .
The probability
Nλ1,...,λnE1,...,En(x) = P
(
n∑
i=1
EiNi(T ) ≤ x
)
where Ni are independent Poisson processes of intensity λi can be computed from the characteristic
function ϕL of L =
∑n
i=1EiNi(T ) which equals
ϕL(y) =
n∏
j=1
exp
(
λjT (e
iEjy − 1)) .
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We then numerically compute the
Nλ1,...,λnE1,...,En(x1)−Nλ1,...,λnE1,...,En(x2) = limτ→∞
1
2pi
∫ τ
−τ
e−iyx2 − e−iyx1
iy
ϕL(y) dy.
To develop the hedging formulas we start with
dV =
N∑
i=1
φi dAi
=
N∑
i=1
φiAi
(
N∑
j=1
EijPi dNj
)
Using the Ito-formula for Poisson processes gets us
dV (t, A1, . . . , AN) = Vt dt+
N∑
i=1
VAi dAi
+
N∑
k=1
(V (t, A1(1 + E1kP1), A2(1 + E2kP2), . . . , AN(1 + ENkPN ))
−V (t, A1, A2, . . . , AN)−
N∑
j=1
VAiAiEikPi
)
dNk (1.21)
Rewriting the equation (1.21) we get
dV (t, A1, . . . , AN) = Vt dt+
N∑
k=1
dNk
N∑
i=1
VAiAiEikPi
+
N∑
k=1
(V (t, A1(1 + E1kP1), A2(1 + E2kP2), . . . , AN(1 + ENkPN ))
−V (t, A1, A2, . . . , AN)−
N∑
j=1
VAiAiEikPi
)
dNk. (1.22)
Solving equation (1.1) for dN gives us
dN = P−1E−1
(
A
−1 dA− η dt) .
Inserting the latter expression into (1.22) we arrive at
dV (t, A1, . . . , AN) = . . . dt+
N∑
k=1
(V (t, A1(1 + E1kP1), A2(1 + E2kP2), . . . , AN(1 + ENkPN))
−V (t, A1, A2, . . . , AN)) dNk
Let us denote by U = (U1, . . . , UN)′ where
Uk = V (t, A1(1 + E1kP1), A2(1 + E2kP2), . . . , AN(1 + ENkPN))− V (t, A1, A2, . . . , AN).
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The weights in the hedging portfolio are then
U ′(AEP )−1.
The following proposition is immediately apparent from Proposition 1.4.3.
Proposition 1.A.5. If the network G can be decomposed into several connected components, then
the securities’ prices depend only on the parameters of the connected components to which they
belong.
Lemma 1.A.6. If the protection buyer pays a constant amount U to the protection seller at time
intervals {ti}i, which pays D to the protection buyer in the event of a default of the referenced entity.
Therefore the fair price for the protection seller charging the protection buyer can be expressed as
U
D
=
EQ[e−rτ˜i1(τ˜i < T )]∑T
j=1 e
−rtjQ(tj < τ˜i)
. (1.23)
Proof. (of lemma 1.A.6.) We start from
U
D
=
EQ[e−rτ˜i1(τ˜i < T )]
EQ
[∑T∧τ˜i
i=1 e
−rti
] . (1.24)
The formula in the denominator can be simplified to get
EQ
[
T∧τ˜i∑
i=1
e−rti
]
=
T∑
n=0
n∑
j=1
e−rtjQ(tn ≤ τ˜i < tn+1) +
T∑
j=1
e−rtjQ(τ˜i > T )
=
T∑
j=1
e−rtjQ(tj ≤ τ˜i < tN )q +
T∑
j=1
e−rtjQ(τ˜i ≥ tN)
=
T∑
j=1
e−rtjQ(tj < τ˜i),
whereas the numerator reduces to the truncated Laplace transform11 in a network.
Proof. (of Proposition 1.4.5.) Equation (1.23) involves computation of the truncated Laplace trans-
form. In the case when default can occur only at maturity, explicit formulas for truncated Laplace
transform have been developed (see Guha and Sbuelz (2003), page 10). In our case we get
EQ[e−rτ˜i1(τ˜i < T )] = exp
(
−xi(αi + ϑi)
σ2i
)
N
(−xi + ϑiT
σi
√
T
)
+exp
(
−xi(αi − ϑi)
σ2i
)
N
(−xi − ϑiT
σi
√
T
)
(1.25)
where quantities are given as in the Proposition.
11Related work on truncated Laplace transform was done by Campi and Sbuelz (2005) which also develop closed
form expressions for the truncated Laplace transform in some specific cases of processes.
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Proof. (of Proposition 1.4.6.) For the determination of the CDO prices we need to compute the
distribution of the sum of correlated log-normal random variables. We use the approximation method
od Fenton (1960). For the derivation we refer to the paper by Safak and Safak (1994) and the
references therein. Fenton (1960) approximates the sum of log-normal distributions ∑Ni=1 exp(Yi),
where Yi is normally distributed by mean mi and variance σ2i by another log-normal distribution
exp(SN ), where SN is normal with mean mSN and variance σ2SN , by fitting the first two moments
of the distribution to that of the sum. In our case the mean and the variance of the logarithm of
individual summand is mi = log(Ai(0)) + rT − 12
∑N
j=1 F
2
ijT and σ2i =
∑N
j=1 F
2
ijT respectively.
The correlation between Yi and Yj in the sum is ρij =
PN
k=1 FikFjkT
σiσj
. Fenton’s method then gives us
mSN = −
1
2
σ2SN + log
(
N∑
i=1
exp
(
mi +
1
2
σ2i
))
σ2SN = log

1 + ∑Ni=1(eσ2i − 1)e2mi+σ2i + 2∑N−1i=1 ∑Nj=i+1 emi+ 12σ2i emj+ 12σ2j (eρijσiσj − 1)(∑N
i=1 e
mi+
1
2
σ2i
)2


We define d1k =
mSN−logCk
σSN
and similarly d2k =
mSN+σ
2
SN
−logCk
σSN
. Then
Q(A˜ ≥ Ck) = Q
(
mSN + σSN
W (T )√
T
≥ logCk
)
= Q
(
−W (T )√
T
≤ mSN − logCk
σSN
)
= N(d1k).
Since A˜ = emSN+
σSN√
T
W (T )
we have
EQ[A˜χ(Ck ≤ A˜ ≤ Ck+1)] = emSN+
1
2
σ2
SN EQ
[
e
− 1
2
σ2
SN
+
σSN√
T
W (T )
χ(Ck ≤ A˜ ≤ Ck+1)
]
= e
mSN+
1
2
σ2SN
(
Q∗(A˜∗ ≥ Ck)−Q∗(A˜∗ ≥ Ck+1)
)
= e
mSN+
1
2
σ2
SN
(
N(d2k)−N(d2k+1)
)
,
where A˜∗ = exp(mSN +σ2SN +
σSN√
T
W˜ (T )), dQ
∗
dQ
= e
− 1
2
σ2SN
+
σSN√
T
W (T )
and W˜ is the Brownian motion
under Q∗. Gathering all terms together we get
Vk = e
−rTFkQ(A˜ ≥ Ck+1) + e−rTEQ[(A˜− Ck)χ(Ck ≤ A˜ ≤ Ck+1)]
= e−rTFkQ(A˜ ≥ Ck+1)− Cke−rT (Q(A˜ ≥ Ck)−Q(A˜ ≥ Ck+1)) + EQ[A˜χ(Ck ≤ A˜ ≤ Ck+1)]
= e−rTFkN(d1k+1)− Cke−rT (N(d1k)−N(d1k+1)) + e−rT+mSN+
1
2
σ2SN
(
N(d2k)−N(d2k+1)
)
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E P λ B D A0 T
 0 30 200 0 60
0 0 0



 0.0030.003
0.002



 5050
50



 −10.000 0.000 0.0000.000 −8.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 −7.000



 8080
80



 100110
130

 1
Table 1.3: Model parameters for the network of three firms. The entries in E reflect the relative business dependence
between firms, i.e. the cash payments between firm 1 and 2 are large than between firms 1 and 3. The factor of
proportionality P for payment streams is small and the average number of payments λ between firms high - a high
transaction/low inter-firm payment economy. The volatility of external cash flows for the given parameters ranges
between 0.1 to 0.2 for all firms in the network. We assume that there is no correlation between the external cash flows
of the individual firms, i.e. B is diagonal. Hence, there is only network dependence between them. Time interval is
normalized to 1.
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Chapter 2
Mergers and Asset Prices in a Firm Network
Economy
2.1 Introduction
The size and the scope of firms has long puzzled economic theory. In the classic general equilibrium
setting, where firms are motivated by profit generation, only a single firm should exist. A general
theory of mergers and acquisitions has not been properly accounted for in finance sholarship even
though mergers have been much investigated. The motivation for merger waves is even included in
the Brealey and Myers (2000) list of the ten unsolved questions of modern financial theory.
In this paper we examine the outcome of an economy populated by multiple firms facing risky
profit streams and merger possibilities. By merging the firms create an internal capital market
and shield themselves from the adverse movements in stochastic cash flows. As pointed out by
Williamson (1987), the internalization of capital markets is an important part of a firm’s strategy and
the functioning of markets in general. The impact of firm’s risk structure on the creation of internal
capital markets is emphasized in Elgers and Clark (1980), p. 66 who state that
“From a shareholder’s standpoint, business combinations are justified when the mar-
ket value of the equity shares of buyer and seller firms increases as a result of their inten-
tion to merge. The incremental value might accrue from expectations of the replacement
of incompetent management, scale economies, extension of the product line, improved
market control, reduction of business risk, or changes in the financial structure.” [em-
phasis mine]
For example, the Neue Zu¨rcher Zeitung (2007) report on News Corporation indicates this phenom-
ena: Although the earnings of the film branch of 20th Century Fox suffered in 2007 the gains in Fox
TV adequately offset them. In this case the aggregate volatility is reduced when firms conglomerate.
The merger between YouTube and Google in late 2006, the attempt of EUREX to merge with LSE
and the takeover of Wachovia by Wells Fargo further exemplify this tendency in conglomeration the-
ory. Merger synergies, market concentration effects, coalitional externalities, firm growth potential,
tax advantages or resource transfers are other factors that determine merger conditions.
In this paper we broadly define the term coalition as the cooperation of firms in forming internal
capital markets. While classical mergers, mergers of equals, acquisitions or hostile takeovers are
examples of coalition formation, cooperations and alliances are not. The following two questions
will thus be addressed:
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1. How does merger behavior depend on the risk structure of firms’ cash flows, i.e. how does
cash flow dependence between buyers and suppliers and firms’ leverage ratios effect merger
activity?
2. What are the post-merger share prices and how are they related to a firm’s network dependen-
cies?
As Brealey and Myers (2000) have pointed out, the value of a firm coalition does not necessarily
exceed the sum of the firm values that form it and hence the classical coalition formation results, such
as the Shapley (1953) value or the results in Maskin (2003), which all assume the superadditivity
of the value function, are not appropriate in this environment. Superadditivity is a very restrictive
assumption implying that the value of any coalition is necessarily greater than the value of its parts.
Games with externalities, mergers for diversification and many others are all examples where the
superadditivity axiom fails. Moreover, there exists considerable empirical literature on the tradeoff
between the benefits of mergers and over-diversification. Ravenscroft and Scherer (1988) argue that
the productivity declines in the years following the merger, while others, such as Healy, Palepu, and
Ruback (1992) found an average increase in subsequent corporate returns.
To account for this deficiency of existing theories we develop a theory of coalition formation
without the superadditivity axiom. The theory that we propose functions as follows. First, the firms
enter the bargaining process sequentially, i.e. firm i starts bargaining when firms 1, . . . , i − 1 have
already formed the coalitions. The coalitions can not be re-negotiated and can not break apart -
our model does not apply to spinoffs. Firm i joins the coalition which maximizes the total welfare
and is paid its marginal contribution to the share price increase (Vickrey principle). The process
is repeated for all possible permutations, i.e. for all bargaining orders. The axioms of the theory
can be implemented algorithmically but are deeply recursive and resource consuming. We prove
that by adding the value function superadditivity to the above stated axioms we obtain the Shapley
value again. Therefore our proposal can be considered as an extension of the Shapley concept to
coalitional games without superadditivity.
Since the analysis of agency conflicts within the firm is not the main purpose of this paper, we
assume that the bargaining parties are managers on behalf of shareholders and that their incentives
are aligned. After (and if) the merger occurs, one of the managers of the merging firms is paid out
and leaves all the managerial decisions to the other one. The merged firm managerial structure is then
the same as before the merger. Since no distinction is made between the firm and its shareholders
(managers), we say with the slight abuse of language that the bargaining agents are firms themselves.
We then apply the newly developed bargaining theory to a model of firm merger in a network of
firms, where economic dependencies between firms are static1. Firms issue buy orders, as described
by network dependencies, that generate the asset dynamics as in Brumen and Vanini (2006). We
assume that the equity value maximization is the firm’s/coalition’s sole objective function and in
order to capture the tradeoff between the cash flow volatility and the possibility of default we use
the Leland and Toft (1996) model of equity pricing. By relying on the buyer-supplier network
theory, the model has the potential to incorporate all three groups of mergers: vertical, horizontal
and conglomerate, and give predictions as to which merger is more likely in a particular network
type.
1An equivalent statement is that the cost of breaking an economic relationship is too high, see Grossman and Hart
(1986).
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The results show that firm values in a network should not be considered in isolation. “Merger
correction” is the difference between the firm’s equity value with and without accounting for merger
possibilities. This fact is documented in Elgers and Clark (1980) who observe that moderate gains to
buyer firms and substantial gains to seller firms occured in the period of approximately three months
prior to the merger. Higher network dependence decreases the number of coalitions formed, i.e.
it generates merger activity, higher firm equity values and increasing merger surplus. Our model
therefore predicts that firms suffering high and negatively correlated levels of cash flow volatility
should merge and exactly the opposite should happen for firms with positively correlated cash flows.
The average leverage ratio in the economy decreases the number of coalitions in a network but
only up to a certain point after which the merger activity decreases again, thereby generating a
non-symmetric inverted U-shaped merger activity curve with more mergers occuring for high than
for low leverage ratios. The results suggest that in networks where the number of buyers (resp.
suppliers) dominates the number of suppliers (resp. buyers), mergers occur primarily in the group
that dominates the other in the number of members.
The neoclassical merger theory of Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) relates the merger and ac-
quisition activity to firm’s (Tobin’s) Q value and technological changes. In our paper we show that
the mergers occurs even if there is no change in technological efficiency of individual firms and the
merger serves as a hedge against volatile cash flows. More recently, the papers by Lambrecht (2004),
Morellec and Zhdanov (2005), Lambrecht and Myers (2006) and Thijssen (2008) proposed a real
options merger formation framework based on the comparison between the underlying real activity
of the individual and the merged firm. The feature of all of these models is that eventually only a
single firm would exist2. The models stated above all have the following shortcomings. Firstly, they
are limited to two firms and hence the results oscillate wildly between no mergers and the merger
of all (two) firms in the economy. An economic environment of multiple firms enlarges the merger
possibility and the coalition formation opportunity set. Secondly, the papers by Lambrecht, Morellec
and Myers are of infinite horizon. While mergers can produce long-term benefits, they can end up
in default over the short run. Finally, the existing literature can not explain merger waves. Contrary
to the articles by Lambrecht (2004) and Morellec and Zhdanov (2005), our model predicts multiple
coalitions (as opposed to a single one) and cyclical merger activity in line with Lambrecht (2004).
Dynamic programming applied to our model has the potential to extend the merger decisions into
the time domain, similar to Thijssen (2008), and even to the analysis of mergers/spinoffs. This is
presented in the final chapters of the paper. The papers by Scharfstein and Stein (2000), Inderst
and Laux (2006) and others take a more strategic approach to the formation of internal capital mar-
kets on behalf of division managers and the incentives that form them. A distantly related paper is
Habib and Mella-Barral (2006) which investigates different type of firm-firm connections, such as
partnerships and mergers and similarly to our paper identifies conditions for a specific form of firm
relationship. Our paper also provides an explanation for managers’ decision about the “currently un-
profitable mergers”, as in Gorton and Rosen (2005), which can generate profits in the long run. The
paper shares insights with Shleifer and Vishny (2003) where stand-alone companies can increase
their stock price by merging or acquiring other firms.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 illustrates the merger theory in a simple two firm
buyer-supplier example. Section 2.3 develops the general theory of coalitional games without the
2In their models, the merger is motivated by the increase of a specific firm characteristic, such as a sales price, driven
by the geometric Brownian motion, to a high enough level. This is a property of the geometric Brownian motion process.
Other processes governing the real economic activity would most probably generate different merger predictions.
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superadditivity axiom which is then applied as a merger solution concept. In Section 2.4 the merger
theory in a general network environment is presented. Section 2.5 sums up the results.
2.2 The two firm case
We illustrate the merger behavior and firm stock price formation on a simple two firm network with
dependent firms. We assume the setting of Brumen and Vanini (2006) of a buyer (firm 1) and a
supplier (firm 2), see Figure 2.1(a). The buyer firm issues buy orders modelled by the jumps of a
Poisson process N1 (with intensity λ1). A jump of N1 induces a net cash flow to the supplier (firm
2) in the amount E12 P2A2 where E12 is the number of links between firms 1 and 2 and denotes the
strength of business relationship between the firms. P2 is the proportionality factor describing the
net cash flow proportion of the total assets (A2) paid by the buyer to the supplier firm. In addition
to network buyer-supplier cash flows, the two firms have external cash flows, irrespective of the
network. The dependence3 between the external cash flows and the buy/supply orders is represented
in a diagonal matrix B = diag (B1, B2). External cash flows are depicted dashed in Figure 2.1(a).
The element B1 describes the dependence between the buy orders and external cash flows of firm
1. For every buy order the firm 1 receives an external cash flow in the amount B1 P1A1. The
external cash flow received by firm 1 is proportional to its size A1 where the proportionality factor
is P1. The number B1 describes how many times this amount firm 1 receives from external sources.
Additional Poisson process N2 (with intensity λ2) drives the external cash flows of firm 2. The
distinction between external and network cash flows allows us to focus and study specific firm-firm
relationships in greater detail and model other economic influences on the firms statistically. The
dynamics of the firms’ asset values can be written as (see Brumen and Vanini (2006), Proposition
2.1)
dA1 = A1(η1 dt+B1P1 dN1) (2.1)
dA2 = A2(η2 dt+ E12P2 dN1 +B2P2 dN2) (2.2)
Some empirical support for the high-frequency version of this specification (see Brumen and Vanini
(2006), Proposition 2.5) is given in Hackbarth and Morellec (2008). We assume that both firms have
issued equity and zero-coupon debt with principals D1, D2 and maturity T . We denote by S1, S2
the equity values. In a two firm network we define the dependency value as the number of economic
links between the firms, i.e. the value of E12. We use Leland and Toft (1996) to determine the value
of stocks. In this setting the firms’ equity values can be expressed as follows.
Proposition 2.2.1. The equity price of firm i with principal value Di and maturity T is given by
Si = Si(σi), where σ1 = (B21P 21 λ1)1/2, σ2 = (E212P 22 λ1 + B22P 22 λ2)1/2, and Si is the Leland/Toft
equity value as given in Leland and Toft (1996), equation (9).
The choice of the Leland and Toft (1996) model correctly reflects the tradeoff between the increased
stock price due to increased volatility of cash flows and the negative effect due to increased likelihood
of default. The results of Leland and Toft (1996) are restated in the Appendix, Proposition 2.A.4.
3Since the buy-supply orders are driven by the Poisson processes the dependence between the external and network
cash flows is not Gaussian and the term correlation is not an appropriate one. In the approximated Gaussian case one
can considerB as the correlation matrix between external and network cash flows.
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1
2
(a) Original net-
work.
M
(b) Cash flows
in a merged net-
work.
1
(c) Cash flows
from the per-
spective of firm
1.
2
(d) Cash flows
from the per-
spective of firm
2.
Figure 2.1: Example of firms and net cash flows in a two firm buyer - supplier network - 2.1(a). The network cash flow
directions are denoted in solid and the external cash flows in dashed lines. A merged firm 2.1(b) possesses only external
cash flows. Cash flows in a network 2.1(a) as seen by individual firms 1 and 2 are presented respectively in figures 2.1(c)
and 2.1(d).
Now consider the case when the two firms merge. We assume additionally that there are no
agency conflicts and the shareholder value maximization is the only motive of the firm. The merged
firm operates the individual units as independent entities, with the difference that the transfer of
goods between the firms is now an internal capital market. The dynamics of the merged company
is then given as A12 = A1 + A2, where A1 and A2 are defined as in (2.1)-(2.2) and the equity value
of the merged company is S12 = S12(σ12), where A12(0) = A1(0) + A2(0), D12 = D1 + D2,
σ12 =
√
(K1(B1P1 + E12P2))2λ1 + (K2B2P2)2λ2, K1 = 1−K2 = A1(0)A1(0)+A2(0) and S12 is the same
as in Proposition 2.2.1 the Leland and Toft equity value. The factor K1 (K2) represents the intial
relative asset size of firm 1 (2) to the total assets of all firms in the economy. We notice that the single
most important parameter of the merged firm that drives the stock values is the volatility difference
between the individual firms and the merged one.
Proposition 2.2.2. In a two firm example the firms merge if and only if S12 ≥ S1 + S2. In this case,
share prices of firms 1 and 2 are 1
2
(S1+S12−S2) and 12(S2+S12−S1) respectively. If S1+S2 ≥ S12
then firms 1 and 2 do not merge and are worth S1 and S2 respectively.
Figure 2.2 shows the equity value S12 of the merged firm (dotted line) and the sum of equity
values of both firms (solid line) for different values of network dependency parameter E12. The
merger is rejected at low levels of network dependency, the “no merger part” in Figure 2.2, where
the sum of individual stock values S1 + S2 is higher than the stock of the merged firm S12. For
this range of E12 the negative external cash flows B2 of the buyer (firm 2) would decrease the stock
price of the merged firm and the merger is rejected by the buyer firm 1. For high levels of network
dependency parameter E12 (the “merger part” in Figure 2.2) the default effect of volatile cash flows
starts to dominate in both firms and it is here where the firms merge and form an internal capital
market in the buyer-supplier chain. In this range of network dependency values, the positive effect
of volatility decrease through a merger dominates and the merger is preferred for both firms. Figure
2.2 also shows that increased network dependence in the buyer-supplier chain raises the value of
the merger, i.e. the difference between the merged firm value S12 and the sum of individual firms
S1+S2 increases withE12. Different values of network/leverage parameters move and scale the two
functions in Figure 2.2 and it is possible that merger is rejected for high dependency values as well
as approved for low ones.
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Figure 2.2: A representation of a merger indicator with respect to the dependency value of the network. The dependency
value of the network was defined in Brumen and Vanini (2006), Section 4, and in the case of two firms reduces to
the number of connections E12 between firm one and two. Proposition 2.2.2 indicates that the firms merge when
S1 + S2 ≤ S12. The model parameters are as follows: the buy order proportionality factor P = 0.0050, the buy order
intensities are λ = (70, 80)′, external cash flow matrix B = diag(9,−3)′, recovery rate 0.7, A0 = (100, 120)′ and the
principal debt values are D0 = (40, 40)′.
We next examine the behavior of the network dependency cut-off values, i.e. the values of
the network dependency parameter E12 when the merger becomes profitable, on the firms’ average
leverage ratio L computed for a two firm example as
L =
1
2
(
D1
S1
+
D2
S2
)
, (2.3)
where D1, D2 are the principal debt values (both firms have issued a zero-coupon bond and equity),
A1(0), A2(0) the initial asset values and S1 = A1(0) − D1, S2 = A2(0) − D2 the equity values of
firms 1 and 2 respectively. The extension to multiple firms is obvious. Figure 2.3 shows that the
network dependency cutoff value E∗12 decreases as the average leverage ratio L increases but only
up to a certain point (around 0.7 in Figure 2.3). For L in the interval [0.25, 0.7] the firms merge
sooner, that is at lower levels of network dependency E12. For L above 0.7 the merger activity
decreases again. The shape of the curve can be economically interpreted as follows. Increasing
the average L ratio increases the probability of default for every individual firm in the network.
A merger therefore becomes more attractive. After L grows above certain high enough level, the
probability of default is already so high that only additional increase in cash flow volatility can
save the firms from defaulting. This parallels the asset substitution effect. The network dependency
cutoff value E∗12 displays an U-shaped curve and the merger activity an inverted U-shaped line. The
maximum number of mergers does not occur for extremely low or high leverage ratios, even though
in both states mergers do occur. We emphasize that the “middle” leverage ratios in the Figure can be
obtained by a combination of high leverage of one firm and a low leverage of the other firm, from
which we conclude that the merger is more likely between firms of heterogenous leverage ratios.
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Figure 2.3: The relationship between the network dependency cutoff values E∗12, i.e. the value of the network depen-
dence parameter E12 where merger becomes rationable, and the average initial leverage ratio L. Other parameters of the
model are given in the caption below Figure 2.2.
The existence of mergers for very high leverage ratios has been empirically documented in Bernile,
Lyandres, and Zhdanov (2007).
2.3 Theory of Coalition Formation without Externalities and the
Superadditivity Axiom
In Section 2.2 we have analyzed the merger process between two firms. The decision in this case
was simple - if the value of the merged firm’s stock is higher than the combined stock value of
individual firms the incentive to merge exists. The decisions are not so simple already in the case
of three firms. Firm 3 has the possibility of forming a coalition with firm 1 or firm 2 or, if the firms
1 and 2 merged, with the merged firm. Firms 1 and 2 optimally anticipate the behavior of firm 3
and act accordingly. Furthermore it is entirely unclear how the increased share values of the merger
should be split among the merging parties. Another problem is that the worth of a coalition (such as
a merger/takeover/partnership) of two firms may be worth less than the sum of individual entities.
Brealey and Myers (2000) give an example of Kaiser Industries, a holding company for Kaiser
Steel, Kaiser Aluminum and Kaiser Cement which traded at significant discount until it sold off its
holdings again forming separate companies. Therefore the classical theory of coalition formation
first proposed by Shapley (1953) does not capture the issue well. In order to resolve these issues
we need some game theoretic concepts which provide consistent guidance into the firm’s merger
decisions in a multi-firm economies.
In this section we propose a new game theoretic solution concept which addresses the problems
of the Shapley theory, the empirical merger puzzles and is algorithmically easily implementable.
The proposed theory establishes a solution concept for cooperative games without externalities and
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without the superadditivity axiom4. Since the superadditivity axiom does not hold the grand coali-
tion does not necessarily form. If in addition the value function satisfies also the superadditivity
assumption, the solution concept coincides with the Shapley value. We therefore consider the pro-
posed solution concept as a (particular) extension of the Shapley value to games with general value
functions.
We denote by n = {1, . . . , n} the set of integers smaller than n + 1. An N-player transferable
utility game (N, v) without externalities is given by
• A set of players N .
• A function v, which assigns a worth v(S) to a coalition S ∈ P , given a partition P of N .
We fix the number of players N and focus on coalitional games that are normalized to v(∅) = 0. We
call a partition Pn of n, n < N a partial partition. Given a partial partition P i−1, let ϕi(P i−1) be
the prediction function of player’s i payoff and ψ(P i−1) be the prediction of a partition of N given
that the partition of i− 1 is P i−1. We require that {ϕi}Ni=1 and ψ satisfy the following set of axioms.
The axioms are inspired heavily by Maskin (2003), but also differ from it substantially.
(NA) Non-negotiation commitment: Let j, k ∈ i, i < N , and partial partition P i be given where
j ∈ S ∈ P i and k /∈ S. If j ∈ S∗ ∈ ψ(P i) then also k /∈ S∗.
The axiom NA guarantees that the players that have been allocated to separate coalitions in the
bargaining process do not “renegotiate” with other players entering the bargaining process after him
to form a new coalition or join a different one than the already assigned. Maskin interprets this
axiom as “cutting the telephone lines”.
(BC) Binding coalitions: Let i < N and the partial partitionP i be given. If S ∈ P i then there exists
S ′ ∈ ψ(P i) such that S ⊂ S ′.
The axiom BC assures that as the bargaining process proceeds the already formed coalitions do not
break apart, i.e. players in a coalition remain together in that coalition till the end of the bargaining
process.
For any S ∈ P i−1 ∪ ∅ and Sˆ ∈ P i−1 ∪ ∅′ we define
Φi(S, Sˆ|P i−1) =
{
v(SN(S))−∑j>i tj(Sj−1(S)|ψj−1(P i−1, Sˆ ∪ i)) S 6= Sˆ
v(SN(S ∪ i))−∑j>i tj(Sj−1(S ∪ i)|ψj−1(P i−1, S ∪ i)) S = Sˆ (2.4)
where tj(S|P) is defined recursively in the VP axiom below (equation (2.8)). We used the following
notation: ψj(P i) (j ≥ i) is the partition of j such that the elements of ψj(P i) are members of ψ(P i)
without players N\j. Sj(S) is the unique element of ψj(P i) such that S ⊂ Sj . The existence of
Sj(S) is guaranteed by the BC axiom. We note that
ΦN (S, Sˆ|PN−1) =
{
v(S) S 6= Sˆ
v(S ∪N) S = Sˆ (2.5)
4Under the superadditivity of the value function we mean that v(S1) + v(S2) ≤ v(S1 ∪ S2) for any coalitions
S1 ∩ S2 = ∅.
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The quantity Φi(S, S ′|P i−1) is the worth of the coalition S ∈ P i−1 if the first i − 1 players form a
partial partition P i−1, i.e. they have already formed selected coalitions, and i is allocated to S ′. Φi
captures the optimal anticipation by player i of future players j ≥ i behaving optimally themselves.
Since the game does not have externalities the function Φi does not depend on P i. We prove this
formally in the Appendix, Lemma 2.A.1. We maintain the dependence on P i in oder to keep track
of the coalitions formed.
(CA) Competitive allocation: Let P i−1 be a partial partition. Then i is allocated to So ∈ P i−1, such
that
So = argmax
Sˆ∈P i−1
∑
S∈P i−1
Φi(S, Sˆ|P i−1), (2.6)
i.e. (So ∪ i) ∈ ψi(P i−1) if and only if So is the maximizer in (2.6).
CA axiom states that the player i joins the coalition which generates maximum total welfare of all
coalitions. This is the “efficiency axiom”.
(CW) Competitive wages: Let P i−1 be a partial partition and assume that player i is competitively
allocated (i.e. according to axiom CA) to coalition So ∈ P i−1. Then the payoff to player i is
ϕi(P i−1) = Φi(So, So|P i−1)− Φi(So, Soo|P i−1), (2.7)
where Soo ∈ P i−1 is any coalition Soo 6= So. The choice of Soo is arbitrary due to the fact that
the game does not have externalities.
The CW axiom speaks about the value assigned to a player in the bargaining process. The player
receives the difference between the coalition’s worth with that player Φi(So, So|P i−1) and the one
when the player joins any other coalition Soo - Φi(So, Soo|P i−1). The player is awarded his marginal
contribution to coalition’s worth. In our setting, that is in games without externalities, Soo is well
defined. The choice of Soo is a major obstacle in defining the solution concept for cooperative games
with externalities.
(VP) Vickrey payments: Let P i−1 be a partial partition and player i be competitively allocated to
So ∈ P i−1. Then for all S ∈ P i−1 the following holds
ti(S|P i−1) =
{
Φi(So, So|P i−1)− Φi(So, Soo|P i−1) S = So
0 S 6= So , (2.8)
where Soo is as in the CW axiom.
The last axiom states that only the coalition which the player joins awards that player with the exact
amount by which the coalition’s value increases. This is in stark contrast to games with externalities,
where externalities can induce payments from other coalitions, and greatly simplifies the analysis.
The bargaining process proceeds as follows. Players enter the bargaining process sequentially,
i.e. player i ≤ N bargains after players 1, . . . , i− 1 have already formed their respective coalitions.
Player i bargains for its payoff (axiom CW) and joins the selected coalition (CA). The coalition
awards the player its marginal contribution according to the VP axiom. The stability of the coalition
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formation is guaranteed by the NA and BC axioms. The axioms NA-VP are constructive and can be
implemented on a computer. The algorithm that implements them is unfortunately highly recursive
and resources consuming. The bargaining and coalition formation process arising from the axioms
above bears close resemblance to the Shapley value. In the case of more than one coalition outstand-
ing, the player next in the bargaining process evaluates his contribution to every coalition (including
forming a new one) correctly anticipating the decisions of other players entering the bargaining pro-
cess later. The bargaining with each coalition separately is done in exactly the same manner as in
Shapley. We illustrate this on an example of 5 players with the already formed coalitions being
{{1, 2}, {3}}. In this scenario player 4 enters the bargaining process next. The decision made by
player 4 is whether to join the first or the second coalition or to start his own. In both of the three
cases he bargains in a manner described by Shapley correctly anticipating whether player 5 joins the
same coalition or any other. Player 4 then joins the coalition to which his marginal contribution is
greatest.
The following theorem provides the existence of a payoff prediction function ϕ and a coalitional
prediction function ψ that satisfy above axioms.
Theorem 2.3.1. For every N-player transferable utility game (N, v) there exist unique payoff pre-
diction function ϕ and coalition prediction function ψ as defined above, which satisfy axioms NA,
BC, CA, CW and VP.
A feature of the proposed solution concept above is that the players entering the bargaining
process can join inefficient coalitions temporarily for the benefit of more efficient outcomes in a
coalition with other players later, i.e. bargaining order has an effect on coalition formation. Example
of such a three player game is given in the Appendix, Proposition 2.A.3 where the solution concept
in Theorem 2.3.1 predicts a grand coalition of three players, yet a a restriction to the first two players
results in separate coalitions for both agents. When forming coalitions the proposed solution concept
considers all players in the bargaining process even though the bargaining takes place sequentially.
To construct the payoff prediction function we randomize over the order of players entering the
bargaining process. Let pi ∈ SN be a permutation in a set of all permutations of N elements. We
define
ϕi =
1
N !
∑
pi∈SN
ϕpii , (2.9)
where ϕpii is obtained as before when the order of players entering the bargaining process is pi. The
predictor of the coalition structure is a uniform distribution over all the coalition predictions, i.e.
ψi = ψ
pi
i (pi ∈ SN ) with probability 1N ! .
The justification for the selection of axioms above comes additionally from the following theo-
rem.
Theorem 2.3.2. Let v be a coalitional game of N players. The following holds.
(a) For every S ∈ ψ({∅}) the efficiency equation∑i∈S ϕi(ψi−1({∅})) = v(S) holds.
(b) For every partial partition P i−1 we have that ∑
S∈P i−1 ti(S|P
i−1, So) = ϕi(P i−1), where
So ∈ ψi(P i−1).
(c) If for some i and for every subset S ⊂ {1, . . . , N} of N players v(S∪{i}) = v(S) holds, then
ϕi(P i−1) = 0.
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(d) If in addition to axioms NA, BC, CA, CW and VP, the superadditivity of the value function v
is also assumed, then ϕi in equation (2.9) equals the Shapley value of player i and the grand
coalition forms.
Part (a) of the theorem states that the sum of payoffs to all coalition members precisely equals
the worth of that coalition, i.e. the worth of the coalition is divided among the players that form it
and there are no loses due to the bargaining process. It is the marginal contribution of every player
(the CW axiom) that determines the percentage of the coalition’s worth the player receives. Part (b)
states that the payoff to player i is the sum of all Vickrey payments by all existing coalitions. It is
obvious from the definition of the Vickrey payments that only the coalition that the player joins pays
that player. Intuitively, this is a consequence of the no externality assumption of the game. Part (c)
is an extension of the Shapley axiom to coalitional games without superadditivity. It states that the
player who has zero marginal contribution to all coalitions receives zero payoff. Part (d) proves that
the established theory is a generalization of the Shapley value concept.
2.4 A general model
We now turn to the case of N firms in a general buyer-supplier network. We use the same network
structure and notation as in Brumen and Vanini (2006). A network consists ofN firms who issue buy
orders to their suppliers. Buy orders depend on business relationships between firms described by the
adjacency matrix E˜ ∈ RN×N . For example, E˜12 = 2E˜23 means that the firm 1 supplies at every issue
of a buy order twice as much (proportional to its asset value) to firm 2 as does firm 2 to firm 3. Buy
orders of firm i arrive with intensity λi independently of all other firms (λ = diag(λ1, . . . , λN) ∈
RN×N ). Every buy order induces a net cash flow to the suppliers in the amount proportional to
its outstanding assets where the proportionality factor equals Pi, P = diag(P1, . . . , PN) ∈ RN×N .
Empirical support for this kind of model is given in Brumen and Vanini (2006). The supplier i
to the buyer j is characterized by the condition E˜ij > 0, j = 1, . . . , N . In addition to network
generated cash flows, firms receive external cash flows where the correlation between the network
generated cash flows and the external ones is given by the matrix B ∈ RN×N . We denote by
E = B+ E˜. Under certain technical assumptions (see Brumen and Vanini (2006), Theorem 3.1 for
precise statements) the asset value process A = (A1, . . . , AN) ∈ RN of all firms in the network can
under the risk-neutral measure be approximated by a multivariate geometric Brownian motion
dA = A
(
r1 dt+ PEλ1/2 dW
)
, (2.10)
where 1 is a vector of ones and W is a multivariate Brownian motion both of dimension N . This is
the same assumption as in Hackbarth and Morellec (2008). The asset volatility of firm 1 ≤ i ≤ N
in this setting is given by
σ2i =
N∑
j=1
E2ijP
2
i λj (2.11)
that is it depends on all of its buy orders Eij weighted by the proportionality factors Pi and buy order
intensities λj .
We define firm coalition as the cooperation of firms in forming internal capital markets. Classi-
cal mergers, mergers of equals, acquisitions or hostile takeovers are in our setting all examples of
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coalition formation. We make the following assumptions. The objective function of a firm coalition
is its equity value maximization. There are no agency conflicts within the coalitions and no tax ad-
vantages of a bigger coalition. Finally, firms in a coalition operate as subdivisions of that coalition,
i.e. there are no production efficiency gains and no externalities of firm mergers. A merger changes
the volatility of cash flows (and therefore the equity prices) through the creation of internal capital
markets, but does not effect any other coalition. We use Leland and Toft (1996) equity pricing model
to determine the equity value of coalitions.
The bargaining and coalition formation process described in Section 2.3 is done at the begin-
ning of the period. After the coalition formation, no subsequent mergers or coalition breakups are
allowed5. We first specify the value of coalitions. Let LT (A,P, σ) be the Leland-Toft equity value
of the firm with beginning of the period firm market value A, total principal P and asset volatility σ
as defined in Proposition 2.A.4 of the Appendix. Assume S ⊂ N is a coalition of firms. The value
v(S) of this coalition is given by
v(S) = LT

∑
i∈S
Ai(0),
∑
i∈S
Di,
√√√√∑
j∈S
(∑
i∈S
KiEi,jPi
)2
λj

 ,
where Ki = Ai(0)P
l∈S Al(0)
, i.e. the initial coalition asset market value is the sum of all assets in the
coalition
∑
i∈S Ai(0) and the debt principal of the coalition is the sum of debt principals of individual
firms
∑
i∈SDi. The volatility of the coalition is the weighted average of individual firm volatilities
weighted by their relative initial sizes Ai(0)P
l∈S Al(0)
. We interpret the value v(i) = LT (Ai(0), Di, σi) for
any 1 ≤ i ≤ N as the the stand-alone firm value with σi as in (2.11). The axioms NA, BC, CA and
VP of the previous section all retain their meaning in coalitions. The bargaining process proceeds
as follows. Firms enter the bargaining process sequentially, i.e. firm i ≤ N begins negotiation after
firms 1, . . . , i−1 have already formed the appropriate coalitions. Firm i’s value is determined by the
CW axiom, taking into account future coalition building, and joins the selected coalition according
to the CA axiom. The stability of the coalition formation is guaranteed by the NA and BC axioms.
As an illustration we consider a network of 3 firms. A larger network complicates computations
considerably but does not offer any new economic insights. In this network firm 1 is a supplier, i.e.
a seller to both firms 2 and 3, firm 2 is an intermediary (a buyer from firm 1 and a supplier of the
retailer) and firm 3 is a retailer (buys from both other firms). The parameter values described before
are given in Table 2.1. The parameters in Table 2.1 are chosen to reflect realistic values of such a
E diag(P ) λ diag(B) D A0 T
 0 2 20 0 3
0 0 0



 0.00500.0070
0.0030



 100110
115



 −5.000−0.500
5.000



 7080
90



 100110
120

 1
Table 2.1: Model parameters for the network of three firms. E is the network dependency matrix, P the proportionality
matrix and B the correlation between network and external cash flows, as explained in the beginning of Section 2.4. λ
is the buy order intensities vector of firms in the network. D is the principal of the zero-coupon bonds issued by firms in
the network. Vector A0 shows the firms’ market asset values at time 0. The time period ends at T .
5This assumption can be relaxed and we comment on it in Section 2.4.2.
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small economy. The D/E ratios of firms 1, 2 and 3 are between 2 and 3 and the asset volatilities are
between 0.2 and 0.4 for all three firms.
We answer the following two questions. What is the effect of network dependency on the merger
activity and economic surplus generated by mergers? Secondly, what effect does firm leverage have
on merger activity?
The effect of different levels of network dependencies on coalition formation is shown in Table
2.2, where in column 9 we present only the average number of coalitions formed for all bargaining
orders (there are a total of 3! = 6 orders for this case). The average number of 3 coalitions means
that no mergers have occurred. All firms operate separately. In cases when 2 coalitions have formed,
two of the firms have merged and the third one operates independently. We deduce which firms
have merged by looking at their values with and without the merger effects, columns 2 − 4 and
5 − 7 respectively. The difference between a firm’s value in isolation (without merger effects) and
its merged value proxies for the Leland and Toft (1996) volatility/default cash flow tradeoff on the
account the creation of internal capital markets and is presented in column 8. The increase in firm
value is attributed to the positive effect between the tradeoff of firm default probability and stock
increase due to upward potential of volatile cash flows. Looking at the firm values under merger
Network
depen-
dency
Firm values with
mergers
Stand-alone firm
values
Merger
surplus
Avg. # of
coalitions
Coalitions
formed
M 1 2 3 1 2 3
1.00 12.82 61.18 246.35 12.82 61.18 246.35 0.00 3.00 (1),(2),(3)
2.00 6.07 5.42 246.35 1.66 1.01 246.35 8.82 2.00 (1,2),(3)
3.00 16.48 19.16 246.35 0.29 2.97 246.35 32.38 2.00 (1,2),(3)
4.00 25.02 32.35 246.35 3.51 10.84 246.35 43.01 2.00 (1,2),(3)
5.00 32.43 43.07 246.35 8.23 18.87 246.35 48.39 2.00 (1,2),(3)
6.00 38.89 51.78 246.35 13.25 26.14 246.35 51.27 2.00 (1,2),(3)
7.00 44.53 58.98 246.35 18.12 32.57 246.35 52.82 2.00 (1,2),(3)
8.00 49.47 65.05 246.35 22.68 38.25 246.35 53.59 2.00 (1,2),(3)
9.00 53.82 70.21 246.35 26.90 43.29 246.35 53.84 2.00 (1,2),(3)
10.00 57.64 74.65 246.35 30.79 47.79 246.35 53.71 2.00 (1,2),(3)
Table 2.2: The dependence of firm stock values and the number of coalitions formed with respect to the dependency
value of the network. The network dependency of the whole network increases with ascending M , i.e. a network
dependency matrix in row M is E(M) = ME, where E is given in Table 2.1. The next three columns (2-4) present
the value of firms 1-3 incorporating the synergy effect of the mergers. The next three columns (5-7) are the values of
individual firms, not incorporating the merger effects. Column 8 gives the average number of coalitions formed and the
last column shows the coalitions most likely to form keeping in mind that for different firm orderings in the bargaining
process different coalitions can arise. Other parameters are given in Table 2.1.
possibilities we notice that: a) Merger surplus increases with network dependency parameter M but
approaches an upper bound, see column 8, Table 2.2. b) Higher levels of network dependency induce
the supplier and the intermediary (firms 1 and 2) to merge but not the retailer (firm 3), column 10
in Table 2.2. c) The retailer is unaffected by the network dependency as demonstrated in columns 4
and 7 in the table.
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Increased network dependency has two opposing effects - the supplier and the intermediary
(firms 1 and 2) become more exposed to cash flow fluctuation which increases their default proba-
bility, but also allows for higher growth. Numerical results in Table 2.2, Column 10, show that the
default probability increase dominates and the two firms merge to reduce their network exposure and
default probability by creating an internal capital market which in turn increases the merger surplus
of firms 1 and 2, see Column 8. The result in c) above is general for buyer-supplier networks and is
due to the explicit modeling assumption where the network cash flows describe only the positive net
effect on the supplier firms (for precise exposition see Brumen and Vanini (2006)). We assume that
the buyer earns zero net profit from the buy order but can generate network cash flows from being a
supplier to other firms, i.e. the supplier, contrary to the buyer, can change its suppliers without large
costs. Hence the increased network dependency does not affect the supplier. The overall structure
of the results depends on the parameter values chosen in Table 2.1.
Similar to the case of two firms in Section 2.2 we now consider the dependence of merger activity
and firms’ equity values in relation to the network average leverage ratio L. Low average leverage
Avg.
leverage
ratio
Firm values with
mergers
Stand-alone firm
values
Merger
surplus
Avg. # of
coalitions
Coalitions
formed
L 1 2 3 1 2 3
2.00 2.35 24.69 117.64 2.35 24.69 117.64 0.00 3.00 (1),(2),(3)
1.60 0.06 6.28 45.52 0.06 6.28 45.52 0.00 3.00 (1),(2),(3)
1.33 8.75 5.73 15.70 3.17 0.15 10.98 15.89 1.67 (1,2,3)
1.14 25.77 20.00 14.36 9.77 2.07 0.22 48.08 1.00 (1,2,3)
1.00 35.26 27.94 19.81 18.56 9.06 3.53 51.86 1.00 (1,2,3)
0.89 43.86 35.95 27.90 28.68 19.07 14.47 45.47 1.00 (1,2,3)
0.80 52.41 35.09 37.67 39.59 30.78 29.04 25.76 1.33 (1,2,3)
0.73 52.96 45.39 50.84 50.93 43.35 44.97 9.94 1.67 (1,2,3)
0.67 62.48 56.30 61.07 62.48 56.30 61.07 0.00 3.00 (1),(2),(3)
0.62 74.10 69.33 76.82 74.10 69.33 76.82 0.00 3.00 (1),(2),(3)
Table 2.3: The dependence of the firm stock values and number of coalitions with respect to the average L ratio of the
firms in the economy. The next three columns (2-4) represent the value of firms 1-3 incorporating the merger effects.
Columns 5-7 are the individual firm values, not incorporating the merger effects. Column 8 gives the average number of
coalitions formed. The last column shows which coalitions formed most likely, keeping in mind that for different firm
bargaining orders different coalitions can arise. Except for the L parameter all other parameter values are given in Table
2.1.
ratio L in Table 2.3, Column 1 increases the value of all firms as separate entities as well as their
coalitional values, columns 5− 7 and 2− 4 respectively. Shape of merger activity resembles that in
a two firm case of Section 2.2 where the majority of mergers occur for medium L values (column 9,
rows 4, 5, 6 in Table 2.3). There are no mergers for the two extreme L cases on both sides (column 9,
rows 1, 2 and 9, 10) - no mergers occur for extremely high or lowL values as indicated by the average
number of 3 coalitions in column 9. Low leverage ratios virtually reduce the network dependency
value thereby lowering the incentives to merge. The reason for no mergers for high levels of L
comes from the asset substitution problem when the firms gamble for resurrection to increase their
volatility and consequently stock values. Merger surpluses, the difference between the firm’s stand-
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alone value and the firm value when merger activity is considered, shown in Table 2.3, column 8,
increase up to a certain level (rows 1 − 5 in Table 2.3) and then decrease again (rows 6 − 10) as
leverage ratios decrease. Merger activity (surpluses) follow an inverted (normal) U-shaped curve
with respect to the average L ratio in the economy, as already pointed out in the case of two firms in
Section 2.2. The difference between the network dependency and L variation in Tables 2.2 and 2.3
is that the L ratio effects all three firms in the economy by approximately equal proportions. This
changes the nature of merger activity form the merger of the supplier and the intermediary (column
10, rows 2− 10 in Table 2.2) to the merger of all three firms, rows 3− 8, column 10, Table 2.3.
2.4.1 Merger effects in different types of networks
We now consider the likelihood and the type of merger, i.e. is it a merger of buyers, suppliers or a
vertical merger, depending on different types of networks. In particular we consider three networks
depicted in Figure 2.4. The network in Figure 2.4(a) depicts a supplier (S) to two buying firms
S
B1 B2
(a) NT 1: Network of multi-
ple buyers B1 and B2 and a
single supplier S.
S1 S2
B
(b) NT 2: Network of multi-
ple suppliers S1 and S2 and a
single buyer B.
S
I
B
(c) NT 3: Net-
work of a buyer
B, an intermedi-
ary I and a sup-
plier S.
Figure 2.4: Different classes of buyer-supplier networks. Bi denotes the buyers, Si the suppliers. I is the intermediary
of the buyer-supplier chain in network 2.4(c).
(B1, B2), whereas 2.4(b) shows two suppliers (S1, S2) and a single buyer (B). Figure 2.4(c) shows
a vertical network of a buyer, an intermediary (I) and a supplier with no relationship between the
buyer (B) and the supplier (S). The adjacency matrices of networks 2.4(a), 2.4(b) and 2.4(c) are
E1 =

 0 1 10 0 0
0 0 0

 E2 =

 0 0 10 0 1
0 0 0

 E3 =

 0 1 00 0 1
0 0 0

 (2.12)
respectively. The three types of networks are distinctively different. In network 2.4(b) the default of
the buyer causes a cash flow shock to both of its suppliers, whereas in 2.4(a) the default of one of the
buyers causes only a cash inflow reduction. The third network 2.4(c) shares familiarities with both
2.4(a) and 2.4(b). The default of the buyer has the same network effect on the intermediary as does
buyer’s default in 2.4(b) on the supplier, and the default of the supplier in 2.4(c) has the same effect
on the intermediary as supplier’s default does on the buyer in 2.4(a). Except for the dependency
matrixE all other model parameters are given in Table 2.1.
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In Table 2.4 we vary the number of business relationships (links) between the individual firms
by multiplying the adjacency matrix E. in equation (2.12) by M . We present only the comparison
of merger activity across different types of networks. Merger surplus and the average number of
coalitions are defined in the same way as in Section 2.4. The complete tables with individual firm
values before and after accounting for mergers for all three types of networks are presented in the
Appendix, Tables 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7. The results in all three types of networks show that all three firms
Merger surplus Average # coalitions Coalitions formed
M NT 1 NT 2 NT 3 NT 1 NT 2 NT 3 NT 1 NT 2 NT 3
1.0 79.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 (S,B1, B2) (S1), (S2), (B) (S),(I),(B)
2.0 75.6 0.0 0.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 (S,B1, B2) (S1), (S2), (B) (S),(I),(B)
3.0 112.4 0.0 0.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 (S), (B1, B2) (S1), (S2), (B) (S),(I),(B)
4.0 112.4 0.0 0.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 (S), (B1, B2) (S1), (S2), (B) (S),(I),(B)
5.0 112.4 0.0 0.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 (S), (B1, B2) (S1), (S2), (B) (S),(I),(B)
6.0 112.4 15.4 0.2 2.0 2.0 2.0 (S), (B1, B2) (S1, S2), (B) (S,I),(B)
7.0 112.4 26.3 6.8 2.0 2.0 2.0 (S), (B1, B2) (S1, S2), (B) (S,I),(B)
8.0 112.4 34.3 11.7 2.0 2.0 2.0 (S), (B1, B2) (S1, S2), (B) (S,I),(B)
9.0 112.4 40.1 15.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 (S), (B1, B2) (S1, S2), (B) (S,I),(B)
10.0 112.4 44.6 18.4 2.0 2.0 2.0 (S), (B1, B2) (S1, S2), (B) (S,I),(B)
Table 2.4: The merger surplus, number of coalitions and coalition structure for network types in Figure 2.4 and different
dependency values M as multipliers of the respective adjacency matrices E. in equation (2.12). NT 1 refers to the
network in Figure 2.4(a), NT 2 to network in 2.4(b) and NT 3 to 2.4(c). The network dependency value has the same
meaning as in Table 2.2. All other parameter values are given in Table 2.1.
never merge together (Table 2.4, Columns 8,9,10)6 which confirms a low probability of mergers for
diversification, the intuition made in Brealey and Myers (2000). All three networks also display a
common feature that merger surplus increases with network dependency (columns 2, 3, 4) which is
due to the fact that for M < 6 the increase in firms’ cash-flow volatility benefits higher firm growth,
while for M ≥ 6, columns 2, 3, 4, firm volatility primarily increases the firms’ default probability.
The firms reduce their default probability through mergers. This fosters merger activity in all three
types of networks. Merger surplus comparison between the network types shows that for every
value of M the merger surplus in NT 1 is greater than in NT 2 which is again greater than in NT
3, columns 2, 3 and 4 in Table 2.4 respectively. This is partially explained by increased average
coalition number when going from NT 1 to NT 3 in columns 5, 6 and 7 for the same value of M . We
can also infer from the Table that in the case where the number of buyers (resp. suppliers) is larger
than the number of suppliers (resp. buyers) (NT 1 and NT 2 resp.), mergers occur primarily in the
group that dominates in the number of members.
We next analyze the merger behavior for different network types in succession. In NT 1, a
network of two buyers dependent on a single supplier, the buyers merge (Table 2.4, column 8, rows
M = 3, . . . , 9). For NT 1 and M = 1, 2 the mergers oscillate between no mergers (three separate
coalitions) and the coalition of all three firms, as indicated by the average number of 2 coalitions
formed in column 5. The reason for the merger of the buyers is not their exposure to the supplier
which does not decrease with the merger but the exposure to external cash flows, see Table 2.1.
6The case for NT 1 and M = 1, 2 is not a conglomerate merger as indicated by the average number of two coalitions
in column 5.
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Negative net external cash flows of buyer B1 are balanced with positive net external cash flows of
buyer B2. Both buyers gain from the merger - the cash flows of B1 are in average positive after the
merger, whereas B2 experiences reduction in cash flow volatility. Both buyers therefore favor the
merger. The two buyers do not favor the merger with the supplier. A stagnant merger surplus for
M ≥ 3, Column 2 is a consequence of the fact that the supplier’s stock is worth nearly 0 at this
point.
In network type NT 2 of two suppliers and a single buyer, the merger is between the suppliers
for sufficiently high dependency values (Table 2.4, column 9, rows M = 6, . . . , 10). The suppliers
have formed a conglomerate and effectively diversified their businesses. The merged firm of both
suppliers defaults less likely than every supplier individually which generates increasing merger
surplus with respect to M . As stated in the beginning of Section 2.4, it is an explicit modeling
assumption that the buyers, as opposed to the suppliers, can always find an alternative supplier
without greater switching costs and hence the buyer in NT 2 has no default considerations. The
coalition of the suppliers does not favor joining the buyer. Its highly volatile external cash flows
(Table 2.1) increase the default probability of the conglomerate more than they offset the growth
rate.
Mergers in a vertical network NT 3 behave similarly as in NT 2. The merger occurs for high
enough levels of network dependencies (M ≥ 6, Column 10 in Table 2.4) between the supplier and
the intermediary and does not include the buyer. We can justify this by ranking the firms by their
exposure to cash-flow fluctuations. The supplier and the intermediary in network NT 3 are each
exposed to its own external cash-flows as well as to the potential default of its buyers. The only
exposure of the buyer is to its external cash flows. As the merger reduces the cash-flow fluctuations
of the supplier and the intermediary, both firms find the merger beneficial. The buyer on the other
hand has no exposure to firms higher in the buy-supply chain and faces no such considerations. The
buyer hence rejects a coalition with the other firms.
2.4.2 Additional considerations and model limitations
The merger theory proposed in this Chapter relies heavily on the risk mitigation between firms and
does not address several other issues important for merger decisions. Firstly, the theory proposed in
this Chapter is not dynamic. Firms can merge only at the beginning of the period and stay either as
separate or merged entities from then on. Using dynamic programming we can relax this assumption
by allowing the firms to split and merge in response to market conditions, such as firms’ asset values,
volatilities, etc., to obtain a dynamic merger theory. The intuition into the behavior is given in
Proposition 2.2.1 and Figure 2.3. By inverting the graph in Figure 2.3 we can view the leverage ratio
L as a function of the network dependencyE12, i.e. L∗ = L∗(E12). When the firms’ average leverage
level L is below the L∗ line the firms are worth their stand-alone values. When the critical L ratio is
reached the firms merge. During the merger period the individual firm’s value is influenced by other
firms as well, see equations defining the firms’ values in Proposition 2.2.1. Using the notation in
Section 2.4 we can assume that the firm’s optimization function is
Si(t, A) = Et
[∫ ∞
t
e−ρi(s−t)LTi(s, A) ds
]
, (2.13)
where ρi is the firm’s time preference parameter, LTi(s, A) is the Leland and Toft (1996) equity value
of firm i in a network with business dependencies described by E and the vector of asset values of
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firms in a network at time s isA. The coalitions in the intertemporal framework form according to the
coalition theory in Section 2.3. The stock value Si in equation (2.13) is obviously greater than in the
general model of Section 2.4 with the assumption that there are no costs to merging/spinoffs. In the
setting with merger/spinoff costs the intuition suggests that there are not as many mergers as opposed
to the case where these costs are absent. A reasonable way to proceed would be to assume that the
coalitions form only when the asset values A reach a certain level, similar to the dynamic portfolio
optimization with transaction costs in Davis and Norman (1990). Hence, there exists a range of A
values where no mergers occur. Moreover, the mean-field games theory recently developed in Lasry
and Lions (2006a) and Lasry and Lions (2006b) gives interacting partial differential equations which
precisely describe the dynamic behavior of interacting firms.
We also assumed in this Chapter that firms gain no production efficiency as they merge, a fact
refuted in for example Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001). Efficiency gains can be modelled by
changing the parameters of the network model at the time of the merger or by a shock in asset value
process similar to Thijssen (2008). The assumption made in this Chapter that is hardest to relax is
that merged firms have no externality effects. Larger merged firms act increasingly more as monop-
olists which restrict competitive firm behavior assumed by the asset formation process in (2.10), as
documented in Farrell and Shapiro (1990). The attempt to solve the problem of externalities was
first made by Maskin (2003) but the theory developed there maintains the superadditivity axiom of
the value function in coalitions and lacks the rigorous proof of its validity.
Another assumption made in this Chapter is that equity value maximization is the firms’ (coali-
tions’) principal objective and that managers always undertake merger decisions in this light, a fact
ignoring the agency issues within a company. E.g., managers’ incentive mechanisms, such as golden
parachutes, can incite them to enter merger negotiations prematurely and thereby harm the share-
holders of the company. The assumption of equity value maximization can easily be altered on the
expense of computational simplicity, which would change the results, but the proposed coalitional
theory in Section 2.3 is flexible enough to accomodate them. An obvious direction of further study
would be the development of measures of agency conflicts and managers’ incentive programs on the
basis of merger behavior.
2.5 Conclusions
This dissertation chapter examines the effect of network dependencies and volatility structure of
firms’ cash flows on firms’ equity values and the merger formation process. Merger creates an
internal capital market and changes the risk-structure of cash flows that the firms generate. This
creates or destroys firm value. For that purpose we develop a theory of coalition formation without
the superadditivity axiom and apply it to the merger formation process. The axioms of the theory
can be recursively implemented in a parallel algorithm. Firm equity value in a network should not
be considered in isolation. “Merger corrections” increase the equity value of the firms accounting
for the potential of a value creating merger and generate economic surplus.
In a two firm case numerical results indicate that higher network dependency increases the like-
lihood of a merger and merger surplus. Moreover, there exists a network dependency cutoff point
above which merger is preferred by both parties. Furthermore, the dependence of merger activity
with respect to the average leverage ratio of firms in an economy exhibits an inverted U-shaped
function, confirming previous empirical results. The results in multi-firm networks indicate that the
merger occurs predominately between either buyers or suppliers depending on which party domi-
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nates the other in number.
Possible model extensions are dynamic coalition formation with externalities.
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2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Proofs of Theorems
Proof. (of Proposition 2.2.2) The proposition uses the notation and results of Section 2.3. We first
assume that the firms enter the bargaining process in order {1, 2}. The only possible coalition struc-
ture after firm 1 has entered is P1 = {{1}, ∅}. Since in a network of two firms firm 2 enters last, we
can compute Φ2 for different coalitions in P1 (we omit the notation P1 from Φ2):
Φ2({1}, ∅) = S1
Φ2({1}, {1}) = S12
Φ2(∅, {1}) = 0
Φ2(∅, ∅) = S2
Therefore the optimal allocation of firm 2 is to a coalition according to CA axiom is the So which
maximizes the following
So = argmax
Sˆ∈{{1},∅}
[
Φ2({1}, {1}) + Φ2(∅, {1}),Φ2({1}, ∅) + Φ2(∅, ∅)]
= argmax
Sˆ∈{{1},∅}
[S12 + 0, S1 + S2]
Therefore So(P1) = {1} if S1 + S2 ≤ S12 and So(P1) = ∅ if S1 + S2 > S12. This is exactly what
the condition in Proposition 2.2.2 states - if S12 ≥ S1 + S2, firm 2 joins the coalition of firm 1, i.e.
firms merge. If S12 < S1 + S2, firm 2 joins the coalition ∅ and operates as an independent entity.
We further calculate the values ϕ2 of firm 2: ϕ2(P1) = Φ2({1}, {1}) − Φ2({1}, ∅) = S12 − S1
when S1 + S2 < S12 and ϕ2(P1) = Φ2(∅, ∅) − Φ2(∅, {1}) = S2 when S1 + S2 > S12. We next
compute just the needed Vickrey payments: t2({1}|P1, {1, 2}) = S12−S1 when S1 +S2 < S12 and
t2({1}|P1, {1, 2}) = 0 in the other case. Therefore we get (P0 = {∅}) ϕ1(P0) = S12−(S12−S1) =
S1 and ϕ1(P0) = S1 − t2({1}|P1, {1, 2}) = S1 respectively for the two cases above. By reversing
the order of firms in the bargaining process, we get that the values of firms 1 and 2 are 1
2
(S1+S12−S2)
and 1
2
(S2 + S12 − S1) in the case S1 + S2 < S12 (exactly the Shapley values) and S1 and S2 in the
opposite case.
Proof. (of Theorem 2.3.1.) To prove the theorem it suffices to show the existence (and uniqueness)
of function Φi for every i = 1, . . . , N . We show the existence part by induction on i (player number)
top down, i.e. we start with player N and proceed downwards to player 1. The basis for induction
is given in equation (2.5). We now assume that we have constructed Φi, i = k + 1, . . . , N . Φk is
then defined by equation (2.4), where tj , j > k is defined by Φj (which was already constructed)
and SN(S) is constructed using the CA axiom. This proves the inductive step. It is obvious from the
construction above that the function Φi is unique.
The proof of Theorem 2.3.2 is facilitated by the series of Lemmas and the notation is adopted from
there.
Lemma 2.A.1. Φi(S, Sˆ|P i−1) is independent of P i−1 for all i = 1, . . . , N .
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Proof. We prove by the downward induction on the player number k. The induction basis for player
N :
ΦN (S, Sˆ|PN−1) =
{
v(S) S 6= Sˆ
v(S ∪N) S = Sˆ
Since the coalitional game does not possess externalities, the value function v is independent of
PN−1. Now we assume that all Φi, i > k are independent of P i−1 respectively. By the CA and VP
axioms and the definition (2.4) of Φi the induction step follows.
Lemma 2.A.2. Let i+1 be competitively allocated to So when the partial partition is (P i−1, Sˆ ∪ i).
Then the following relationships hold.
(a) If S 6= Sˆ ∈ P i−1 and So 6= S then Φi(S, Sˆ|P i−1) = Φi+1(S, So|(P i−1, Sˆ ∪ i)).
(b) If S 6= Sˆ and So = S then Φi(S, Sˆ|P i−1) = Φi+1(S, S|(P i−1, Sˆ ∪ i))− ti+1(S|(Pi−1, Sˆ ∪ i)).
(c) If S 6= So then Φi(S, S|P i−1) = Φi+1(S ∪ i, So|P i−1, S ∪ i).
(d) If S = So then Φi(S, S|P i−1) = Φi+1(S ∪ i, S ∪ i|P i−1, S ∪ i)− ti+1(S ∪ i|P i−1, S ∪ i).
Proof. To prove part (a) we write
Φi(S, Sˆ|P i−1) = v(SN(S))−
∑
j>i
tj(S
j−1(S)|ψj−1(P i−1, Sˆ ∪ i))
= v(SN(S))−
∑
j>i+1
tj(S
j−1(S)|ψj−1(P i−1, Sˆ ∪ i, So ∪ (i+ 1)))
−tj(Si(S)|ψi(P i−1, Sˆ ∪ i)).
Since S 6= So we have that tj(Si(S)|ψi(P i−1, Sˆ ∪ i)) = tj(S|ψi(P i−1, Sˆ ∪ i)) = 0, which proves
part (a).
To prove part (b) we compute
Φi(S, Sˆ|P i−1) = v(SN(S))−
∑
j>i
tj(S
j−1(S)|ψj−1(P i−1, Sˆ ∪ i))
= v(SN(S ∪ (i+ 1)))−
∑
j>i+1
tj(S
j−1(S ∪ (i+ 1))|ψj−1(P i−1, Sˆ ∪ i, S ∪ (i+ 1)))
−ti+1(Si(S)|ψi(P i−1, Sˆ ∪ i))
= Φi+1(S, S|P i−1, Sˆ ∪ i)− ti+1(S|ψi(P i−1, Sˆ ∪ i)),
since ti+1(Si(S)|ψi(P i−1, Sˆ ∪ i)) = ti+1(S|ψi(P i−1, Sˆ ∪ i)), which proves part (b).
Part (c) and (d) are proved in a similar manner.
Proof. (of Theorem 2.3.2.) We fix an ordering of players entering the bargaining process as pi =
(1, 2, . . . , N). By averaging over all permutations pi ∈ SN we obtain the desired result. On occasions
we will suppress certain function arguments when it is obvious from the context what they are.
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To prove (a) we first establish the following identity.∑
i∈S
ϕi(P i−1) = Φk(S, So|Pk−1), (2.14)
where S, S0 ∈ Pk−1 and So is the competitive allocation (by the axiom CA) of player k. We prove
(2.14) by induction on the player k getting into the bargaining process. We first establish the basis
of induction.
ϕ1({∅}) = Φ1(∅, ∅|P0)− Φ1(∅, ∅′|P0)
= Φ1(∅, ∅|P0),
where the identities follow from the fact that the maximum in the CW axiom (2.7) for player 1 is
attained at Soo = ∅′ and the fact that Φ1(∅, ∅′|P0) = 0.
We now prove the inductive step. Let 2 ≤ k < N andPk−1 be fixed. We first assume that S 6= So
in (2.14) and differentiate between two cases: k+1 is competitively allocated to (i) Soo 6= S and (ii)
Soo = S. For the case (i) we have ∑i∈S ϕi(P i−1) = Φk(S, So|Pk−1) = Φk+1(S, Soo|Pk−1, So ∪ k)
by Lemma 2.A.2(a). This proves the inductive step in the case (i). Now consider the case (ii)
Soo = S. Here∑
i∈S∪(k+1)
ϕi(P i−1) = Φk(S, So|Pk−1) + ϕk+1(Pk)
= Φk+1(S, S|Pk−1, So ∪ k)− tk+1(S|Pk−1, So ∪ k)ϕk+1(Pk−1, So ∪ k)
= Φk+1(S, S|Pk−1, So ∪ k)
using Lemma 2.A.2 and the CW and VP axioms.
We now turn to the induction step when S = So. The case Soo 6= (S ∪ k) is almost identical to
(i) above and will not be repeated. We prove only the last case S = So and Soo = S ∪ k. Then∑
i∈S∪k∪(k+1)
ϕi(P i−1) = Φk(S, S|Pk−1) + ϕk+1(Pk−1, So ∪ k)
= Φk+1(S ∪ k, S ∪ k|Pk−1, S ∪ k)− tk+1(S ∪ k|Pk−1, S ∪ k)
+ϕk+1(Pk−1, So ∪ k)
= Φk+1(S ∪ k, S ∪ k|Pk−1, S ∪ k)
by Lemma 2.A.2(d) and the CW and VP axioms. Altogether, this proves the induction step. Since
the induction hypothesis holds also for k = N , we have proven (a).
Part (b) is obvious from the construction of the Vickrey payments. To prove (c) we compute
ϕk(Pk−1) = Φk(So, So|Pk−1)− Φk(So, Soo|Pk−1)
= v(SN(So ∪ k))−
∑
j>k
tj(S
j−1(So ∪ k)|ψj−1(Pk−1, So ∪ k))
−v(SN(So)) +
∑
j>k
tj(S
j−1(So)|ψj−1(Pk−1, Soo ∪ k)),
where k is competitively allocated to So and So 6= Soo ∈ Pk−1. By assumption we have that
v(SN(So ∪ k)) = v(SN(So)) and by Lemma 2.A.1 we have that for all j > k we have tj(Sj−1(So ∪
k)|ψj−1(Pk−1, So ∪ k)) = tj(Sj−1(So)|ψj−1(Pk−1, Soo ∪ k)). This concludes the proof.
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To prove (d) we show that the axioms we defined imply the axioms which define the Shapley
value. The Pareto optimality condition of the Shapley value is implied by (a) of this theorem. The
anonymity of the value function in the Shapley axioms is implied by the averaging over ϕi for
different permutations. The dummy axiom is implied by (c). It remains to prove the linearity of the
Shapley value, i.e. we prove that ϕv+v′i (here we make the dependence on the value function explicit)
constructed from v+v′ equals the sum of ϕvi +ϕv
′
i . To prove this we show that Φiv+v′(S1, S2|P i−1) =
Φiv(S1, S2|P i−1) + Φiv′(S1, S2|P i−1). This is done by induction on i. The case of ΦN is proven from
the assumption since
ΦNv+v′(S1, S2|PN−1) =
{
v(S1) + v
′(S1) S1 6= S2
v(S1 ∪N) + v′(S1 ∪N) S1 = S2
which evidently proves the base for induction. The inductive step is a consequence of induction
assumption and the equation (2.4).
The following Proposition demonstrates that mergers can be optimal even if synergies between
certain firms are negative, thereby confirming the results in Thijssen (2008).
Proposition 2.A.3. Let (3, v) be a coalitional game of three players as in Section 2.4. We assume
the following inequalities hold:
(1) v({1, 2}) < v({1}) + v({2}).
(2) v({1}) + v({3}) > v({2, 3})
(3) v({2}) + v({3}) > v({1, 3})
(4) v({1, 2, 3}) > v({1, 2}) + v({3})
(5) v({3} > v({1}) + v({2})
Then the axioms NA-VP predict the formation of the grand coalition even though in the game (2, v)
reduced to the first two players the grand coalition does not form.
Proof. We analyze the game top-down. Let us first assume that the partial partition of the first two
players is P2 = {{1, 2}, ∅}. Then
Φ3({1, 2}, ∅|P2) = v({1, 2})
Φ3({1, 2}, {1, 2}|P2) = v({1, 2, 3})
Φ3(∅, ∅|P2) = v({3})
Φ3(∅, {1, 2}|P2) = 0
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If P2 = {{1}, {2}, ∅}:
Φ3({1}, ∅|P2) = v({1})
Φ3({1}, {2}|P2) = v({1})
Φ3({1}, {1}|P2) = v({1, 3})
Φ3({2}, {1}|P2) = v({2})
Φ3({2}, {∅}|P2) = v({2})
Φ3({2}, {2}|P2) = v({2, 3})
Φ3(∅, {1}|P2) = 0
Φ3(∅, {2}|P2) = 0
Φ3(∅, ∅|P2) = v({3})
The optimal choice for the coalition (CA axiom) of player 3 in the case of P2 = {{1, 2}, ∅} is
max
{{1,2},∅}
{ Φ3({1, 2}, {1, 2}|P2) + Φ3(∅, {1, 2}|P2),Φ3({1, 2}, ∅|P2) + Φ3(∅, ∅|P2)}
= max
{{1,2},∅}
{v({1, 2, 3}), v({1, 2}) + v({3})},
where the first element in the maximum above is connected to the coalition {1, 2} and the second to
forming a new coalition (∅).
By condition (4) above the optimal choice for player 3 in this case is the coalition {1, 2}.
Let us now assume that P2 = {{1}, {2}, ∅}. In this case player 3 chooses between
max
{{1},{2},∅}
{ Φ3({1}, {1}|P2) + Φ3({2}, {1}|P2) + Φ3(∅, {1}|P2),
Φ3({1}, {2}|P2) + Φ3({2}, {2}|P2) + Φ3(∅, {2}|P2),
Φ3({1}, ∅|P2) + Φ3({2}, ∅|P2) + Φ3(∅, ∅|P2)}
= max
{{1},{2},∅}
{v({1, 3}) + v({2}) + v({1}), v({1}) + v({2, 3}) + v({2}),
v({1}) + v({2}) + v({3})}
By the assumptions (2) and (3) player 3 chooses its own coalition (∅) in this case. We next analyze
the competitive wages (CW axiom) for player 3 in both cases. When P2 = {{1, 2}, ∅} we have that
ϕ3({{1, 2}, ∅}) = v({1, 2, 3})− v({3}) and t3({1, 2}|P2) = v({1, 2, 3})− v({3}), t3(∅|P2) = 0.
In the case when P2 = {{1}, {2}, ∅} it holds that ϕ3({{1}, {2}, ∅}) = v({3}).
We now proceed to the decision of player 2. The only possibility is P1 = {{1}, ∅}. We have
Φ2({1}, ∅|P1) = v({1})
since the optimal choice for player 3 in the case of (P2)′ = {{1}, {2}, ∅} is its own coalition (∅) and
Φ2({1}, {1}|P1) = v({1, 2, 3})− t3({1, 2})
= v({1, 2, 3})− v({1, 2, 3}) + v({3})
= v({3}),
since in the case of (P2)′′ = {{1, 2}, ∅} the player 3 joins the coalition {1, 2}. Furthermore
Φ2(∅, {1}|P1) = 0
Φ2(∅, ∅|P1) = v({2}).
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In the first equation we used the fact that the games ends with the grand coalition forming and the
payoff to the empty coalition is 0. In the second equation that player 2 forms its own coalition and
so does player 3. The payoff to this coalition is therefore v({2}). Optimal decision for player 2 is
therefore
max
{{1},∅}
{ Φ2({1}, ∅|P1) + Φ2(∅, ∅|P1),Φ2({1}, {1}|P1) + Φ2(∅, {1}|P1)}
= max
{{1},∅}
{v({1}) + v({2}), v({3})}
By assumption (5) in the Proposition player 2 chooses the coalition with player 1. It is easily seen
that there exists values for v which satisfy conditions (1)-(5) above. This completes the proof.
The following proposition is a restatement of the debt and equity pricing results in Leland and Toft
(1996) and is repeated here for coherence.
Proposition 2.A.4 (Leland-Toft (1996)). Let the dynamics of firm assets be dA
A
= µdt+ σdW . The
firm issued zero-coupon debt with maturity T and principal P which is retired uniformly over the
interval [0, T ]. The firm defaults whenA falls below the default boundary VB, determined below. The
costs of bankruptcy are αVB . Then the value of the equity in this model, denoted by LT (mnemonic
for Leland-Toft Equity value), is
LT (V, P, σ) = V − αVB
(
V
VB
)−(a+z)
−D, (2.15)
where the value of D is given by
D = P
(
1− e−rT
rT
− I(T )
)
+ (1− α)VBJ(T ), (2.16)
where
I(T ) =
1
rT
(G(T )− e−rTF (T ))
J(T ) =
1
zσ
√
T
(
−
(
V
VB
)−a+z
N(q1(T ))q1(T ) +
(
V
VB
)−a−z
N(q2(T ))q2(T )
)
and the constants are given by
F (t) = N(h1(t)) +
(
V
VB
)−2a
N(h2(t))
G(t) =
(
V
VB
)−a+z
N(q1(t)) +
(
V
VB
)−a−z
N(q2(t))
z =
√
(aσ2)2 + 2rσ2
σ2
q1(t) =
−b− zσ2t
σ
√
t
q2(t) =
−b+ zσ2t
σ
√
t
h1(t) =
−b− aσ2t
σ
√
t
h2(t) =
−b+ aσ2t
σ
√
t
a =
r − δ − σ2/2
σ2
b = log
(
V
VB
)
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and the default boundary VB is given by
VB = − AP/(rT )
1 + α(a+ z)− (1− α)B
with
A = 2ae−rTN(aσ
√
T )− 2zN(zσ
√
T )− 2
σ
√
T
n(zσ
√
T ) +
2e−rT
σ
√
T
n(aσ
√
T ) + z − a
B = −
(
2z +
2
zσ2T
)
N(zσ
√
T )− 2
σ
√
T
n(zσ
√
T ) + z − a+ 1
zσ2T
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2.A.2 Additional tables for Chapter 2.4.1
Firm values w/
merger effects
Firm values w/o
merger effects
M S B1 B2 S B1 B2 av. # coal Coalitions
1.0 22.9 84.6 265.1 20.8 26.4 246.4 2.0 (S,B1, B2)
2.0 13.2 83.0 265.1 12.8 26.4 246.4 2.0 (S,B1, B2)
3.0 5.8 82.6 302.6 5.8 26.4 246.4 2.0 (S), (B1, B2)
4.0 1.7 82.6 302.6 1.7 26.4 246.4 2.0 (S), (B1, B2)
5.0 0.1 82.6 302.6 0.1 26.4 246.4 2.0 (S), (B1, B2)
6.0 0.3 82.6 302.6 0.3 26.4 246.4 2.0 (S), (B1, B2)
7.0 1.6 82.6 302.6 1.6 26.4 246.4 2.0 (S), (B1, B2)
8.0 3.5 82.6 302.6 3.5 26.4 246.4 2.0 (S), (B1, B2)
9.0 5.8 82.6 302.6 5.8 26.4 246.4 2.0 (S), (B1, B2)
10.0 8.2 82.6 302.6 8.2 26.4 246.4 2.0 (S), (B1, B2)
Table 2.5: The dependence of firm stock values and the number of coalitions formed with respect to the dependency
value of the network for network depicted in Figure 2.4(a). The network dependency of the whole network increases
with ascending M , i.e. a network dependency value in row M is 2M with adjacency matrix M · E1, where E1 is
given in equation (2.12). The next three columns (2-4) present the value of firms 1-3 incorporating the synergy effect
of the mergers. Columns 5-7 are the values of individual firms, not incorporating the merger effects. Column 8 gives
the average number of coalitions formed. The last column shows which coalitions were most likely to form keeping in
mind the fact that for different firm bargaining sequences different coalitional outcomes are possible. Other parameters
are given in Table 2.1.
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Merger effects No merger effects
M S1 S2 B S1 S2 B av. # coal Coalitions
1.0 22.6 521.3 246.4 22.6 521.3 246.4 3.0 (S1), (S2), (B)
2.0 17.6 186.6 246.4 17.6 186.6 246.4 3.0 (S1), (S2), (B)
3.0 11.7 61.2 246.4 11.7 61.2 246.4 3.0 (S1), (S2), (B)
4.0 6.7 20.9 246.4 6.7 20.9 246.4 3.0 (S1), (S2), (B)
5.0 3.1 6.2 246.4 3.1 6.2 246.4 3.0 (S1), (S2), (B)
6.0 8.7 8.7 246.4 1.0 1.0 246.4 2.0 (S1, S2), (B)
7.0 13.3 13.2 246.4 0.1 0.0 246.4 2.0 (S1, S2), (B)
8.0 17.2 18.1 246.4 0.1 1.0 246.4 2.0 (S1, S2), (B)
9.0 20.8 23.0 246.4 0.7 3.0 246.4 2.0 (S1, S2), (B)
10.0 24.1 27.7 246.4 1.8 5.4 246.4 2.0 (S1, S2), (B)
Table 2.6: The dependence of firm values and the number of coalitions formed with respect to the dependency value
of the network for network depicted in Figure 2.4(b). The network dependency of the whole network increases with
ascending M , i.e. a network dependency value in row M is 2M with adjacency matrix ME2, where E2 is given in
equation (2.12). The next three columns (2-4) present the value of firms 1-3 incorporating the synergy effect of the
mergers. Columns 5-7 are the values of individual firms, not incorporating the merger effects. Column 8 gives the
average number of coalitions formed. The last column shows which coalitions were most likely to form keeping in mind
the fact that for different firm bargaining sequences different coalitional outcomes are possible. Other parameters are
given in Table 2.1.
Merger effects No merger effects
M S I B S I B av. # coal Coalitions
1.0 22.7 521.3 246.4 22.7 521.3 246.4 3.0 (S),(I),(B)
2.0 17.8 186.6 246.4 17.8 186.6 246.4 3.0 (S),(I),(B)
3.0 12.1 61.2 246.4 12.1 61.2 246.4 3.0 (S),(I),(B)
4.0 7.1 20.9 246.4 7.1 20.9 246.4 3.0 (S),(I),(B)
5.0 3.4 6.2 246.4 3.4 6.2 246.4 3.0 (S),(I),(B)
6.0 1.3 1.1 246.4 1.2 1.0 246.4 2.0 (S,I),(B)
7.0 3.6 3.4 246.4 0.2 0.0 246.4 2.0 (S,I),(B)
8.0 5.9 6.9 246.4 0.0 1.0 246.4 2.0 (S,I),(B)
9.0 8.3 10.7 246.4 0.5 3.0 246.4 2.0 (S,I),(B)
10.0 10.7 14.6 246.4 1.5 5.4 246.4 2.0 (S,I),(B)
Table 2.7: The dependence of firm values and the number of coalitions formed with respect to the dependency value
of the network for network depicted in Figure 2.4(c). The network dependency of the whole network increases with
ascending M , i.e. a network dependency matrix in row M is 2M with adjacency matrix ME3, where E3 is given
in equation (2.12). The next three columns (2-4) present the value of firms 1-3 incorporating the synergy effect of the
mergers. Columns 5-7 are the values of individual firms, not incorporating the merger effects. Column 8 gives the
average number of coalitions formed. The last column shows which coalitions were most likely to form keeping in mind
the fact that for different firm bargaining sequences different coalitional outcomes are possible. Other parameters are
given in Table 2.1.
Chapter 3
Financial Effects of External Auditing
3.1 Introduction
The efficient market hypothesis postulates that investors possess the information to correctly value
the companies in their portfolio although how this occurs is usually not examined. As Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980) have demonstrated in their seminal publication on asymmetric information, the way
investors acquire information is highly significant for price determination. Market participants are
driven to asses costs involved in obtaining and conveying information. The empirical study by Li
and Xu (2008) shows that the establishment of the 1933/34 regulatory acts which provides company
information in a standardized way has reduced the volatility of financial assets at the NYSE. Auditing
choice and accounting standards have been until recently overlooked in the scholarship literature.
Watts and Zimmerman (1990) state that if information acquisition and transition is costless then the
choice of accounting methods and auditing choice is irrelevant, p. 133. An examination of firms’
actual balance sheets shows that the costs of gathering and transmitting financial information are
far from negligible. For instance, the four biggest external auditing firms, PricewaterhouseCoopers,
Deloitte, Ernst & Young and KPMG have posted their total global revenues in excess of 47 billion
US dollars in 2007, a 12 % increase from 2006 on account of auditing services.
According to Ronen and Yaari (2007) there are two main roles of auditing: informativeness and
stewardship. Informativeness, the focus of this paper, refers to the investors’ demand for information
in order to predict future cash flows as stated in the Statement of Financial Accounting Concept No.
1, AICPA, 1994; and AIMR, 1993. Lambert (2003) has underscored the importance of consistent
summary statistics because of their ability to lessen contracting costs and transform soft information
into hard one. Hard information, usually reduced to numeric form, can be transmitted easily and
verifiably between economic agents, see Petersen (2004) for literature review. Past firm earnings
or defaults are an example of hard information. On the other hand soft information can not be
verifiably transmitted. Ideas, forecasts, future plans are all examples of soft information. Firm’s
stock is necessarily the combination of both hard and soft information. Auditing reduces the soft
firm information part and transforms the soft into hard information, as illustrated in Chapter 5 of
Petersen (2004), thereby providing a verifiable signal to the outside investors, see e.g Gibson (1999).
Ronen and Yaari (2007) document that the stock market reacts differently if a firm transaction is
recorded as an expense in the income statement (hard information) or simply in a footnote (soft). Our
approach based on information theory brings a novel way of dealing with soft to hard information
transformation on the account of auditing effort in a quantifiable manner.
61
62 CHAPTER 3. FINANCIAL EFFECTS OF EXTERNAL AUDITING
We use the term “auditing” for the effort of an external auditor to verifiably convey firm cash-flow
information to the outside investors. This dissertation chapter answers the following three questions:
1. What is the appropriate extent (quality) of auditing for a firm maximizing its share price?
2. Do shareholders and debtholders disagree about the optimal auditing level?
3. What are the auditor’s revenues?
We model the optimal amount of auditing services to the firms as a choice of the auditing effort
which relates the audit costs and the precision of accounting statements, i.e. the transformation of
soft into hard information. On the one hand, auditing reduces the firm’s cash flow volatility observed
by outside investors while on the other hand, auditing is costly to the firm. In an economy where
the representative investor is risk-averse, auditing raises stock prices. The strength of both of these
effects determines the optimal auditing effort. Information theory, as developed by Shannon (1948)
gives a quantitative answer as to how much and in what structural way the perceived volatility of the
firm’s cash flows is reduced with the certain amount of audit effort.
Apart from auditor’s fees, Gibson (1999) identifies other indirect costs of auditing: threat of
product market competition, tax avoidance considerations, agency problems among different classes
of shareholders. We notice that the auditing analysis based on information theory best describes the
verification of information and not information search. We realize that there are other functions of
auditing which we do not account for. Auditing can be viewed as an extreme case of inspection
games (Avenhaus, von Stangel, and Zamir (2002) and Kaplan (1993)), i.e. a disciplinary device of
internal auditing. Gibson (1999) names others: enhanced auditor’s report lowers the cost of capital
since they reduce the moral hazard and adverse selection problems, auditing acts as a signaling
device for firms in industries where products are close substitutes, or as a reputation device.
The results show that the firm chooses the level of external auditing strictly below the level that
eliminates all economic noise. If the costs of conveying the information are too high, or the noise
volatility and risk-aversion are too low, the lowest auditing quality is chosen. The choice of auditing
quality was empirically analyzed in Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) who show that the firms’ stock
prices increase if the disclosure of information and the audit effort is voluntarily. The share price
increase on the account of auditing has a put option like structure with respect to auditing costs and
a call option like structure with respect to noise volatility, i.e. there exists a level of auditing costs
(resp. noise volatility) above (resp. below) which the firm chooses the lowest audit effort which
still complies with imposed auditing regulations. We prove that under certain technical conditions
the auditing model is consistent with cash-flow signalling and incomplete markets arbitrage pricing
models and provides simpler mathematical structure. The multi-period model of auditing preserves
the one-period structural form of results for the optimal per-period auditing effort but with changed
audit costs and risk aversion parameters. We prove that under general parameter conditions the
level of auditing chosen by the debtholders is higher than if chosen by the shareholders, especially
if the marginal auditing costs are low. Debtholders choose highest auditing levels for intermediate
firm leverage values. Optimal auditing chosen by the shareholders is much smaller and generates
at most a slight increase in stock price indicating that auditing primarily protects debtholders. We
further show that the first best auditing contract is achieved irrespectively of whether the firm or
the auditor holds the bargaining power and competition between auditors raises the auditing cutoff
point. The firm’s optimization problem under incomplete information about the economic noise
volatility reflects the probability that the contract will be rejected by the auditor which make a cutoff
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rejection/acceptance decision given its signal. Based on the results developed in previous sections,
we use the Shapley value to compute the auditor’s revenues and multiple units’ firm stock values
under auditing, a situation which proxies for both the firm size as well as for an auditor with many
clients. The price obtained in this way constitutes the basis for econometric modeling.
The information theory approach to asset pricing is a relatively novel way of looking at economic
agent optimization problems. One of the first papers in this area is Sims (2003) who imposes infor-
mation capacity constraints on economic agents, based on the psychological results on the scarcity
of attention in individuals’ decision making process. The papers by Peng (2005) and Peng and Xiong
(2006) extend his analysis to intertemporal financial decisions and price formation under capacity
constraints. In this thesis chapter we follow the same general intuition where economic agents are
firms who maximize profits with respect to the costly information constraint which reduces firm
volatility. The richer framework of the information theory precisely quantifies the variance reduc-
tion in the contract theory approach to the corporate governance framework in Hermalin (2005) and
Hermalin and Weisbach (2006). Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) analyzed firms following less stringent
German accounting practices and show that the firms’ stock prices increased for those firms in the
system who disclosed additional accounting information with more audit effort voluntarily. Ronen
and Yaari (2007) identify earnings smoothing as one of the three most familiar patterns of earn-
ings management behavior and Lambert (1984) develops a rational principal-manager model which
includes earnings smoothing and implies the reduction in earnings volatility. The results in these pa-
pers are in line with the multi-period auditing behavior in our model. The paper by Immordino and
Pagano (2007) discusses the self-regulation of auditor’s and starts the analysis where our paper has
left off. In their paper the audit quality is unobservable and the auditor does not necessarily provide
the level of auditing required by the firm. Hermalin and Weisbach (2006) report on the provision of
the Sarbanes-Oxley act which requires increased reporting of off-balance sheet financing and special
purpose vehicles thereby implicitly requiring the transformation of soft information about the firm
profitability due to off-balance sheet assets into a much more hard information about the firm. Our
model based on information theory precisely quantifies what effect does such a policy decision has
on stock prices.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the information model of optimal
auditing behavior and develops the stock valuation formulas under auditing. Section 3.2.1 examines
a discrete time framework of the same auditing model. In section 3.2.2 we analyze agency problems
regarding auditing. Section 3.2.3 shows how the results change when competition between auditors,
different bargaining power and incomplete information about the noise are introduced. Section 3.3
then develops the theory of auditing revenues for a multiple business units’ firm. Section 3.4 sums
up the results.
3.2 A simple model of auditing
The economic setting is as follows. We consider a firm which lives for one period and generates
cash flows X at the end of that period. The firm estimates that X ∼ N(µ, σ2I ), i.e. the cash flows are
distributed normally with mean µ and intrinsic volatility σI . The outside investors observe distorted
version X˜ = X + Z, where Z is independent of X and distributed normally with mean 0 and
variance σ2N which implies that X˜ ∼ N(µ, σ2 = σ2I + σ2N), i.e. the estimation of the cash flows
by the market investors is unbiased. The noise component Z is non-diversifiable and influences the
pricing of stocks in such economic setting, as observed by Musiela and Zariphopoulou (2008) for
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pricing of securities in incomplete markets. Economic noise therefore constitutes a systematic factor
in this setting. The firm has a possibility to hire an external auditor. If the management chooses to do
so and the auditor exerts an effort R (at a cost c(R)) the noise variance σ2N is reduced to1 σ2N · 2−2R.
Putting both effects together the audit effort R provides investors with cash flow distribution
X˜r ∼ N
(
µ− c(R), σ2I + σ2N2−2R
)
. (3.1)
The mechanism is depicted in Figure 3.1.
+
Z
X X˜ X˜r
audit Rfund.
noise
Figure 3.1: The addition of the economic noise Z to the intrinsic cash flow volatility X . The resulting cash flow is X˜ .
Auditing effort R produces firm cash flow X˜r about the firm’s cash flows.
The objective function of the firm is to maximize its stock price p by choosing the audit effort R.
The firm solves the following optimization problem
max
R≥0
p(X˜r(R)). (3.2)
There are two opposing effects of auditing. On the one side it reduces firm cash flows by the audit
costs c(R). On the other hand it also reduces the volatility of cash flows - risk averse investors in the
financial market prefer to hold shares of low volatility firms ceteris paribus. The tradeoff between
these two effects determines the optimal auditing effort.
We make the following additional assumptions. The cost function is linear2 in R, i.e. c(R) =
C · R. The market is composed of a single representative agent with CARA utility of absolute risk
aversion α. The firm’s shares are in unit supply. We assume throughout this chapter that the riskless
interest rate in the economy is normalized to 0. The following proposition characterizes the price
formation in this setting.
Proposition 3.2.1. In an economy described above the firm chooses auditing effort R∗ > 0 if and
only if K = ασ2N log(4)
C
> 1. The price of shares is given by
p = µ− CR∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
µ′
−α (σ2I + σ2N2−2R∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(σ′)2
, (3.3)
where R∗ is given by
R∗ =
{
1
2
log2K =
1
2
(log2 α + log2 σ
2
N − log2C + log2 log 4) K > 1
0 K ≤ 1 (3.4)
1This is the result of distortion theory for normally distributed random variables, see Appendix, Theorem 3.A.1.
2The structural form of the cost function assumed here does not account for the economies of scale with regards to the
auditing effort. The linear costs are justified if we assume that the cost function of the auditor is in the form CR−Dσ2N ,
see Proposition 3.A.9 in the Appendix, an assumption made later on. Auditing results accompanying a more general
form of the cost function are presented in Proposition 3.A.4 in the Appendix. Stock pricing effects stemming form this
more general setting can be treated when performing the empirical estimation.
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The price of company shares has the same structure as under full information but with a changed
cash flows’ expectation µ′ (instead of µ) and variance (σ′)2 (instead of σ2I + σ2N ). The CARA in-
vestors weigh the marginal costs C of establishing a credibility channel and the marginal benefits
of volatility reduction ασ2N log(4). Auditing effort R∗ is positively related to the coefficient of in-
vestors’ risk aversion α and the noise in the economy σN . In the risk neutral economy, the price
optimal level of auditingR = 0, i.e. the lowest auditing level is chosen. The investors value only ex-
pected stock returns, which are highest when the auditing level is at its minimum. Stock price (3.3)
can be decomposed into the classical component µ− ασ2I not influenced by auditing and a reduced
economy-wide noise component ασ2N2−2R
∗
together with the auditing costs CR∗. The results for
the general cost function c are given in Appendix 3.A.2, Proposition 3.A.4.
The firm’s benefits from auditing B are
B = −CR∗ + ασ2N (1− 2−2R
∗
) =
{
ασ2N
(
1− 1
K
)− C
2
log2K K > 1
0 K ≤ 1 (3.5)
where R∗ and K are given as in Proposition 3.2.1. The auditor’s revenue from auditing L is given
by L = CR∗ − Dσ2N where we assume that the auditor incurs a cost Dσ2N due to the auditing
procedure. This costs are proportion the noise variance σ2N with proportionality factor D. This
assumption reflects the fact that the auditor’s costs are higher in a noisier economy. We can compute
the following comparative statics results (K > 1, ∂B
∂α
= ∂B
∂σ2
N
= ∂B
∂C
= 0 and ∂L
∂α
= ∂L
∂σ2
N
= ∂L
∂C
= 0
otherwise):
∂B
∂α
= σ2N −
C
2α
∂B
∂σ2N
= α− C
2σ2N
∂B
∂C
=
1
2
− K
log 4
− 1
2
log2K < 0
∂L
∂α
=
C
2α log 2
> 0
∂L
∂σ2N
=
α
K
−D = C
σ2N log 4
−D (3.6)
∂L
∂C
=
1
2 log 2
(logK − 1)
Graphical representation of auditing benefits and auditor’s revenues from auditing is presented in
Figure 3.2. The firm’s auditing benefits B have a call-option like structure with respect to the overall
noise in the economy σ2N and a put-option like payoff with respect to the audit costs C. The intrinsic
cash flow volatility σI does not influence firm’s auditing benefits. For both parameters C and σ2N
there exists a cut-off value C∗ and (σ2N)∗ such that for all C > C∗ and σ2N < (σ2N )∗ audit benefits
are 0 and the lowest level of auditing is optimal. Additionally,B becomes linear in σ2N as σ2N ր∞,
i.e. ∂B
∂σ2
N
ր α. The same happens for ∂B
∂α
ր σ2N as α ր ∞. The payoff with respect to average
risk-aversion parameter α is similar to that of σ2N . Similar effects are observed for L. As the risk
aversion parameter α in the economy increases more auditing is demanded which increases audit
fees L. The behavior of L with respect to σ2N and C is non-monotonic. If the noise variance σ2N is
large or the audit fees C are small, the auditing revenues decrease with σN - the auditor has to exert
large effort to reduce the noise variance to the level demanded by the firm or the collected fees do
not cover the costs to the auditor. When C is low more auditing is required but the net audit effort is
still low. The opposite happens when C is high.
As emphasized by Brunnermeier (2001) auditing is not the only way firms reduce their volatil-
ity. The entropy based model illuminates which signalling models are compatible with the auditing
behavior described in this section. The signal we have in mind can come from various sources, such
as the revealed accounting information about comparable firms, default of firm’s buyers or other
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Figure 3.2: Auditor’s revenues from auditing L and auditing benefits to the firm B drawn with respect to the cost of
auditing C and the overall noise in the economy σ2.
macroeconomic informations such as the economy-wide sales decrease. The investors therefore
make stock price inference on the posterior distribution X|R, where R is the signal. In the remain-
ing of this paragraph we show which signalling models are compatible with the structural form of
posterior cash flows (3.1). We first prove the impossibility result for the jointly normal cash-flow
and signal vector.
Lemma 3.2.2. Let the firm’s cash flowsX be distributed normally as above and the investors receive
a signal R about the economic noise Z. Then there does not exist a jointly normal distribution
(X,R)′ such that the conditional distribution X|R has structural form (3.1).
The non-existence result shows that the signalling models consistent with the auditing behavior do
not belong to the normal class. In the appendix we prove that there exist signalling models which are
consistent with the structural form (3.3) where the conditional distribution X|R is normal, but the
signal R is not, see Appendix, Proposition 3.A.6 for details. The information theory based auditing
analysis therefore restricts the set of signalling models which can be used in the analysis of auditing.
In can easily be deduced that the market model presented in this section is incomplete and there
exist multiple equivalent pricing measures. Musiela and Zariphopoulou (2008) have shown that in
an incomplete market the price of an asset paying out X + Z with a non-tradable part Z is given
by EQ[X + Z], called the utility indifference price, where the equivalent measure Q is such that
the conditional distribution of Z|(X + Z) is the same under both the historical measure P and the
equivalent pricing measure Q. We show in the Appendix, Lemma 3.A.8 that the indifference pricing
in such an incomplete market coincides with the equilibrium complete market pricing under auditing
possibilities, more precisely, there exists values of the auditing effort R such that the equilibrium
share price of the audited firm is the same as the firm’s utility indifference price.
The results in this Section are in line with the Coase theorem, where firms endogenously produce
demand for auditing in order to increase share prices and raise the investors’ value. The market
mechanism thereby produces welfare first-best auditing scheme. The result does not obtain in an
environment with debtholders, see Section 3.2.2.
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3.2.1 A multi-period model
In this section we consider a firm with demand for auditing and a risk averse representative investor
in a multi-period setting. The firm’s cash-flows follow an AR(1) process whose mean and variance
both decrease with increasing auditing effort as modelled in Section 3.2. The economic setting is
similar to Vayanos (1999) with few changes to fit the auditing behavior of the firm.
Representative investor
Activity takes place at discrete times t = 0, 1, . . .. There is one consumption good and two invest-
ment opportunities - a riskless one yielding a per-period return of δ and a risky investment in the
stocks p of the firm. The optimization problem of the representative investor is given by
max
{c(t),x(t)}t≥0
E
[
−
∞∑
t=0
βte−αc(t)
]
(3.7)
subject to the wealth and equity holdings’ dynamics
W (t) = (1 + δ)[W (t− 1)− c(t− 1)] + e(t− 1)X(t)− p(t)x(t− 1) (3.8)
e(t) = e(t− 1) + x(t− 1) (3.9)
where W (t) is wealth, c(t) consumption, e(t) stock holdings, x(t) demand for stocks, X(t) payoff
from holding stocks and p(t) firm’s stock prices, all at time t. The parameter β is the investor’s time
discount parameter and α the coefficient of risk aversion. The agent is endowed with M units of
consumption good at time 0.
The firm
We denote by X the cash flows to the firm. The investors observe a distorted version of X where the
overall economic environment adds a noise component to X . We assume that without any auditing
the cash flows perceived by the investors follow a dynamics
X(t) = ρX(t− 1) + S(t), (3.10)
where S(t) is a white noise process with mean µ and variance σ2I + σ2N . In the presence of auditing
the process S is still a white noise process but with mean µ(r) = µ − Cr and variance σ2(r) =
(1− ρ2)(σ2I +σ2N2−2r), see Appendix, Proposition 3.A.3. Auditing affects both the per-period mean
and standard deviation of firm’s cash flows as in the one-period model in Section 3.2. The cash
flows mean µ is decreased by the audit fees Cr and the per period variance is reduced to σ2(r). The
precise value of the variance reduction is given by the information theory. The firm sets per-period
auditing quality r so as to maximize the present value of the discounted future share prices p, i.e. it
maximizes
max
r≥0
E
[ ∞∑
s=1
γsp(s)
]
, (3.11)
The supply of firm’s stocks is constant and normalized to 1. It is a surprising result that per period
level of auditing effort r coincides with the one-period auditing level R but with changed cost and
risk aversion parameters. We can hence restrict the study of auditor’s compensation to the one period
case with multiple units.
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Proposition 3.2.3. Let the firm’s optimizatio function be given by (3.11) and let βρ > 1
2
, where β is
the investor’s time discount parameter and ρ is defined in (3.10). Then r∗(t) = r∗ is constant and
has the same structural form as R∗ in (3.4) with the following cost and risk-aversion parameters:
C1n =
ρ
2− ρC (3.12)
α1n = α
δ
1 + δ
2βρ− 1
βρ− 1
2(ρ− 1)
2− ρ (3.13)
A similar type of result is obtained if the optimization function of the firm is to maximize its
long-run average share price. These results are presented in the Appendix, Proposition 3.A.10. The
following relationship exists between the cost parameters:
C1n < C (3.14)
The relationship between α and α1n is not that simple and depends on the relationship between β and
ρ.
Ronen and Yaari (2007) on page xix identify earnings smoothing as one of the three most familiar
patterns of earnings management behavior. Lambert (1984) develops a rational principal-manager
model which includes earnings smoothing and implies the reduction in earnings volatility. This
result is in line with Proposition 3.2.3 where the shareholders require the same degree of auditing
effort per period thereby reducing the volatility of earnings to a constant amount.
3.2.2 Auditing in view of the debtholder-shareholder conflict
In this section we assume that the firm is financed with zero-coupon debt and equity and we answer
the following two questions. What auditing effort would debtholders (shareholders) choose in order
to maximize the value of debt (stocks)? How much are debt (stock) values increased if auditing is
accounted for?
We assume the setting3 of Leland and Toft (1996) where zero-coupon debt principal is P , its
maturity is normalized to 1 and the riskless interest rate to 0. The agent (debtholder or share-
holder) chooses the level of auditing effort R. By doing this, the firm’s initial asset value4 is re-
duced to A0 − c(R) and the firm’s volatility observed by outside investors to
(
σ2I + σN2
−R)1/2
, as
discussed in Section 3.2. The value of equity S(R) and debt D(R) under auditing are given in
the Appendix, equations (2.15) and (2.16) respectively. Debtholders (resp. shareholders) choose
the auditing effort RD (resp. RS) so as to maximize the value of debt (equity), i.e. {RD, RS} =
argmaxR≥0{D(R), S(R)}. Debt yields under the optimal auditing effort choice for debtholders are
YA. Debt yields under the lowest auditing effort are denoted by YNA. It is trivial to prove that
YA ≤ YNA, the reason being that YA is the yield that maximizes the debt value (2.16). Similarly, we
denote the firm’s stock price under the smallest audit effort by SNA. The maximal value of stock
prices when the auditing decision is with the stockholders is denoted by SA(RS) and by SA(RD) if
3Almost the same results are obtained in a Merton (1974) model. We present those results in the Appendix, Section
3.A.3.
4Under certain technical conditions, see Dixit and Pindyck (1994) or Proposition 1.2.1, the firm’s cash flows and
asset values are proportional and we can assume that the auditing costs affect both in equal amount.
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the decision is with the debtholders. The difference SA(RS)−SA(RD) is a measure of agency costs
originating from the decision about the auditing procedure.
Figure 3.3 shows the relationship between firm leverage L on the horizontal axis and debt yields
(left, Figure 3.3(a)) / stock prices (right, Figure 3.3(b)) on the vertical one. The optimal auditing
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Figure 3.3: The relationship between firm leverage L and debt yields Y (equity prices S) with auditing and under the
lowest audit regime. Model parameters are as follows: auditing costs C = 0.1, intrinsic cash flow volatility σI = 0.15,
noise level volatility σN = 0.3 and initial firm asset value A0 = 1.2.
effort R that the shareholders/debtholders require is different. Debtholders require most auditing
protection at intermediate leverage levels (Figure 3.3(a)) and much less for extremely low and high
leverage where the audit and non-audit curves almost coincide. Low leverage levels imply very
low debt riskiness and little if any auditing protection is needed. The situation is reversed in a high
leverage situation where debt riskiness is amplifyed by additional auditing costs. It follows from
the considerations above that the “total costs of auditing”, that is the sum of direct costs and the
costs of increased default probability, exhibit an inverted bell shaped form from the perspective of
debtholders. A very different picture emerges when we look at auditing effects on the shareholder
value, Figure 3.3(b). Curves depicting stock values with lowest auditing effort possible SNA and
with auditing chosen optimally by the shareholders SA(RS) almost coincide5. Without any restric-
tion on audit requirements the shareholders normally choose the lowest auditing level possible. If
the auditing is chosen optimally by the bondholders (lower line in Figure 3.3(b)) the share value
decreases and the shareholders are made worse off at every leverage level. Debt yield (stock price)
figures scale with different parameter values of C, σI , σN but the shape remains pretty stable. The
only cases when SA(RS) > SNA is for extremely small values of the intrinsic volatility parameter
(σI ≈ 3% as opposed to σI = 15% considered in Figure 3.3) and very small audit cost parameter
C and even for these cases the audited stock price SA(RS) is somewhat higher than SNA only for
5The parameter values can be chosen so that the stock value under auditing can be higher than when the lowest
auditing level is selected but the cost function has to be unrealistically orders of magnitude smaller than other parameters.
Even for those parameter values the auditing surplus is extremely small.
70 CHAPTER 3. FINANCIAL EFFECTS OF EXTERNAL AUDITING
certain leverage values L. We perform the robustness control for auditing cost function (which we
assumed linear in auditing effort CR as in Section 3.2) in the empirical section where a more general
cost function is assumed. The auditing effects in the Merton (1974) model mentioned above yield
almost exactly the same results and are presented in Appendix 3.A.3.
3.2.3 Strategic considerations regarding auditing
In the previous sections we assumed that both intrinsic and noise volatilities σI , σN are known, that
both the firm and the auditor agree on the extent of auditing and that there is only one auditor. In this
section we relax these assumptions and examine the auditing decision under these new conditions.
Varying the degree of bargaining power
We first address the issue of negotiating power, that is which party offers the contract. We distinguish
between two extreme cases. In the first one, the firm offers an auditing contract with specific auditing
quality (effort) level. A single auditor can then either accept or decline the contract. All other inputs
and models assumptions, such as investor’s preferences and parameters, are the same as in Section
3.2.
Proposition 3.2.4. Let R∗ be the first best auditing effort as defined in (3.4), Proposition 3.2.1. If
the firm offers the auditing contract and a single auditor can only accept or decline it, then the first
best auditing effort R∗ is accepted if and only if
log
ασ2N log 4
C
>
2Dσ2N
C
. (3.15)
If the condition (3.15) fails the audit contract is not accepted by the auditor.
In the second example, we consider two auditors, which simultaneously submit audit offers. The
firm then chooses the one closest to its optimal audit level. If both auditors submit the same auditing
offer, they share the auditing profits equally. The following proposition shows that in favorable
economic condition (specified precisely below) the first best auditing level is always achieved, i.e.
the same contract is proposed when the firm or the auditor(s) offer the contract. The difference
between the two cases emerges when the overall economic conditions are not sufficiently favorable.
Proposition 3.2.5. Let R∗ be the first best auditing effort as defined in (3.4), Proposition 3.2.1. If
two auditors simultaneously submit audit offers, than the optimal auditing effort is R∗ if and only if
log
ασ2N log 4
C
>
4Dσ2N
C
. (3.16)
If the condition (3.16) fails the audit contract is not accepted by the auditor.
Conditions (3.15) and (3.16) are the participation constraints on the auditor’s side. Results in Propo-
sitions 3.2.4 and 3.2.5 show that even though the auditor and the firm have different optimizing
functions only the first best contract from the firm’s perspective is always chosen. This is due to
the fact that the auditor’s profit function is increasing with audit effort R while the firm’s profits
are decreasing after a certain cutoff value of the auditing level. Even though the auditor’s profits
would increase after the first best auditing level, the firm rejects the auditing contract. In cases when
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auditing is beneficial for both parties, that is when conditions (3.15) and (3.16) are satisfied, the firm
maximizes its profit due to auditing and the auditor accepts it. The difference between the two cases
is what are the economic conditions that allow it. We analyze only condition (3.15), the other one
follows exactly the same reasoning. Not surprisingly, the audit contract is accepted if the coefficient
of risk aversion α is high enough. The decrease of cost parameter C has an ambiguous role. Its
decrease means lower auditing costs to the firm but at the same time lower profit to the auditor. As
C ց 0 the auditing becomes non-profitable for the auditor and as C ր ∞ the auditing becomes
unprofitable for the firm. It is the medium range of C values where the contract if profitable for
both parties. Economic noise σN has almost the exact opposite effect to C. In an environment
where economic noise is large the demand for auditing is high but the costs to the auditor are also
large. When the noise is small firms usually do not demand auditing. The auditor’s cost D act only
as a cut-off point. High D moves the auditing cut-off to the left while low values of D move the
cutoff audit level R to the right. The condition (3.16) is stricter than (3.15), that is the case when
the contract is offered by the auditors is accepted less often as when offered by the firm which is
due to the competition on the auditors’ side, i.e. the profits from auditing have to be shared among
the auditors which decreases the likelihood of a contract being accepted. Similarly to the case of
debtholder/shareholder conflict there exist room for welfare improvement due to limiting competi-
tion in the auditors’ market. This line of reasoning of course ignores many other frictions regarding
auditors, such as technological innovation in monitoring and gathering information, etc.
The case of unknown σN
In Section 3.2 we assumed that the noise variance parameter σN was known by both the firm and the
auditor perfectly. Here we relax this by imposing that only the firm, but not the auditor has perfect
knowledge about σ2N . We model this behavior in a framework of signalling games, see Fudenberg
and Tirole (1991), Chapter 3. There exist two players, the shareholders of the firm (called only the
firm), player 1 and the auditor, player 2. All variables in the remaining part of this section with index
1 and 2 refer respectively to the firm and the auditor. The game proceeds in the following fashion.
The firm proposes a contract of auditing effort level r to the auditor taking into account the auditor’s
uncertainty about σ2N . The auditor receives independently of the firm a signal S2 regarding σ2N and
decides whether to accept or decline the audit offer. If the auditor declines, it earns zero profit. If
the auditor accepts the auditing contract, it collects the audit fee and incurs a cost Dσ2N , as described
below equation (3.5) on page 65. The auditor’s response function s2(S2) therefore takes only values
in {Accept,Decline}.
The signal S2 of the auditor can come from a multitude of sources. The auditors usually audit a
large portfolio of firms and have knowledge of noise amount about the industry sector to which the
firm belongs. Furthermore, the auditors can compare firm share prices to those of other similar ones
and obtain more or less reliable information about the noise level. The firm on the other hand knows
σI (and therefore σN ) perfectly. The game matrix for this signalling game is given in Table 3.1. The
following proposition characterizes the actions of both the firm and the auditor in this setting.
Proposition 3.2.6. Let E(σ2N |S2) = S2. In the setting above the firm proposes a contract of auditing
level r∗ which maximizes
r∗ ∈ argmax
r
{
N(b′)(−Cr + ασ2N (1− 2−2r))
}
, (3.17)
where b′(r) = Cr
D
and N(x) = P(S2 ≤ x) is the distribution function of S2. The auditor’s decision
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Auditor
Accept Decline
Firm r (µ− Cr − ασ2I − ασ2N2−2r, Cr −Dσ2N )) (µ− ασ2I − ασ2N , 0)
Table 3.1: The game matrix for the signalling game between the firm and the auditor. The first entry in the parenthesis
is the payoff to the firm and the second to the auditor for both actions (Accept or Decline) of the auditor. The allowed
values for r ∈ R+.
s2 to accept the offer has a cutoff value b′(r) with signals S2 below b′(r) eliciting an acceptance of
the auditing procedure, i.e.
s∗2(S2) =
{
Accept S2 ≤ b′(r)
Decline S2 > b′(r)
The condition that E(σ2N |S2) = S2 is plausible in a normal setting, i.e. if (σ2N , S2) are jointly normal
and S2 is an unbiased statistic of σ2N . The decision of the auditor is driven by its profit meaning that
it accepts audit offers when the signal S2 about the noise level volatility σ2N compared to σ2N is low
enough, implying low enough costs of auditing. The conditions of this sort are very common in the
literature on global games and other games of imperfect information.
The comparison between the firm’s/auditor’s decision making in the complete and incomplete
information setting is presented in Table 3.2. The major difference for the auditor is the replacement
Complete information Incomplete information
Auditor’s cutoff point Dσ
2
N
C
DS2
C
Firm’s opimizing function −CR − ασ2N2−2R N(b′)(−Cr + ασ2N (1− 2−2r))
Table 3.2: The comparison of auditor’s cutoff point and firm’s optimization function in the complete and incomplete
information setting.
of the noise variance parameter σ2N in the complete information case with the signal S2 about σ2N
in the incomplete setting. Regarding the firm’s optimization function (Table 3.2, second row) we
observe that the complete information auditing costs C are lowered to CN(b′) in the incomplete in-
formation case and that the risk-aversion parameter α of the complete information setting is replaced
by αN(b′(r)). Since r enters non-linearly in the firm’s optimization function the direction of audit
effort change in comparison to the complete information case is ambiguous. We show in Proposition
3.A.12 in the Appendix that the incomplete information case converges to the complete information
case in Section 3.2 as the parameter uncertainty about the economic noise σ2N decreases to zero, i.e.
the firm’s objective functions (3.17) and (3.2) coincide.
3.3 A model of auditor’s revenues
We now apply the theory developed in Section 3.2 to the revenues of external auditors. We assume
a stylized one-period model where a firm is composed of n business units, each of which is a source
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of cash flows with varying riskiness as described in Section 3.2. Subsection 3.2.1 confirmed that
the analysis of a multi-period case is essentially the same as the one-period. Firm’s business units
proxy for both firm size as well as the number of audited firms by a single auditor. The firm has
the possibility to invest resources into auditing which reduces the overall cash flow volatility of each
individual business unit as perceived by outside investors.
There are two types of agents in the model - an external auditor, which we denote by a and n
individual firm business units. Each business unit i (i = 1, . . . , n) generates at the end of the period a
cash flowXi+Zi to the firm whereXi and Zi are independent,Xi ∼ N(µi, σ2Ii) andZi ∼ N(0, σ2Ni).
The firm has a choice of employing an external auditor. If it does so the auditing costs are Cr per
business unit and the volatility of the business unit is reduced from σ2Ii+σ2Ni to σ2Ii+σ2Ni2−2r
∗
. Firm’s
stock pricing is done the same way as in Section 3.2. We denote by v(A) the value of a certain subset
of firm’s business units (A subset of {1, . . . , n}) under the lowest auditing level scenario and v(a, A)
the value of these units under external auditing. The following relationships hold:
v(∅) = v(a) = 0
v(A) =
∑
i∈A
(
µi − ασ2Ii − ασ2Ni
) (3.18)
v(a, A) =
(∑
i∈A
(µi − Cr∗ − ασ2Ii)− α|A|
∏
i∈A
σ
2/|A|
Ni
22r∗
)
(3.19)
where the notation is the same as in Section 3.2. Since business units are assumed to be independent6
the value of a subset A of firm’s business units under the lowest auditing effort (3.18) is the sum of
individual business unit contributions to the total share price as in Section 3.2, equation (3.3). The
volatility of a set of business units when the auditor exerts an effort r∗ is reduced according to
Proposition 3.A.2, result (3.25) in Appendix 3.A.2). We use Shapley value as a solution concept to
determine the auditor’s revenues and the value added by the auditor to the firm with n business units.
Proposition 3.3.1. Under the assumptions stated above the auditor’s revenue ϕa of auditing a firm
with n business units described above is
ϕa = α
n− 1
n
n∑
i=1
σ2Ni − α
∑
S⊂{1,...,n}
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
s
∏
i∈S
σ
2/s
Ni
22r∗
− Cr∗n(H(n)− 1) (3.20)
where
r∗ =
1
2n
log
2n(log 2)α (
∏n
i=1 σ
2
Ni)
1/n
C
(3.21)
and H(n) is the n-th harmonic number. The total market firm capitalization is then
v(a, {1, . . . , n}) =
n∑
i=1
(µi − ασ2Ii)︸ ︷︷ ︸
T1
−α
∑
S⊂{1,...,n}
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
s
∏
i∈S
σ
2/s
Ni
22r∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
T2
− C
2
log
2n(log 2)α (
∏n
i=1 σ
2
Ni)
1/n
C︸ ︷︷ ︸
T3
(3.22)
6The independence assumption can be removed with significant mathematical difficulties but does not offer any new
economic insights. In the framework of correlated business units generating normally distributed cash flows, the firm’s
business units can be redefined so as to become independent.
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The equation (3.21) equates the marginal costs of auditing Cn(H(n)−1) with the marginal benefits
(second term in (3.20)). The marginal costs of a unit of auditing increases with the number of firm’s
business units almost linearly since limn→∞ H(n)n = 0 where the proportionality factor is the auditing
costs C. The marginal benefit of auditing is a decrease in overall firm’s volatility as indicated by
the second term of (3.20). The marginal benefits depend positively on the level of risk aversion
parameter α and in a non-linear fashion on the volatilities of firm’s business units. Equation (3.20)
reveals that the size of the auditor’s contribution to the firm value does not depend on the mean
production level µ of firm’s business units. The value of the firm under auditing (3.22) is the standard
valuation without economic noise (term T1 in 3.22), reduced by the now decreased noise volatility
T2 and the optimal cost of auditing T3.
3.4 Conclusions
This chapter develops a model of optimal auditing behavior when cash flows to the firm are observed
imperfectly by the outside investors. An external auditor’s report produces a verifiable signal and
reduces the observed cash flow volatility. Using the results in information theory we develop explicit
formulas for firm’s share price under auditing in the Gaussian-CARA framework in which the firm’s
auditing benefits have a call-option like structure with respect to the noise volatility and a put-option
like payoff with respect to the marginal audit costs. The multi-period model of auditing preserves the
one-period structural form of results for the optimal per-period auditing effort but with changed audit
costs and risk aversion parameters. The shareholders and debtholders in a firm disagree about the
optimal auditing effort which primarily shields debtholders. Under sufficiently favorable economic
conditions we obtain that the first best audit contract is offered irrespective of the bargaining power
between the auditor and the firm and the number of auditors competing for the same contract. The
auditor makes a cut-off decision with respect to the signal about economic noise when the noise
volatility is not observed perfectly. Finally we develop the auditing profits and firm values for a
multi-unit firm which lays ground for empirical testing.
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3.A Appendix
3.A.1 Basic results of Information Theory
Theorem 3.A.1 (adapted from Theorem 13.3.2 in Cover and Thomas (1991)). In a noisy Gaussian
channel where the input variable is distributed normally with mean zero and variance σ2, the size R
of the channel necessary to reduce the variance of the input to D is
R(D) =
{
1
2
log σ
2
D
0 < D ≤ σ2
0 D > σ2
(3.23)
We call R also the rate distortion parameter. Theorem 3.A.1 gives the size of the channel R if all
normally distributed random variables with varianceD or less are to be communicated without error.
By inverting (3.23) and solving for D we obtain that the normally distributed random variables with
variance D = σ22−2R can be communicated perfectly over the channel of size R.
The next result establishes the link between channel size and total variance reduction for nor-
mally distributed random vectors.
Theorem 3.A.2 (adapted from Theorem 13.3.3 in Cover and Thomas (1991)). In a noisy Gaussian
channel for a vectorX of dimension k of independently distributed random variables with variances
{σ2i }i=1,...,k respectively, the size of the channel necessary to reduce the total variance of the input
to D is
R(D) =
k∑
i=1
1
2
log
σ2i
Di
, (3.24)
where Di = min(λ, σ2i ) and
∑k
i=1Di = D.
In case when D < kmin{σ21 , . . . , σ2k} we have from (3.24) that
D = k
k∏
i=1
(
σ2i
e−2R(D)
)1/k
(3.25)
The last result concerns rate distortion of a sequence of random variables following an AR(1)
serially correlated process.
Proposition 3.A.3. Assume that R ≥ log(1 + ρ). The rate distortion of a Gauss-Markov source
process X(t) = ρX(t− 1) + S(t), where 0 < ρ < 1 and S is an i.i.d. Gaussian N(0, σ2) sequence
is given by
D(R) = (1− ρ2)σ22−2R.
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3.A.2 Proofs of Theorems
Proof. (of Proposition 3.2.1.) Since limR→∞ σ2(R) = σ2I and limR→0 c(R) = 0 we have that the
maximum is achieved either when R = 0 or in the interior of the positive real axis, when ∂p
∂R
= 0.
The first order condition for this is
∂p
∂R
= −C − ασ2N2−2R log(2−2)
which establishes (3.4). If R∗ > 0 then
∂2p
∂R2
= −ασ2N2−2R
∗
(
log
1
4
)2
< 0,
which guarantees that p(R∗) is indeed a maximum.
Proposition 3.A.4. In an economy of Section 3.2, the firm chooses auditing effort R∗ > 0 if and
only if there exists a positive solution to
c′(R) = ασ2N (log 4)2
−2R. (3.26)
The price of the shares is given by
p = µ− c(R∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
µ′
−α (σ2I − ασ2N2−2R∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(σ′)2
. (3.27)
The proof of Proposition 3.A.4 follows the same lines as that of Proposition 3.2.1 and will be omitted.
The following Proposition proves that the audit costs are linear (affine) provided that the costs of
the auditor are linear in its effort.
Proposition 3.A.5. Let the assumptions of Section 3.2 hold with the exception of the structural form
of c and let the unknown variable σN ∈ {σHN , σLN} be known to the auditor but unknown to the firm,
see the discussion in Section 3.2.3. Then the audit costs CH , CL connected to different levels of σN
are given by
CH = Dσ
H
NRH (3.28)
CL = Dσ
L
NRL +D(σ
H
N − σLN )RH . (3.29)
Proof. We formulate the firm’s contracting problem as
max
CH ,CL,RH ,RL
E
[
µ− Ci − α(σ2I + σi2N2−2Ri)
] (3.30)
subject to the auditor’s incentive compatibility constratints
CH −DσHNRH ≥ CL −DσHNRL (3.31)
CL −DσLNRL ≥ CH −DσLNRH (3.32)
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and participation constraints
CH −DσHNRH ≥ 0 (3.33)
CL −DσLNRL ≥ 0 (3.34)
It is easy to show that
CL −DσLNRL ≥ CH −DσLNRH ≥ CH −DσHNRH ≥ 0 (3.35)
where the middle inequality is inferred from the incentive compatibility constraint (3.51), the second
one since σHN ≥ σLN and the third one from the participation constraint (3.52). Therefore (3.52) holds
with equality and we arrive at (3.47). Using (3.47) in (3.51) we get that
CL −DσLNRL ≥ CH −DσLNRH = D(σHN − σLN )RH > 0
and therefore we can not have CL − DσLNRL = 0 but rather (3.48), an affine function of RL. It
therefore follows that the cost function is either linear or affine, not very differnt than the assumed
c(R).
Proposition 3.A.6. There exist independent random variables S and a standard normal random
variable Z such that X given by
X = µ− CS + Z
√
σ2I + σ
2
N2
−2S.
satisfies
E(X) = µ (3.36)
var(X) = σ2I + σ
2
N (3.37)
E(X|S) = µ− CS (3.38)
var(X|S) = σ2I + σ2N2−2S (3.39)
Proof. The results for the conditional mean and variance (3.38), (3.39) as well as the unconditional
mean (3.36) are obvious. It remains to calculate the conditional variance (3.37). For that purpose we
first compute:
E(X2) = µ2 + C2E(S2) + E(Z2(σ2I + σ
2
N2
−2S))
= µ2 + C2E(S2) + E(σ2I + σ
2
N2
−2S)
In order to obtain the desired result the following identity has to hold
C2
σ2N
E(S2) = 1− E(2−2S), (3.40)
subject to E(S) = 0. Let M be the moment generating function of S. We write the Taylor expansion
of M as
M(t) = 1 + v
t2
2
+O(t3),
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where v is the variance of S. For (3.40) to hold the following equation has to be satisfied
av = −(2 log 2)
2
2
v −O((−2 log 2)3),
where a = C2
σ2
N
and E(2−2S) = M(−2 log 2). The condition for the existence of solution to (3.40)
is that the Taylor series expansion of the moment generating function M of S from third term on
evaluated at −2 log 2 is positive: −O((−2 log 2)3) > 0. We prove in Proposition 3.A.7 that there
does not exist a normally distributed random variable S such that (3.40) holds except when S = 0
a.s.
Proposition 3.A.7. There does not exist a joint normal distribution (X,S) such that (3.40) holds.
The Proposition is equivalent to solving the equation
av = 1− e2v log2 2
where a = C
σ2
N
which has a solution only for v = 0, which implies that S = 0 a.s.
Proof. (of Lemma 3.2.2.) Let R ∼ N(0, σ2R) correlated with cash flows X ∼ N(µ, σ2I + σ2N) where
the correlation coefficient is ρ. The conditional distribution X|R ∼ N(µX|R, σ2X|R) where
µX|R = µ+R
ρ
√
σ2I + σ
2
N
σR
(3.41)
σ2X|R = (1− ρ)2(σ2I + σ2N ) (3.42)
But (3.42) is not consistent with the variance decrease given in (3.1) which implies that
σ2X|R = σ
2
I + σ
2
N2
−2R
or in other words that
ρ = 1−
√
σ2I + σ
2
N2
−2R
σ2I + σ
2
N
,
a function of R.
Lemma 3.A.8. Let the vector (X,Z)′ be distributed normally with mean (µ, 0)′ and variance-
covariance matrix
[
σ2I 0
0 σ2N
]
and let the equivalent measure changes be such that the vector
(X,Z)′ under the new measure is also distributed normally with mean (µ1, µ2)′ and variance-
covariance matrix
[
(σQI )
2 2ρσQI σ
Q
N
2ρσQI σ
Q
N (σ
Q
N )
2
]
. Then in order that the conditional distribution Z|X +Z
is the same under both measures the following must hold:
(σQN)
2 + ρσQNσ
Q
I
V
=
σ2N
σ2I + σ
2
N
:= A (3.43)
(1− ρ2)(σQN)2(σQI )2
V
=
σ2Iσ
2
N
σ2I + σ
2
N
=: AB (3.44)
µA = µ2 − (µ1 + µ2)(σ
Q
N)
2 + ρσQNσ
Q
I
V
(3.45)
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where V = (σQI )2 + (σ
Q
N)
2 + 2ρσQI σ
Q
N . The solution to (3.43)-(3.45) exists and the distribution of
X + Z under Q is normal with mean µ2 σ
2
N
+σ2
I
σ2
N
− µ and variance V .
Proof. The distribution of Z|X +Z under both measures is normal. It therefore suffices to compute
conditional mean and variance. Under P the following holds:
E(Z|(X + Z) = x) = (x− µ) σ
2
N
σ2I + σ
2
N
var(Z|(X + Z) = x) = σ2N −
σ4N
σ2I + σ
2
N
=
σ2Iσ
2
N
σ2I + σ
2
N
.
Under the equivalent measure Q the following relationships hold:
E(Z|(X + Z) = x) = µ2 + (x− µ1 − µ2)(σ
Q
N )
2 + ρσQNσ
Q
I
V
var(Z|(X + Z) = x) = (σQN)2 −
((σQN )
2 + ρσQNσ
Q
I )
2
V
=
(1− ρ2)(σQN)2(σQI )2
V
Matching the conditional moments under both measures we get the system (3.43)-(3.45).
We next prove that for all values of ρ ∈ (−1, 1) there exist µ1, µ2, σQI and σQN such that the
system (3.43)-(3.45) has a solution. Dividing (3.44) by (3.43) we get
(1− ρ2)σQN(σQI )2 −BρσQI −BσQN = 0,
which is a quadratic equation for σQI . In order for σ
Q
I to be positive we have to take the positive root
of the equation and we obtain
σQI =
Bρ+
√
B2ρ2 + 4(1− ρ2)B(σQN )2
2(1− ρ2)σQN
Inserting σQI into (3.43) we get that the following equation has to hold (x = σQN )
L(x) = R(x) (3.46)
L(x) = x2 + ρ
Bρ+
√
B2ρ2 + 4(1− ρ2)Bx2
2(1− ρ2)
R(x) = A(x2 + (σQI )
2(x) + 2ρxσQI ).
The equation (3.46) can not be solved explicitly, so we only show that the solution exist. We know
the following behavior of L and R:
lim
xց0
L(x) < ∞
lim
xր∞
L(x)
x2
= 1
lim
xց0
R(x) = ∞
lim
xր∞
R(x)
x2
= A < 1
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It follows that the system (3.46) always has a solution.
The mean of X + Z under the measure Q is according to (3.45) given by
µ1 + µ2 = −µ + µ2σ
2
I + σ
2
N
σ2N
.
The following Proposition proves that the audit costs are linear (affine) provided that the costs of
the auditor are linear in its effort.
Proposition 3.A.9. Let the assumptions of Section 3.2 hold with the exception of the structural form
of c and let the unknown variable σN ∈ {σHN , σLN} be known to the auditor but unknown to the firm,
see the discussion in Section 3.2.3. Then the audit costs CH , CL connected to different levels of σN
are given by
CH = Dσ
H
NRH (3.47)
CL = Dσ
L
NRL +D(σ
H
N − σLN )RH . (3.48)
Proof. We formulate the firm’s contracting problem as
max
CH ,CL,RH ,RL
E
[
µ− Ci − α(σ2I + σi2N2−2Ri)
] (3.49)
subject to the auditor’s incentive compatibility constratints
CH −DσHNRH ≥ CL −DσHNRL (3.50)
CL −DσLNRL ≥ CH −DσLNRH (3.51)
and participation constraints
CH −DσHNRH ≥ 0 (3.52)
CL −DσLNRL ≥ 0 (3.53)
It is easy to show that
CL −DσLNRL ≥ CH −DσLNRH ≥ CH −DσHNRH ≥ 0 (3.54)
where the middle inequality is inferred from the incentive compatibility constraint (3.51), the second
one since σHN ≥ σLN and the third one from the participation constraint (3.52). Therefore (3.52) holds
with equality and we arrive at (3.47). Using (3.47) in (3.51) we get that
CL −DσLNRL ≥ CH −DσLNRH = D(σHN − σLN )RH > 0
and therefore we can not have CL − DσLNRL = 0 but rather (3.48), an affine function of RL. It
therefore follows that the cost function is either linear or affine, not very differnt than the assumed
c(R).
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Proof. (of Proposition 3.2.3.) The proof and the problem setting follows Vayanos (1999) closely. Let
Ft = σ{S(1), . . . , S(t)} be σ-algebra generated by the white noise process S. We write E[·|Ft] =
Et[·]. We conjecture that the demand x(t) for the risky asset at time t is given by
x(t) = AX(t)− Bp(t) + Ce(t) +D (3.55)
with A, B, C and D constants and assume the following functional form for p
p(t) = aX(t) + ce(t) + d, (3.56)
with a, c and d constants. From (3.56) it follows that
p(t+ 1)− p(t) = a(X(t+ 1)−X(t)) + c(e(t+ 1)− e(t))
= a((ρ− 1)X(t) + S(t+ 1)) + cx(t).
Let V be the representative’s agent value function, i.e.
V (W,X, e, t) = max
{c(s),x(s)}s≥t
Et
[
−
∞∑
s=t
βse−αc(s)
]
subject to constraints (3.8)-(3.9). In line with Vayanos (1999) we conjecture that the value function
is given by
V (W,X, e, t) = − exp(−α(HX(t)e(t) + Fe(t)2 +GW (t) + L)) (3.57)
for some constants H , F , G and L. We proceed to compute Et[V (W,X, e, t + 1)]. We divide the
calculation into two parts:
Et[e
−αGW (t+1)] = e−αG(1+δ)(W (t)−c(t))Et
[
e−αGe(t)X(t+1)−αGp(t+1)x(t)
]
= e−αG((1+δ)[W (t)−c(t)]−e(t)ρX(t))Et
[
e−αG(x(t)(p(t)+a(ρ−1)X(t)+aS(t+1)+cx(t))+e(t)S(t+1))
]
= e−αG((1+δ)[W (t)−c(t)]−e(t)ρX(t)+x(t)(p(t)+a(ρ−1)X(t)+cx(t)))
Et
[
e−αG{ax(t)+e(t)}S(t+1)
]
and
Et
[
e−αHX(t+1)e(t+1)
]
= e−αHρX(t)e(t+1)Et[e−αHS(t+1)e(t+1)].
Putting all together we get
V (W,X, e, t) = Et [V (W,X, e, t+ 1)]
= − exp {−αG[(1 + δ)[W (t)− c(t)]− e(t)ρX(t)+
x(t)(p(t) + a(ρ− 1)X(t) + cx(t))]− αHρX(t)e(t+ 1)
+
1
2
(−αG(ax(t) + e(t))− αHe(t+ 1))2 σ2
−αµ(G(ax(t) + e(t)) +H(x(t) + e(t)))} . (3.58)
The Bellman equation for V can therefore be written as
V (W,X, e, t) = max
c(t),x(t)
{−e−αc(t) + βEt[V (W,X, e, t+ 1)]}
= max
c(t),x(t)
{−e−αc(t) + βV (W,X, e, t)} (3.59)
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Differentiating (3.58) with respect to x(t) gives us
0 = −αG[p(t) + a(1− ρ)X(t) + cx(t)]− αGcx(t)− αHρX(t)
+σ2α2(Ga+H)(G(ax(t) + e(t)) +H(e(t) + x(t)))
−αµ(Ga+H)
which can be rewritten as
L0p(t) + L1x(t) + L2e(t) + L3X(t) + L4 = 0, (3.60)
where the coefficients Li, i = 0, . . . , 4 are as follows:
L0 = −αG
L1 = −2αGc+ α2σ2(Ga+H)2
L2 = α
2σ2(Ga+H)(G+H)
L3 = −αGa(1− ρ)− αHρ
L4 = −αµ(Ga+H)
This confirms the structural form of prices (3.56).
Differentiating the expression in the maximum of equation (3.59) with respect to c(t) gives us
−αe−αc(t) + βαG(1 + δ)V (t) = 0
or differently
αc(t)− αG {(1 + δ)[W (t)− c(t)]− e(t)ρX(t) + x(t) [ce(t+ 1) + d+ aρX(t)]}
−αHρX(t)e(t+ 1) + 1
2
{−αG [ax(t) + e(t)]− αHe(t+ 1)}2 σ2
+ log(βG(1 + δ)) = 0 (3.61)
Putting together (3.57), (3.58), the Bellman equation (3.59) and (3.61) we get that
G =
δ
1 + δ
.
Using the envelope theorem with respect to X(t) in equation (3.59) we compute the fraction G
H
:
∂V
∂X
= V (W,X, e, t)(−αHe(t))
and
∂V
∂X
= V (αGρe(t)− αGa(ρ− 1)x(t)− αHρ(x(t) + e(t))).
Equating the terms at e(t) in the previous two equations we get
−αH = β(αGρ− αHρ)
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from where it follows that
G
H
= 1− 1
βρ
< 0. (3.62)
Since there is only a representative investor in the market, the equilibrium conditions require that
e(t) = 1 and x(t) = 0 for all t. Using the equilibrium conditions in (3.60) we obtain
p(t) = −L2 + L4
L0
− L3
L0
X(t). (3.63)
Matching expressions (3.56) and (3.63) we get the following relationship for a:
a = −L3
L0
=
αGa(1− ρ) + αHρ
−αG
= −a(1− ρ)− H
G
ρ
from where it follows that
a = − ρ
2− ρ
H
G
and taking into account the relationship (3.62) we get that
a =
ρ
2− ρ
βρ
1− βρ > 0.
The firms maximize the future discounted value of share prices, i.e. they choose per period
auditing investment r as to solve (3.11). For simplicity7 we assume that E(X(0)) = µ0 = µ− Cr∗.
From the recursive relation (3.10) for X(t) we get that E(X(t)) = (µ− Cr∗)1−ρt+1
1−ρ . Therefore
∞∑
s=1
E(γsp(s)) =
∞∑
s=1
γs
[
aE(X(s)) + c′(σ2(r∗))
]
=
a(µ− Cr∗)
1− ρ
∞∑
s=1
[γs(1− ρs)] + c′(σ2(r∗))
∞∑
s=1
γs
=
a(µ− Cr∗)
1− ρ
[
γ
1− γ −
ργ
1− γ
]
+
γ
1− γ c
′(σ2(r∗))
=
γ
1− γ
[
a(µ− Cr∗) + c′(σ2(r∗))] ,
where
c′(σ2(r∗)) = −L2 + L4
L0
= −α
2σ2(Ga +H)− αµ(Ga+H)
−αG
= ασ2
(
a+
H
G
)
(G+H)− µ
(
a +
H
G
)
.
7The general case is not much more difficult than this and it does not offer any significantly different economic
insights.
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We have
a +
H
G
=
βρ
1− βρ
2(ρ− 1)
2− ρ < 0
H +G = G
βρ
βρ− 1 +G
= G
2βρ− 1
βρ− 1
=
δ
1 + δ
2βρ− 1
βρ− 1 .
Putting everything together we can write
∞∑
s=1
E(γsp(s)) =
γ
1− γ
[
a(µ− Cr∗) +
(
a+
H
G
)
ασ2(r∗)(G+H)− µ
(
a+
H
G
)]
=
γ
1− γ
(
−H
G
)[
µ+ a
G
H
Cr∗ +
(
−G
H
)
ασ2(r∗)
(
a+
H
G
)
(G+H)
]
=
γ
1− γ
(
−H
G
)[
µ− Cnr∗ + αnσ2(r∗)
]
The optimization problem coincides with the one-period problem (3.3) where the new cost and risk
aversion parameters
Cn = −aG
H
C = − ρ
2− ρ
H
G
(
−G
H
)
C =
ρ
2− ρC
αn = α
(
−1− aG
H
)
(G+H)
= α
δ
1 + δ
2βρ− 1
βρ− 1
(
−1 + ρ
2− ρ
)
= α
δ
1 + δ
2βρ− 1
βρ− 1
2(ρ− 1)
2− ρ
The optimal per-period choice of r by the firm satisfies the same structural form as in the one-period
case with the cost and the risk aversion parameters changed as indicated above.
Proposition 3.A.10. Let the same conditions as in Proposition 3.2.3 hold with the exception that the
firm’s objective function is
max
r≥0
lim
t→∞
1
t
E
[
t∑
s=1
p(s)
]
. (3.64)
If ρ > 2/3 then the results of Proposition 3.2.3 still apply in this setting and the new per-period
auditing costs and risk aversion parameters are
Cn =
ρ
3ρ− 2C
αn =
2(1− ρ)2
3ρ− 2
δ
1 + δ
2βρ− 1
1− βρ α
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Proof. The only thing that differs in the proof of Proposition 3.2.3 from this setting is the firm
analysis. The firms maximize the long-run average of stock prices, i.e. they choose per period
auditing investment r as to solve (3.64). We assume as before that E(X(0)) = µ0 = µ − Cr∗. The
firm’s optimizing function therefore reads
lim
t→∞
1
t
t∑
s=1
E(p(s)) = lim
t→∞
1
t
t∑
s=1
[
aE(X(s)) + c′(σ2(r∗))
]
= lim
t→∞
1
t
(µ− Cr∗)
1− ρ
t∑
s=1
[
a(1− ρs+1)]+ c′(σ2(r∗))
=
a(µ− Cr∗)
1− ρ limt→∞
1
t
t∑
s=1
(1− ρs) + c′(σ2(r∗))
=
a(µ− Cr∗)
1− ρ limt→∞
(
1− ρ2 1− ρ
t
(1− ρ)t
)
+ c′(σ2(r∗))
=
a(µ− Cr∗)
1− ρ + c
′(σ2(r∗))
=
a
1− ρ
(
(µ− Cr∗) + 1− ρ
a
c′(σ2(r∗))
)
=
a
1− ρ
[
µ− Cr∗ + 1− ρ
a
(
ασ2(r)
{
a+
H
G
}
(G+H)− µ
(
a+
H
G
))]
=
a
1− ρ
[
µρ− µH
G
1− ρ
a
− Cr∗ + 1− ρ
a
α
{
a+
H
G
}
(G+H)σ2(r∗)
]
=
a
1− ρ
[
µ
3ρ− 2
ρ
− Cr∗ + 2(1− ρ)
2
ρ
δ
1 + δ
2βρ− 1
1− βρ ασ
2(r∗)
]
,
where we have used the following relationships
1− ρ
a
=
1− ρ
ρ
2−ρ
βρ
1−βρ
=
(1− ρ)(2− ρ)(1− βρ)
βρ2
H
G
1− ρ
a
=
(1− ρ)(2− ρ)
ρ
ρ− H
G
1− ρ
a
=
3ρ− 2
ρ
1− ρ
a
(
a+
H
G
)
(G+H) =
(1− ρ)(2− ρ)(1− βρ)
ρ2β
βρ
1− βρ
2(ρ− 1)
2− ρ
δ
1 + δ
2βρ− 1
βρ− 1
=
2(1− ρ)2
ρ
δ
1 + δ
2βρ− 1
1− βρ
Proof. (of relationship (3.14).) The first inequality follows from
ρ
2− ρ − 1 =
2(ρ− 1)
2− ρ < 0.
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To prove the second we write
ρ
3ρ− 2 − 1 =
2(1− ρ)
3ρ− 2 > 0
by assumption that ρ > 2/3.
Proof. (of Propositions 3.2.4 and 3.2.5.) We define the firm’s auditing profit function
l(R) = ασ2N(1− 2−2R)− CR, (3.65)
i.e. auditing is beneficial to the firm if l(R) > 0 and destructive of firm’s value otherwise. We also
define the firm’s zero-profit condition as the value R1 which solves the equation l(R1) = 0, see
equation (3.5). The auditor’s profit function is
m(R) = CR−Dσ2N .
Since the auditor’s profit function is increasing in R we have that m(R∗) > m(0) where R∗ is
defined in (3.4). The auditor accepts the offer if and only if
CR∗ > Dσ2N
or equivalently if (3.15) holds.
To prove part b) in the Proposition let R1 be the largest solution to l(R1) = 0. It is easy to prove
that l(R) < 0 for R > R1 and l(R) ≥ 0 for 0 ≤ R ≤ R1. If R1 = 0 then no audit contract is ever
accepted by the firm. Let us therefore assume that R1 > R∗ > 0, where R∗ is defined in (3.4). It is
also obvious that the auditing effort by both firms is the same since by deviating the firm can only
increase its chances of winning the contract. If both firms bid R > R∗ and 1
2
CR − Dσ2N > 0 then
both firms have the incentive to propose the auditing closer to R∗. The same happens when firms
start with R < R∗. The proposition follows.
Proof. (of Proposition 3.2.6.) We first solve the optimization problem of the auditor, i.e.
max
b′
E[(Cr −Dσ2N ) · 1(S2 ≤ b′)|S2] = 1(S2 ≤ b′)(Cr −DS2).
The maximum is obtained for b′ = Cr
D
.
We now proceed by solving the optimization problem of the firm, i.e.
max
r
E[(µ − Cr − ασ2I − ασ2N2−2r) · 1(S2 ≤ b′) + (µ− ασ2I − ασ2N ) · 1(S2 > b′)]
= (µ− Cr − ασ2I − ασ2N2−2r) P(S2 ≤ b′) + (µ− ασ2I − ασ2N ) P(S2 > b′)
= (µ− ασ2I − ασ2N) + P(S2 ≤ b′)(−Cr + ασ2N (1− 2−2r))
Proof. (of Proposition 3.3.1.) The relationship between arithmetic and geometric mean together
with relationships (3.18) and (3.19) confirm that v(A) + v(LI) ≤ v(A,LI), v(A,LI) + v(LJ) ≤
v(A,LI∪J), v(LI)+v(LJ) ≤ v(LI∪J), where I and J are disjunct subsets of {1, . . . , n}. This proves
the superadditivity of function v.
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We next compute the Shapley value of the auditor, i.e.
ϕA =
∑
S⊂{1,...,n}
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
(v(a, S)− v(S)).
Let
AD(S) = v(a, S)− v(S)
=
(
−C|S|r∗(|S|) + α
∑
i∈S
σ2Ni − α|S|
∏
i∈S
σ
2/|S|
Ni
22r∗
)
, (3.66)
where r∗ = R∗/n. Reinforcing the statement given at the beginning of this proof, we first show that
(3.66) is positive for r∗ = 0. By the inequality between arithmetic and geometric mean we have that
(s = |S|)
1
s
∑
i∈S
σ2i ≥
(∏
i∈S
σ2i
)1/s
,
where s = |S|. Therefore it is even more the case that
1
s
∑
i∈S
σ2i ≥
∏
i∈S
σ
2/s
i
22r∗
from where it follows that
∑
i∈S
σ2i − s
∏
i∈S
σ
2/s
i
22r∗
≥ 0.
In the following we use the facts that
∑
S⊂{1,...,n}
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
=
n∑
s=1
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
(
n
s
)
=
n∑
s=1
1
n− s =
n∑
s=1
1
s
= H(n)∑
S⊂{1,...,n}
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
s =
n∑
s=1
s
n− s
=
n∑
s=1
n− s
s
= nH(n)− n
= n(H(n)− 1),
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where H(n) is the n-th Harmonic number. Therefore
∑
S∈{1,...,n}
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
Csr∗ = Cr∗n(H(n)− 1)
∑
S⊂{1,...,n}
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
∑
i∈S
σ2Ni =
(
n∑
i=1
σ2Ni
)
n−1∑
s=0
(
n− 1
s
)
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
=
(
n∑
i=1
σ2Ni
)
n− 1
n
.
The expression (u = 1
22r∗ )
∑
S⊂{1,...,n}
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
s
∏
i∈S
σ
2/s
Ni
22r∗
=
∑
S⊂{1,...,n}
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
sus
∏
i∈S
σ
2/s
Ni
does not allow for analytical simplification. Putting all together gives us (3.20). Differentiating
(3.19) for S = {1, . . . , n} with respect to r gives us the condition for the optimal auditing effort r:
C = 2n log 2 2−2nrα
∏
i∈{1,...,n}
σ
2/n
Ni . (3.67)
Solving the equation (3.67) for r gives us (3.21). Inserting the r∗ in (3.19) for A = {1, . . . , n} gives
us the result in (3.22).
3.A.3 Merton’s model
We assume a one period model where the total firm value A(1) at the end of the period is distributed
log-normally (similar to the CARA-normal framework in Section 3.2), i.e. A1 = A0 exp(µ + σN),
where N is the standard normal random variable and A0 is the firm’s asset value at the beginning of
the period. Under the risk-neutral pricing measure8 the value of the company at the end of the period
is given by A1 = A0 exp
(−1
2
σ2 + σN
)
. The agent (debtholder or shareholder) chooses the level
of auditing effort R. By doing this, the initial value of the company is reduced to A0 − c(R) and
the economic noise volatility is reduced from σN to σN2−R, as discussed in Section 3.2. Company’s
liabilities are zero-coupon debt with principal P and equity. The value of debt and equity under
auditing is determined by arbitrage arguments, i.e.
D(R) = E(min(P,A1(R)))
= P P
(
(A0 − c(R)) exp
(
−1
2
σ2(R) + σ(R)N
)
> P
)
+
∫ yU (R)
−∞
(A0 − c(R)) exp
(
−1
2
σ2(R) + σ(R)y
)
n(y) dy
= PN(−yU(R)) + (A0 − c(R))N(yU(R)− σ(R)), (3.68)
8We assume as in the previous sections that the riskless interest rate is normalized to 0.
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where n,N are the probability density and distribution function of the standard normal random
variable and yU(R) = 1
σ(R)
(
log
(
P
A0−c(R)
)
+ 1
2
σ2(R)
)
. The value of the equity is then given by
S = A0 − c(R) − D. Debtholder (shareholder) choose the auditing effort RD (RS) in order to
maximize the value of debt (equity), i.e. {RD, RS} = argmaxR≥0{D(R), S(R)}. Debt yield (stock
prices) under auditing are denoted by YA (SA) and under the lowest audit regime as YNA (SNA). It
is trivial to prove that YA ≤ YNA, the reason being that YA is the yield that maximizes the debt value
(3.68).
3.A.4 Auditing game with incomplete information for both the auditor and
the firm
We next address the issue of external noise variance parameter σN . In Section 3.2 we assumed that
the parameter was known by both the firm and the auditor perfectly. Here we relax this restrictive
assumption. When employing an external auditor the shareholders do not know if the increase in
firm value comes from auditing procedure by reducing σ2N or through the reduction of the intrinsic
cash flow volatility σ2I , see (3.3). We model this behavior in a framework of signalling games, see
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), Chapter 3. There exist two players, the shareholders of the firm (called
only the firm), player 1 and the auditor, player 2. All variables in the remaining part of this section
with index 1 and 2 refer respectively to the firm and the auditor. The game proceeds in the following
fashion. First the firm receives a signal S1 about σ2N . The signal is unbiased. The firm then proposes
a contract of auditing effort level r = s1(S1) to the auditor. The auditor receives independently of
the shareholders a signal S2 regarding σ2N and decides whether to accept or decline the audit offer.
If the auditor declines, it earns zero profit. If the auditor accepts the auditing contract, it collects the
audit fee and incurs a cost Dσ2N . The auditor’s response function s2(S2) therefore takes only values
in {Accept,Decline}.
The signal S2 of the auditor can come from a multitude of sources. The auditors usually audit a
large portfolio of firms and have knowledge of the amount of noise in the industry sector that the firm
operates. Furthermore they can compare firm share prices to those of other similar ones and obtain
more or less reliable information about the noise level. The firm on the other hand does not know
σI (and therefore σN ) perfectly too. They can obtain a time series of its share prices and from it by
taking a long-run average infer the average value of σN . The remaining part of firm excess volatility
over its long-run average is attributed to economic noise. We refer to this as the firm’s signal S1.
The game matrix for this signalling game is given in Table 3.3. The following proposition char-
Auditor
Accept Decline
Firm r (µ− Cr − ασ2I − ασ2N2−2r, Cr −Dσ2N )) (µ− ασ2I − ασ2N , 0)
Table 3.3: The game matrix for the signalling game between the firm and the auditor. The first entry in the parenthesis
is the payoff to the firm and the second to the auditor for both actions (Accept or Decline) of the auditor. The allowed
values for r ∈ R+.
acterizes the actions of both players in this setting.
Proposition 3.A.11. Let E(σ2N |S1, S2) = aS1 + bS2 where a, b ≥ 0 and a + b = 1. In the setting
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above the firm proposes a contract of auditing level s∗1(S1) which minimizes
s∗1 ∈ argmin
s1
CN(−b′(s1))s1 + αaN(−b′(s1))S12−2s1
(
1 +
N(b′(s1))
N(−b′(s1))2
2s1
)
(3.69)
where b′(s1) = Cs1−DaS1(s1)Db and N(x) = P(S2 ≤ x). The auditor’s decision to accept the auditing
offer has a cutoff value b′(s1) with signals S2 below b′(s1) eliciting an acceptance of the auditing
procedure, i.e.
s∗2(S2) =
{
Accept S2 ≤ b′(s1)
Decline S2 > b′(s1)
Proof. Let the strategy of the firm be a function S1 7→ s1(S1), where S1 is the signal that the firm
receives about the noise component σ2N . The strategy of the auditor is a cutoff decision, i.e. accept
the auditing procedure if S2 < b(s1), and decline it otherwise. Given this strategy profile we first
analyze the decision of the auditor. The auditor maximizes
1(S2 < b(s1)) ·
(
Cs1 −DE(σ2N |s1, S2)
)
. (3.70)
Using the assumption E(σ2N |s1, S2) = E(σ2N |S1, S2) = aS1 + bS2 the auditor’s profit in the case
when the auditing contract is accepted is
Cs1 −DaS1 −DbS2,
and 0 otherwise. Hence, the auditing contract is accepted if and only if
S2 < b
′(s1).
We now analyze the contract setting by the firm which sets s1 so that it is a best response to the
auditor, i.e. it maximizes (minimizes)
s1(S1) ∈ argmax
s1
N(b′(s1))E(µ− ασ2I − ασ2N |S1)
+N(−b′(s1))E(µ− Cs1 − ασ2I − ασ2N2−2s1|S1),
∈ argmax
s1
−N(b′(s1))E(ασ2N |S1)− Cs1N(−b′(s1))−N(−b′(s1))E(ασ2N2−2s1 |S1)
∈ argmin
s1
N(b′(s1))αaS1 + Cs1N(−b′(s1)) +N(−b′(s1))α2−2s1aS1
with respect to s1 where we used the equality
E(σ2N |S1) = E(E(σ2N |S1, S2)|S1)
= E(aS1 + bS2|S1)
= aS1,
since the signals S1 and S2 are independent. Rearranging the terms we obtain (3.69).
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The condition that E(σ2N |S1, S2) is a linear function of S1 and S2 is a plausible condition in a normal
setting, i.e. if (σ2N , S1, S2) are all jointly normal. The decision of the auditor is a cutoff decision,
i.e. it accepts audit offers when the signal S2 about the noise level volatility σ2N compared to σ2N is
low enough implying low enough costs of auditing. The conditions of this sort are very common in
the literature on global games and other games of imperfect information. The cutoff value of R in
the complete information case is Dσ
2
N
C
with values of R < Dσ
2
N
C
eliciting a rejection of the auditing
procedure. In the incomplete information case this cutoff value is
DbS2 +DaS1(s1)
C
. (3.71)
Two similarities between the two cases are obvious. First the known value of σ2N in the complete
information case is replaced by the signal S2 about it. Secondly, the auditing costs D are replaced
by smaller costs Db which would imply that auditing is rejected less often. This is not the case due
to the second factor in the numerator of (3.71) which increases the cutoff value: Since the firm’s
optimal auditing contract effort level s1 is an increasing function of S1, so is the inverse function
S1(s1).
The decision of the firm is a more complicated function of its signal S1. The contract offered by
the firm in the incomplete information setting resembles the contract in the perfect information case
in equation (3.3) which we rewrite here in terms of a minimizing problem for coherence:
R ∈ argmax
R
−CR− ασ2N2−2R
∈ argmin
R
CR+ ασ2N2
−2R. (3.72)
Comparing optimal firm decisions (3.69) and (3.72) in the incomplete and complete information
setting we see that the signal S1 takes the place of the actual noise variance σ2N in the full information
setting. The auditing costs of the incomplete information game are virtually lowered - CN(−b′(s1))
instead of full auditing costs C - in comparison to the full information economy. If this was the only
change the demand for auditing in the this framework would be actually higher: lowered auditing
costs generally result in higher demand for auditing R. Unfortunately this is not the only change the
firm is concerned with. The risk-aversion parameter in the incomplete information setting (3.69) is
the complete information α multiplied by
aN(−b′(s1))
(
1 +
N(b′(s1))
N(−b′(s1))2
2s1
)
= a(N(−b′(s1)) +N(b′(s1))22s1).
Two forces are at work here. The parameter a ≤ 1. On the other hand the second factor in equation
above is in the normal setting (which is appropriate for the assumptions made above)
N(−b′(s1)) +N(b′(s1))22s1 ≥ 1,
since N(−b′(s1)) + N(b′(s1)) = 1 and 22s1 ≥ 1 (the auditing contract s1 ≥ 0). For a sufficiently
close to 1 we have that aN(−b′(s1))
(
1 + N(b
′(s1))
N(−b′(s1))
)
> 1. The incomplete information setting
resembles that of the incomplete information but with reduced marginal costs of auditing C and
increased level of risk aversion parameter α. We show in Proposition 3.A.12 in the Appendix the the
incomplete information case converges to the complete information in Section 3.2 as the parameter
uncertainty about the economic noise σ2N decreases to zero, i.e. the firm’s objective functions (3.69)
and (3.72) coincide.
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Proposition 3.A.12. If the parameter uncertainty about σ2N decreases to 0, that is E(σ2N |S1, S2) =
S1 and S1 → σ2N almost surely the firm’s decisions in the incomplete information case (3.69) and
the complete information case (3.72) coincide.
Proof. As a→ 1 we have that b→ 0. Therefore N(−b′(s1))) = P(S2 < b′(s1)) = P(S2 <∞) = 1
since limb→0 b′(s1) =∞. The result follows.
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